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In this respect, at least, the wary Lauenbourg, who was entrusted with a separate mission, conducted himself with greater judgment and delicacy. Without scaring the conscience, or piquing the pride of Salvius, he opened the conferences by the most dazzling offers; declaring, that the emperor was so desirous of restoring tranquillity to Europe, that he would no longer object to the cession of Pomerania, provided the transaction could be managed in such a manner, as to screen his character from the imputation of inconstancy. By way of Salvo, for the honour of the imperial crown, he suggested the following expedient; "that Sweden should consent to accept a pecuniary indemnification, but should require a sum so enormous, as to exceed the finances of Ferdinand; and that he, in

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\* Bougeant, xi. 68.



consequence, should offer Christina the occupation of Pomerania, till the debt should be liquidated, with the annexed condition of its being retained in perpetuity, under the title of an imperial fief, in case the money should not be forthcoming at the period stipulated for its payment.\*

No proposal could have been better calculated to captivate the Swedes, who might perhaps have become the dupes of Austrian duplicity, had not Salvius been induced, by some concomitant circumstances, to suspect the sincerity of the offer. The pretensions of Spain to a permanent establishment on the coasts of the Baltic, had been too openly manifested, for any person conversant with political affairs to entertain the smallest doubt of their existence. Even during the negotiation with Lauenburg, the court of Madrid was known to maintain a secret agent at Hamburg, who, under pretext of transacting commercial business, was entirely occupied with political intrigues, in concert with the Austrian minister.

The magistrates of Dantzic, equally interested in defeating a project, which, if carried into execution, could not fail to have given a fatal blow to their commerce, having penetrated the design, communicated the discovery to D'Avaux. These suspicions were confirmed by the sailing of a fleet from the Spanish ports, for the avowed purpose of invading Sweden, and establishing such an ascendancy in the Northern Seas, as would have secured a monopoly of the entire trade enjoyed by the members of the Hanseatic confederacy. Fortunately, however, the chimerical projects of Olivares

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\* Bougeant, i. 344.

were defeated by the valour of the Dutch admiral, Van Tromp, who, with an inferior squadron, intercepted this formidable armament, and after destroying and, taking a great number of ships, compelled the rest to return in a shattered condition.\*

These circumstances very naturally led Salvius to question the professions of Austria, and to suspect them of having been made at the instigation of Olivares, as the most probable method of realizing his ambitious designs. Nothing certainly could have been easier than for Spain to have come forward to the assistance of Austria, at the period appointed for the liquidation of the debt, and to have received from the emperor the Duchy of Pomerania, upon the same conditions that it was to have been given to Sweden.†

Disappointed, perhaps, but no wise discouraged, by the spirited rejection of Salvius, the court of Vienna renewed the attack in a different quarter. "Every thing concurred to prove," says Laboureur, "that Banner was desirous of terminating his glorious career by restoring tranquillity to Europe."‡ His wife, whom he loved with the tenderest affection, is supposed to have exerted all her influence in favour of peace, at the express desire of her relation, the Count of Schlitt, who occupied a distinguished place in the administration of Bohemia. With the voice of conjugal tenderness the impulse of ambition united. Dazzled by the prospect of obtaining the Duchy of Glogau, together with the dignity of a prince of the empire, the Swedish general mani-

\* 1640. *Le Vassor*, xv. 236.

† Bougeant, i. 346.

‡ *Histoire du Marechal Gueblian*, iv. 1.

fested a strong inclination to second the pacific intention of Ferdinand.\*

This delicate business is said to have been transacted by means of a physician, sent from Prague, by Schlitt, under pretence of attending the Countess of Banner, then seriously indisposed; and it is further asserted, that his proposals proved so agreeable to the marshal, that he no longer made a secret of his intentions. Beauregard, who was attached to the Swedish army, lost no time in communicating this alarming intelligence to D'Avaux, who immediately addressed a spirited remonstrance to the Swedish ministers, upbraiding them in terms of bitter indignation with this breach of national faith, in case Banner was acting by their directions; but, supposing him unauthorized by their approbation, he desired that instant orders might be dispatched for the purpose of stopping all further proceedings. This manly behaviour on the part of the ambassador was attended with the happiest results, as it prevented Banner from receiving the powers which he earnestly demanded for pursuing the treaty, notwithstanding his request was supported by the powerful interest of his brother-in-law, who was a member of the council of regency.†

\* *Histoire du Mareschal Guebriant*, iv. 1.

† *Hist. de Guebriant*, iv. 1.

Puffendorf gives a very different account of this transaction; but it evidently was his wish to exculpate a general, whom he deservedly admired, from the disgrace of having listened with too great facility to the insidious offers of an enemy. Notwithstanding the high respect which I must ever entertain for the judgment and veracity of the Swedish historian, I have preferred the authority of a writer, who derived his information from authentic documents, collected by a man of uncommon sagacity, the friend and companion of Banner. Puffendorf, indeed, admits that the general's application for official authority to treat, occasioned violent debates in the senate, before it was negatived by a majority of votes;



Richelieu had long assumed to himself considerable merit, because Louis had been prevented, by his zeal for religion, from recurring to means which had been employed by his predecessors with signal advantage, notwithstanding he was at war with a power, whose eastern frontier came in contact with the Ottoman empire. No temporal interests, he had triumphantly boasted, should ever induce him to deviate from a principle, the infraction of which must produce incalculable mischief to Europe, and might even endanger the stability of the Christian republic. The event, however, shewed that the cardinal's scruples were far from being of that inveterate kind, which are proof against every temptation.

Amurat IV. after his return from the Persian war, is reported to have made a solemn vow, that, in the event of his recovery from a dangerous malady, the fruit of intemperance, he would lead his warlike bands into the heart of Europe, and compel all the nations, which he expected to subdue, to embrace the religion of Mahomet. This determination having been communicated to the Venetian senate, those wary politicians, with commendable prudence, made haste to terminate all their differences with the Porte; because they knew from experience that the Christian powers, though

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an event, in great measure, owing to the influence of Salvius, indignant that a soldier should presume to meddle with diplomatic affairs, and attempt to deprive him of the glory to which he aspired as the pacificator of Europe. In the violence of his animosity, he is reported to have propagated the most invidious reports, in order to blacken his rival's reputation, and even to have represented his ambition as sufficiently extravagant to indulge in those chimerical projects, which, with far greater propriety, had formerly been imputed to Wallenstein, xi. 70. Laboureur Hist. de Guebriant. Bougeant, i. 306.

always profuse in professions and promises, were not equally punctual in the performance. This reconciliation was in great measure due to the influence of France, whose episcopal minister would certainly have preferred, that the sultan should accomplish his promise by the invasion of Hungary, rather than by attacking the mistress of the Adriatic.\*

"There are many things which may be done, but which ought not to be talked of," said D'Avaux significantly to the Transilvanian envoy, when the latter required, as a preliminary to actual hostilities, that Louis should obtain permission from Amurat for Ragotzi to enter into a war with Austria. His Christian majesty's conscience, if ever tormented by serious scruples, was so easily calmed, that he openly attempted to persuade the Turks, that it was ridiculous in them to be more delicate than himself respecting the observance of treaties.†

The real object of Ragotzi, in commencing a negotiation with the Parisian court, has never been clearly ascertained; because fraud and duplicity were so interwoven in his character, that, even when he meant to act with integrity, his actions were dark and mysterious. That he may have been sincere in his professions of wishing to procure more extensive privileges for the Hungarian protestants, is far from impossible; but this undertaking, like every other article in his profligate code, was subject to the condition, that he could not obtain superior advantages by pursuing an opposite course.

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\* Le Vassor, xv. 214. Siri. Mem. Recond. viii. 680.

† Le Vassor, 216.

As Richelieu was perfectly acquainted with his mercenary disposition, he probably attached very little importance to the promise; but merely intended to avail himself of the waivode's services, whenever he might be able to command them; and he accordingly consented to advance a stipulated sum, upon conditions that the Transilvanian should enter Hungary in hostile array; and further covenanted for the payment of an annual pension during the life of Ragotzi, in case the contest should terminate unprosperously.

This convention, however, was never attended with the advantages which it was expected to produce, because the Dutch refused to contribute to the undertaking, in spite of the efforts of Richelieu. While this question was agitating with reciprocal violence, the death of Amurat produced a total revolution in Ottoman politics; and, as Ragotzi could no longer expect assistance from the Turks, he prudently declined engaging in a contest, from which neither honour nor profit could result.\*

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\* Le Vassor, 217. Puffendorf, xi. 80. xii. 66.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

The miserable condition of the Swedish army compels Banner to retire into Thuringia, where, being joined by the Weimerians, he offers battle to the imperialists. Unable to procure supplies from his protestant allies, he threatens to abandon them to the mercy of the emperor, and even commences his march towards Silesia.—The Duke of Longueville, being compelled by illness to quit the army, resigns the command to Guebriant.—Excessive grief of Banner for the loss of his wife effaced, on a sudden, by a new attachment.—He marries a princess of Baden; forms a scheme for surprizing the diet at Ratisbonne, and is assisted by Guebriant in carrying it into execution.—Causes which induced the emperor to assemble a diet.—Rapid decline of the Spanish power.—Revolt of the Catalans, and loss of Portugal.—Proceedings of the diet, and danger to which the members are exposed.—The French separate from the Swedes; fatal consequences resulting from it.—Death and character of Banner.—Insubordination of the German troops; they threaten to quit the Swedish standard; means employed to appease the revolt.—The Duke of Brunswick dies.—The imperialists defeated at Wolfenbüttele.—Secret negociations at Ham-burgh, between Salvins and Lutzau, for a separate peace. Spirited behaviour of D'Avaux upon that occasion.—Wise conduct of the Swedish government in renewing the alliance with France.

UNABLE to support himself for any length of time in a country so exhausted as Misnia, and pressed on every side by the activity of an enemy, not only superior in numerical strength, but more abundantly provided with every necessary of life, Banner prudently retired into Thuringia; and, having selected an unassailable position near Erpert, employed himself assiduously, during an inclement winter, in making preparations for the ensuing campaign, by recruiting his forces, re-establishing discipline, and augmenting the number of

his allies. We should be grossly deceived, were we to estimate the difficulties with which he had to contend, according to the scale of modern resources; when the science of taxation has been carried to an extent, which, at the period I am describing, would have appeared as chimerical as an attempt to transmute stone or iron into gold.

During "the thirty years' war" a generation had arisen totally unacquainted with the blessings of peace, who may probably have regarded contention when decorated with the pompous appellation of glory, as the natural occupation of man. To them plunder appeared not only the easiest mode of acquiring wealth, but the most conformable to human institutions. Accustomed from their infancy to consider bloodshed in the light of a profitable traffic, they became no less insensible to the impulse of honour than deaf to the voice of humanity. To all political attachments they were equally strangers. The country which afforded the fairest prospect of plunder, or offered the largest stipend, they readily adopted as their own; uninfluenced by any of those exalted feelings, which induce the members of civilized society to sacrifice their lives and fortunes in defence of the government under which they partake the comforts of social enjoyment. Ferocity is not the soil in which discipline is accustomed to flourish. To keep robbers and assassins in any tolerable order is an undertaking of infinite difficulty; because severity, the only instrument that can be employed with effect, tends directly to aggravate the evil, by adding desertion to every other excess. Frequently, unable either to feed or pay the soldiers, Banner was reduced to the painful alternative of conniving at the commission of every

crime which lust or rapacity can inspire, or of seeing himself abandoned by all except the native troops, which, at the time of his death, are supposed not to have exceeded a thousand combatants. The caprice and insincerity of those who called themselves his allies, were also productive of constant disappointments; because, though profuse in promises in the hour of prosperity, and even apparently zealous in the cause, the tide of fortune no sooner changed than they veered with the fluctuating current.\*

This last consideration determined the Swedish general to recur for assistance to Longueville, who commanded the Weimerian army. But that fine corps, which, under the direction of its illustrious chief, had justly acquired immortal renown, was no longer in a condition to inspire terror. The talents of the Duke of Longueville, when compared with that of his gallant precursor, were little calculated to attract admiration; neither was his authority sufficient to stifle the jealousies which prevailed among the different generals, or even to maintain a proper degree of subordination. Indeed, to such an extent was this evil diffused, that the officers agreed in no point whatever, except in contempt for their present commander. Under pretence that the French had failed to accomplish various articles of the convention concluded at Brissac, the directors assumed an independent jurisdiction over the German regiments, and even publicly threatened to unite with Banner, who was strongly suspected of having encouraged this refractory

spirit by the offer of more advantageous conditions.\*

The danger attending these secret practices rendered Longueville more cautious with respect to his conduct, than was agreeable to his generous nature. Yet much as he dreaded the consequences likely to ensue from uniting his forces with those of Banner, he was fearful of offending that haughty commander, by neglecting to comply with his request: for he felt himself unable to keep the field, if singly opposed to the imperialists, having recently sustained a considerable loss from the skill and activity of the Bavarian General Mercy.

The junction of the French with the Swedish army was more important with respect to the sudden change it produced in the fluctuating politics of Germany, than on account of the augmentation of numbers. Secure in the protection of a powerful ally, the Duke of Brunswick once more attempted to assert his independence; and, as a convincing proof that he was sincere in his professions, he sent four thousand auxiliaries to Banner. His example was followed by Amelia Elizabeth, who, alarmed at the progress of the imperial arms, had been remiss in fulfilling her engagements.†

Finding himself at the head of a numerous army, and eager to recover his superiority, the Swedish commander advanced with a determination of giving battle to the Austrians, encamped in the vicinity of Saalfeld. All his endeavours, however, to bring on an engagement, having been frustrated by the caution of Piccolomini, he was reluctantly forced by want of provisions to seek more plentiful quar-

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\* *Histoire de Guebriant*, v. Puffendorf, xi. 55. † *Ibid.* xii. 8. Galetti, 509.

ters in Hessa. Elated with the disastrous triumph of beholding the enemy first obliged to retire, the Austrian commander broke up his camp, after sustaining a severer loss from the devastations of famine, than might even have been occasioned by defeat. Directing his movements by those of the allies, he encamped in the territory of Fulda, from whence, watching the Swedes with unremitting attention, he kept them continually in alarm.\* After having maintained his position for several weeks, the total exhaustion of the surrounding country again imposed the necessity of a removal, and even compelled him to separate from the Bavarians. No sooner was it known in the Swedish camp, that the enemy had retired in different directions, than Banner attempted to cut off the latter; but, notwithstanding the plan was conducted with consummate ability, it was frustrated by the vigilance of Mercy.†

The jealousy of command is among the fatal evils attending a coalition, as Banner experienced to his constant disquietude. In deference to the dignity of a royal crown, both Brunswick and Hessa professed to bow to the superior authority of Sweden; yet when the moment arrived for active service, they insisted that their troops should be left entirely at the disposal of their national leaders; and even pretended, that no enterprise should be undertaken without the knowledge and approbation of the other generals, who, to the total frustration of all those splendid achievements, which depend upon the intuition of superior genius, were to be previously consulted for that purpose.

Though the capricious vanity of the Duke of

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\* Puffendorf.

† 1640. Schiller, vi.



Brunswick proved an almost constant source of disappointment, it was from the venal and intriguing character of Melander that the most serious obstacles arose. Secretly devoted to the imperial court, he omitted no opportunity of disconcerting the plans of Banner, either by avowed opposition in the council of war; or, when his opinion was overruled by an uncorrupted majority, by his treacherous behaviour in the field. The eyes of Amelia, however, being at length opened by the remonstrance of Salvius and D'Avaux, Melander, as we mentioned in the preceding chapter, was deprived of all his appointments.

The change of commanders was, however, attended with no material benefit to Sweden, because the influence of France preponderated so decidedly at the court of Cassel, that while Longueville was provided with every necessary, the remonstrances of Banner were hardly able to procure the most scanty supplies: neither were his applications to the Duke of Brunswick, though repeatedly urged in the most forcible language, attended with better success. Instead of meeting with the assistance which his situation required, and which his services entitled him to expect, his demands were eluded upon the fallacious pretext, that the resources of both countries were so thoroughly exhausted, as to be no longer sufficient even for domestic consumption: and when he attempted to expostulate upon the want of generosity with which he was treated, he was answered with proposals no less petulant than impracticable, for a total change in the whole military system.\* Convinced from re-

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\* Puffendorf, xii. 15.

peated trials that nothing could be effected by prayers or expostulations, Bannér resolved either to obtain the assistance of which he stood in need, or to abandon to the fury of an implacable foe, allies grown indifferent to every feeling, except that of personal interest. And he accordingly declared, that unless some effectual steps were immediately taken for the relief of the soldiers, he should be reduced to the necessity of evacuating Saxony, and endeavouring to find more comfortable quarters in Silesia. This menace was followed by the most active preparations for carrying it into immediate execution.

Terrified at the prospect of being abandoned to the resentment of an enemy, whom they had irreparably offended, the Landgravine, and the Duke of Brunswick implored him to suspend his intended march, faithfully promising, if he would not deprive them of his powerful protection, to obviate in future every cause of complaint. Having thus extorted reinforcements as well as provisions, Bannér advanced with the resolution of giving battle to the imperialists, who occupied a strong position at Fritzlar; but his sagacious antagonist, adhering with firmness to the Fabian tactics, which he had hitherto pursued, it became a contest of suffering, and not of courage.

A dangerous malady, which soon conducted him to an untimely grave, having obliged the Duke of Longueville to retire from the fatigues of an active campaign, the command of the army devolved on Guebriant, who, though endowed with abilities of a much higher order, still wanted authority to enforce obedience in an army, almost entirely destitute of food, and still more deficient in discipline.

However great the activity and talents of Piccolomini, it was nevertheless generally believed, that the facility with which the imperial army effected its retreat, was full as much owing to the negligence of Banner, as to the indefatigable exertions of its gallant commander. The imputation of neglect, when coupled with the name of a man, whose character is distinguished by the very opposite quality, requires further illustration.

In a former chapter we were led, by the chain of events, to mention the attachment of the Swedish general for his amiable wife; who, by a strong understanding and fascinating accomplishments, had acquired such an ascendancy over his turbulent spirit, as enabled her to keep the violence of his temper within the bounds of discretion, as well as to prevent him from giving way, with disgraceful excess, to a taste for intemperance and dissolute pleasures. After her death, which occurred during the campaign of 1640, his intellects appeared in some degree disordered; a misfortune, of which he was himself so sensible, that he declared to Beauregard, the French resident, "that the affliction with which it had pleased Providence to visit him, had bereft him of all mental exertion." This opinion, which was at first imputed to immoderate grief, was found in the sequel to rest on more solid foundations than those of plaintive affliction; since, during the few months which he survived the tender companion of his youth, his character assumed a totally different aspect. No longer attentive to the motions of the enemy, he beheld reinforcements arrive from Bohemia and Hungary, without ever attempting to intercept them. Of the intrigues of the Duke of Brunswick, unquestionably engaged in a clandes-

tine correspondence with the imperial court, he heard with equal insensibility. Even the prospect of glory was no longer viewed with enthusiasm ; so that it was in vain for Guebriant to point out opportunities for acquiring additional laurels, and to prove the facility of the enterprize by unanswerable arguments. Banner was obstinate, and evaded the proposal upon pretexts the most frivolous and unfounded.

Had this sudden transition from ardour to sloth resulted solely from the torpor of a mind oppressed, and lacerated by domestic misfortune, though we might possibly have blamed him for yielding to affliction with too much facility, our censure must have been tempered with sympathy. But compassion gives place to very different sentiments, when we learn that his grief was no less short than excessive ; and that, as he conducted the body of his lamented consort to be interred at Erfurt, he accidentally saw the young and beautiful Princess of Baden, and became so enamoured in a moment, that every occupation, however important, was made subservient to this ridiculous passion. No dangers could deter him from daily repairing to the castle of Arolt, where this German Circe resided ; and he even sometimes ventured to pass almost within sight of the Austrian outposts, accompanied by a slender escort. The infatuation, which prompted him to expose his person with culpable temerity, was not confined to these amorous visits, but was equally discernible in every action of his life ; for, when he returned to the camp, it was not to provide for the subsistence of the soldiers, but to pass the day in intemperate mirth with some of his favourites, with whom he celebrated the charms of

this incomparable beauty. Upon obtaining the margrave's consent for the celebration of his marriage, he gave a magnificent entertainment to the whole army, attended with discharges of artillery, which continued so long, that the neighbouring country was thrown into consternation, and, no longer doubting that a general action was taking place, all the churches were thronged, even those of Cassel, with pious votaries, offering up their petitions to the God of hosts, for the success of the protestant cause.\*

But, though in a heart like that of this illustrious Swede, it is possible for pleasure to silence for a while the voice of ambition, it can never wholly extinguish its influence. No sooner had he obtained his mistress's hand, than, as if ashamed of the part he had so lately acted, he endeavoured to efface the transient stain by fresh and more brilliant achievements; but still it must be confessed by his warmest admirers, that notwithstanding the torch of genius occasionally blazed, it never regained that steady lustre which brightened its early career.

Though morally secure of the co-operations of the French, whose views and interests were too closely identified with those of Sweden, to admit of their acting with duplicity, various events had occurred, which tended to excite a serious alarm, respecting the conduct of the other allies. The actions of the Duke of Brunswick too clearly proved that he was more frequently guided by the momentary impulse of vanity and caprice, than by any regular system of policy. Every fluctuation in the fortune of Sweden occasioned a variation equally sudden in his politi-

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\* Histoire de Götterb., iv.

cal conduct; as the temporalities of Hildesheim had given rise to his hostility towards the imperial court, it was easy to foresee that his resentment would abate, the moment he was gratified in that particular. Neither was the behaviour of the landgravine, though she had hitherto displayed exalted patriotism, at this time exempt from suspicion. Disappointed in the hope of beholding her dominions exempt from the calamities of war, she had, without the knowledge of all except her secret advisers, again entered into a negotiation with the emperor; and would willingly have accepted the terms she so lately refused, had Ferdinand been disposed to accord them. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Banner to place any confidence in the professions of either; particularly when he heard from every quarter, that the Austrian commanders publicly boasted, that it was no longer practicable for him to escape.

Whatever, in reality, may have been the foundation upon which this delusive expectation reposed, it is certain that the confidence with which they spoke of their approaching success, was calculated to produce a powerful sensation among the timid politicians of Germany; and particularly in those courts, whose superannuated ministers were greater adepts in judicial astrology, and the hair-breadth distinctions of scholastic theology, than in the useful tenets of enlightened philosophy, or the manly science of arms.

Few men were ever destined to struggle against severer difficulties than Banner; but, however urgent the distress to which they exposed him, or splendid the talents which they enabled him to display, the narrative becomes dull and disgusting,

particularly as it must prove little more than a repetition of those affecting scenes, we have been so repeatedly called upon to illustrate.

The pride or impolicy of the Austrian cabinet having neglected to avail itself of the Duke of Brunswick's inconstancy, he again renewed his connexion with Sweden, and in token of his reconciliation invited Banner to a splendid entertainment at Hildesheim; which, on account of the fatal consequences with which it was supposed to have been attended, has become memorable in the annals of Germany. According to the prevailing prejudices of the age, it was hardly possible for any person, illustrious from the casual distinctions of birth, or the more splendid endowments of genius, to terminate his existence by a natural course; and it is but fair to acknowledge, that the suspicions entertained of sinister means being frequently employed to hasten the end of a formidable enemy, are not so entirely destitute of foundation, as it may appear to us, who are accustomed to estimate the actions of men according to a purer scale of morality.

Without, however, stopping to ascertain the exact degree of probability, which attaches to the heinous accusation, we shall content ourselves at present with narrating facts, as they are presented by the German historians. By many of these whose probability is unquestioned it is gravely asserted, that poisoned wine was introduced during the repast by a French monk, and that the landgrave Christian of Hesse, and the Count of Schomberg, who drank more freely than their companions, expired in the course of the following night; but that Banner and the Duke of Brunswick, who are supposed to have been the destined victims, having been more temperate than

usual, the operation of the poison was not so immediate; and, though it irrecoverably injured the constitutions of both, it did not immediately conduct them to the grave.\*

Soon after the imperialists had quitted Fritzlas, Piccolomini took advantage of the supineness of his antagonist to attempt to establish himself in the Duchy of Brunswick; but Banner, having recovered from his disgraceful torpor, and united with Guebriant, appeared on the banks of the Weser to oppose his passage, and thus compelled him to relinquish the undertaking. From subsequent movements the hostile armies, for the fourth time in the course of a single campaign, appeared in presence of each other, without coming to a general engagement. Yet the caution of the leaders was far from being attended with its usual results. The want of wholesome food; combining with the fatigues to which they were exposed during long and painful marches, had reduced many of the regiments to perfect skeletons; so that both armies, at the conclusion of a bloodless campaign, were almost as much in need of recruits, as if the summer had been past in constant encounters.† It must, however, be acknowledged, that the result of it proved ex-

\* 1640. Galleti, l. 517. Cæterum eo tempore multus de convivio Hildesiano rumor erat, convivatori æque ac hospitibus exitioso, quo utrisque malefica arte medicatum vinum opera cujusdam monachi Galliei propinatum fuerat, catholicis gaudium male dissimulantibus. De quo scelere, etsi nobis parum distincte compertum, eventus tamen rumorem non vanum fuisse arguit. Nam Christianus Hassiæ langravius et Schaumbergius comes largius hausto liquore mox extincti sunt; dux Georgius, et Bannerius, qui præcipue petebantur, parciori potione, exitium ad proximum ver distulere.—I give the exact words of Puffendorf, in order that the reader may form his own opinion. xii. 24.

† Histoire de Guebriant, iv.



tremely creditable to the military talents of Piccolomini, who enjoyed the honour of having driven the enemy entirely out of Bohemia, and compelled him to confine his operations exclusively to the defence of the territories of his allies.

The joy occasioned at Vienna by this success, was however greatly damped by the ill fortune of Spain, now rapidly hastening to her decline. Her navy had been crippled by repeated defeats. Arras, perhaps the most valuable of all her frontier possessions, had been lost by the mismanagement of Olivares; whose ambitious projects for extending her dominion over the north of Italy, had been rendered abortive by the secession of the princes of Piedmont, whom prudence or fear had, at length, tempted to submit to the predominating power of France. This sagacious determination, by depriving Leganes of any plausible pretext for interfering in the internal politics of the court of Turin, wrested from him the only instrument which rendered him truly formidable. Justly irritated by the barbarous system of oppression, established by Philip II. and invariably pursued by his contemptible successors, the inhabitants of Portugal had thrown off the yoke, and imitating the glorious example of the Dutch, had given the world an additional proof, that no government can rest upon a solid foundation, which is not built upon the affections of the people. By a simultaneous impulse the Catalans had asserted their natural rights, after long submitting with exemplary patience to the most flagrant violation of their privileges, and to the licentiousness of a ferocious banditti, who acted as if they thought the title of a soldier a satisfactory excuse for every enormity.

These events, as they appear under an episodic form, must of course be related with brevity.

The high feelings of independence, for which the Catalonian character was ever distinguished, had attracted the hatred of Olivares, whose ill-judging arrogance regarded obedience as the only valuable quality in a subject. Determined, at all events, to humble their pride, he caught with avidity at every opportunity of attacking those immunities, which the despotism of Charles V. and the bigotry of his son, had been compelled to respect. Among these the most cherished by national pride was an exemption from receiving any troops except their own provincial militia; yet, in open violation of this long-established right, Olivares assembled a numerous army in the vicinity of Barcelona, under pretence that the enormous preparation of France made it advisable to place the maritime provinces in a better state of defence. The plausibility of the excuse might possibly have induced the inhabitants to submit, had not the minister, in the wantonness of tyranny, ordered a levy of six thousand Catalans to assist in the conquest of Italy. The insolent behaviour of the Castillian soldiers, who seconded the apparent wishes of Olivares by the most intolerable outrages, served to convince the people, that no hope remained of preserving submission to a sovereign, whose despotism had emancipated them from their allegiance. No time was lost in asserting their independence, the moment they resolved to be free; and the Bishop of Girona, a venerable prelate, accordingly gave the signal for a general revolt, by publishing a sentence of excommunication against the Castillian soldiers, on account of their disorderly behaviour. The torch of

rebellion was no sooner kindled at the shrine of religion, than the peasants, by hundreds, flew to arms, revenging the indignities to which they had been exposed, by massacring the invaders of their national privileges, whenever they encountered them in separate parties. Elated with success, they advanced to the capital in a formidable body, and were actually preparing to set fire to the viceroy's palace, when they were prevented by the vigilance of the magistrates, who employed the influence which they had obtained by their patriotic exertions, for the re-establishment of order and tranquillity. The representative of majesty, however, being unwilling to expose his person to a repetition of similar insults, abandoned the city in disguise, and a few days after was found dead in the mountains; but whether he perished by accident, or fell a victim to national indignation, has never been clearly ascertained. The bond of union between Catalonia and Castille was now dissolved, and the militia having joined the standard of freedom, the Spanish mercenaries were easily driven out of a province, in which they were held in execration. Considering themselves as free from all legitimate ties, and of course at liberty to dispose of themselves, the insurgents dispatched a deputation to Paris, offering to place themselves under the dominion of Louis, upon his engaging to afford them protection. A proposal, so consonant to the views of Richelieu, was of course accepted with eager delight; and the act of donation having been officially ratified, Marshal Brere was immediately sent, with the dignified title of viceroy, to take up his residence at Barcelona, whither the king graciously promised shortly

to follow, for the purpose of confirming all their ancient immunities in person.\*

As the revolt of a province is a less fatal calamity than the loss of a kingdom, it is not to be wondered that the court of Madrid was far more astounded at the elevation of the Duke of Braganza to the throne of Portugal, than it had been at the insurrection in Catalonia. The annexation of Portugal to the Spanish crown, by Philip II. though unquestionably an act of the grossest injustice, was not altogether indefensible, on the ground of political expediency, because, by consolidating the whole of the peninsula under one government, it gave additional strength and stability to a country, which wanted nothing, except an enlightened administration, to become one of the most flourishing in Europe.

So long as the Spaniards continued to exercise their usurped authority with prudence and moderation, the Portuguese submitted with patience. The descendants, however, of the tyrant, by whom they were subjugated, being much inferior in political sagacity to the prototype, from whose example they borrowed their ideas of government, regarded every privilege enjoyed by a subject as an infringement upon legitimate authority, and formed a plan for reducing the dependent kingdom to a state of the most abject submission, by gradually stripping it of all its resources. For carrying into execution this nefarious project, it would have been difficult to find a fitter instrument than Olivares, had his patience been equal to his

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\* Bougeant, i. 439.

ambition. But the impetuosity of his temper often prevented him from realizing his schemes for the extirpation of liberty, by exciting an alarm in the bosoms of those whom he intended to enslave, before his preparations were brought to maturity. A profound adept in the science of treachery, he flattered himself that he could obviate the danger attending a general association, by fomenting jealousies between the principal families in Portugal; and, for this purpose, carefully excluded from every office, either of honours or emolument, all persons who manifested the faintest attachment to the ancient constitution; while he loaded with favours all those recreant spirits who courted his patronage at the expense of every patriotic feeling. The extensive wars in which the house of Austria was engaged, afforded a specious excuse for draining the country of all the national forces, and depressing the spirit of its unfortunate inhabitants by extraordinary taxation. However repugnant to justice, or subversive of freedom, the views of a minister may prove, his projects will hardly ever miscarry for want of tools to carry them into execution. Under the popular name of Margaret of Savoy, the Dowager Dutchess of Mantua, the whole executive power was really vested in Don Michel Vasconcellos, a man no less haughty, presumptuous, and despotic, and even more cruel and treacherous than Olivares.

It is fortunate for mankind that the methods, usually resorted to by tyrants for the purpose of rivetting their fetters, prove frequently means of breaking them. Popular tumults, which broke out successively in various parts of Portugal, announced that oppression had not yet extinguished

the flame of liberty. A plan for restoring the ancient family to the throne of Portugal was matured in silence, and concealed from the watchful eye of Vasconcellos with so many precautions, that the Duke of Braganza was actually in possession of the crown of his ancestors, before the tools of Olivares believed him capable even of conceiving the glorious project.

The admirers of Richelieu, unwilling to admit that any event of importance could have occurred in Europe without his participation, attributed to him the honour of having prepared and directed the conspiracy. Whether this was in reality the case, and no proofs are produced to establish the fact; or, whether the emancipation of Portugal was solely due to the intrepid spirits of a heroine, who availed herself with ability of popular discontent; the cardinal was too sensible of the many advantages which policy might derive from such an occurrence, to leave the new government to contend, unaided, against the superior resources of Philip. He accordingly prevailed upon his master to acknowledge Braganza as the legitimate sovereign of Portugal, and to promise him the assistance of a powerful fleet, to secure the independance of his crown.\*

This sudden, and, to those who were unable to penetrate beneath the gilded surface, unexpected change in the situation of a nation, on which the bounty of Providence had lavishly bestowed all the elements of power, though it denied it the sense to employ them advantageously, excited a serious alarm at Vienna, where it was fashionable to con-

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\* 1640. Bougeant, i. 443.

sider the mines of Peru as affording resources far too abundant, for either time or extravagance to exhaust. These apprehensions, of course, were considerably augmented by the discovery, that the war was daily becoming very unpopular; a fact, so clearly demonstrated, by the complaints and murmurs of the German people, that it was no longer possible for pride or prejudice to misinterpret them. To oppose the wishes of a nation, no less loud than unanimous in its desire of peace, was a measure too perilous to be hazarded; because it might eventually induce the catholic princes to seek their security by separate treaties, and thus leave the house of Austria, in its debilitated state, to contend against the forces of the protestant league, supported by all the power of France. It became necessary, therefore, to gratify the public inclination by an apparent compliance; although with the secret determination of raising such insuperable difficulties in the way of peace, that it should be henceforth considered as a chimerical pursuit, even by those who were most clamorous for its attainment. And, when this was accomplished, the emperor flattered himself with the hopes of obtaining more abundant supplies, from the patriotic indignation of his co-estates.\*

With this view he convened an electoral assembly at Nuremberg, the proceedings of which were so manifestly directed by the influence of Austria, that they were regarded with indifference by the public. It became requisite, therefore, to have recourse to some measure better calculated to satisfy the national feeling; and accordingly a diet was summon-

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\* Galetti, 518.

ed to meet at Ratisbonne, over which Ferdinand determined to preside in person. In adopting a plan so repugnant to the lofty pretensions of Austria, the emperor, in fact, proclaimed to the world that his hereditary resources were exhausted. Under such circumstances, it required much prudence and address to avoid purchasing the assistance of the different members of the empire by disgraceful concessions, or seriously offending them by refusing their demands. That at this delicate crisis the emperor displayed both firmness and judgment, even his opponents were forced to admit. Instead of yielding with facility, as his enemies expected, to the general outcry for peace, he called upon all the members of the German confederacy, who felt for the national honour, to unite in opposing the ambitious designs of those powers, which, under pretence of asserting the cause of toleration, were artfully endeavouring to enslave them. To his mortification, however, he shortly discovered, that the ascendancy of Austria was no longer sufficient to regulate the proceedings of an assembly, most of the members of which were animated with sentiments of independence unknown to their ruder progenitors. The servile veneration so long entertained for the imperial throne, had yielded to the influence of reason and philosophy, and made way for more liberal opinions. The head of the empire was no longer revered as the sacred representative of Constantine and Justinian, and as possessing that boundless power which those illustrious monarchs had formerly exercised over the degraded world. On the contrary, it was maintained by the German civilians, that the empire was in reality an aristocratic confederacy, in which the emperor occupied



the most conspicuous station; but that being invested with limited authority for the benefit of the whole, he was not only bound to consult the public opinion in all matters of importance, but was even accountable to the diet for all the measures of his administration.

These principles, which would have been treated as seditious by the haughty Charles, but which appeared wise and consistent to the understandings of men enlightened by discussion, were first promulgated under a systematic form, in an anonymous work, published by Chemnitz, Chancellor of Stettin, under the name of Hippolytus a Lapide.\* The sentiments displayed in this popular treatise were too agreeable to the prevailing opinions of the age, not to be received with the most flattering approbation. Indeed, such was the avidity with which it was studied, that it may almost be said to have produced an entire revolution in the German constitution, by giving consistency, and even legality, to principles which had for some time fermented in the public mind, but which had never before been admitted as elemental by any tribunal.

From this period we may date the rapid decline of the imperial authority, and the increasing influence of foreign powers, with respect to the internal politics of Germany.†

Disappointed in his hopes of engaging the empire

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\* For the persusal of this work, which is extremely scarce, I am indebted to the liberality of Mr. Coxe. It is intitled "*De Ratione status in Imperio nostro Romano Germanico.*" Should the reader be anxious to obtain more accurate information, he will find it in Putter's *Development*, vi. 7. published at Stettin in 1690. Soon after its appearance, it was burnt at Vienna, by the hands of the executioner, but was soon after reprinted in Holland.

† Cox, i. 927.

in a rational war, or even of obtaining any considerable augmentation of subsidies,\* Ferdinand was obliged to content himself with having persuaded the diet to establish, as a fundamental maxim of policy, that the peace of Prague should be taken for the basis of any treaty, which might hereafter be negotiated with the protestants; and that the same rigorous system should still continue which had hitherto precluded the palatine family from the enjoyment of all their dignities and possessions.†

To obviate the difficulties which occasionally arose in the course of these intricate debates, both patience and address were required; and, it is highly probable, from the temper with which they were conducted, that the diet might have separated without coming to any decision, in case the emperor had consented to a proposal for inviting the belligerents to send plenipotentiaries to Ratisbonne, under pretence that the concurrence of foreign powers might give additional solemnity to the proceedings. This plan was vehemently opposed by the Austrian mi-

\* It is difficult to describe the consternation which prevailed in the diet, upon receiving a statement from the imperial minister, respecting the actual condition of the army, and the estimates for the ensuing campaign. Terrified at the enormity of the demand, the most scrupulous bigots began seriously to calculate, whether the prosecution of a contest, so expensive and obstinate, was not likely to be attended with greater calamities, than even Luther and Calvin, with their iconoclastic fury, could possibly inflict.—Londorp, iv. 785. *Theatrum Europ.* 306, &c.; Schmidt, v. 17.

† This point appeared of such essential consequence to the Austrian court, that Trautmansdorf (a confidential minister of Ferdinand, and afterwards employed as plenipotentiary at the Westphalian Congress) made no scruple of declaring, that rather than advise the emperor to consent to an amnesty upon the terms proposed by the protestants, he would see him live in exile in the Spanish dominions, for as long a period as the Elector Palatine had passed in Holland.—Puffendorf, xiii. 92. Bougeant, i. 405.

nisters, who contended, that it was not only highly derogatory from the dignity of the imperial throne, but was totally inconsistent with all former precedents. To these ostensible motives were added others of greater moment, which they studiously endeavoured to conceal. For it would have been an unpardonable insult, to have proclaimed to the members of the assembly the sentiments entertained of its venality; which, in case the accredited agents from the hostile powers should be permitted to approach the seat of government, would lay them open to all the arts of corruption.

Far, however, from being discouraged by want of success, the diet determined, by a great majority, to write to the kings of France and Spain, as well as to the regency of Sweden, intreating them to order their respective ambassadors to repair immediately to the congress at Cologne. For they were so far deceived, by the vague and delusive language employed by the imperial ministers, as actually to consider the question respecting passports to have been definitively settled. They soon, however, discovered that, in imputing to the sovereigns of the house of Austria so much candour and liberality, they had given them credit for virtues which they did not possess; as the court of Spain, still more decidedly averse than that of Vienna, to every pacific overture, was not yet sufficiently humbled to listen with patience to any proposal, by which the independence of the Batavian republic must have been virtually recognized.\*

Though the proceedings of the diet, which continued its sittings till late in the following year, did

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\* 1641. Puffendorf, xii. 81. Bougeant, 406.

not conduce to the restoration of peace, they were at least sufficient to prove, that it was in vain to expect that inestimable blessing, whilst it was in the power of Austria to prevent it. It also clearly appeared, that notwithstanding the veneration of the catholic princes for the imperial throne was visibly lessened, yet the influence of Austria was still great enough to prevent the enactment of any measure, which it was her interest steadily to oppose. In the electoral college, the majority was ready to sacrifice every thing, except their personal comforts, to the support of the papal religion. Of the two protestant members, one\* was blindly devoted to Austria; so that the young Elector of Brandenburg was the only person who still supported the liberties of his country. His solitary voice, however, was too weak to produce any beneficial effects; though, in his spirited conflict against superstition and venality, he gave early proofs of that admirable judgment, sagacious policy, and unshaken perseverance, which were destined to reflect the purest lustre on his future government. From the college of princes, composed for the most part of ecclesiastical sovereigns, no disinterested patriotism could be expected; because the moment any member was rash enough to suffer an honourable feeling for national dignity to get the better of professional attachments, he was instantly menaced with the papal indignation; and, in case that proved insufficient to bridle his zeal, he was immediately assailed with a more powerful weapon, and told, that on his acquiescence depended the pension; by the distribution of which the court of Madrid had acquired

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\* The Elector of Saxony. . . .

an ascendancy almost unbounded over the venal clergy of Germany. The rank and authority of the above-mentioned orders, were sufficient to ensure them respect, but it would have been derogating from the splendour of the imperial crown, for Ferdinand to have listened with equal attention to the plebeian remonstrances of commercial republics; and we accordingly find, that the prayers and expostulations of their numerous deputies, though loud and unanimous in favour of peace, were heard with silent disdain.\*

Banner was too well acquainted with the intentions of the court of Vienna in convening the diet, to behold its proceedings with indifference. Anticipating the advantage which must inevitably accrue from dispersing an assembly expressly summoned to sanction the ambitious projects of Austria, he formed a plan for surprising Ratisbonne, and conducted his preparations with so much secrecy, that had he not been impeded by a sudden thaw, which rendered the Danube impassible, all the members of the diet, together with their chief, must have fallen into his hands, before they were aware of any danger. A spirit of enterprise congenial with his own assured him of the co-operation of Guebriant; and the two armies having joined in the vicinity of Erfurt, began their march on the 27th of December, in defiance of the rigorous season. Having obtained information that a large body of Austrians had lately entered Bohemia; that the Bavarians had taken up their quarters in Swabia, and that the remaining part of the imperial army was scattered in different cantonments, the Swedish

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\* Puffendorf, xlii. 97.

commander proposed to his colleagues to direct their united strength against the Bohemian regiments, in the hope of striking a decisive blow before the enemy was prepared to resist. But the sagacious Frenchman, inferring from various circumstances that the Weimerians, if once carried to such a distance from France, might be easily tempted to enter into the Swedish service, and that Banner had actually formed a plan for seducing them, alleged such powerful arguments for adhering to the original scheme, that the Swede was obliged to acquiesce. From Schwardorf, which they reached about the middle of January, Wittenberg and Nassau, both officers of merit, were ordered to reconnoitre the country. Pushing forward with ardour, they crossed the Danube on the ice, and after carrying devastation to the gates of Ratisbonne, returned to the camp with a valuable booty. This predatory enterprise had well nigh proved decisive with respect to the final issue of the contest, as Ferdinand, together with many of his principal nobility, must inevitably have fallen into the hands of the Swedes, had they not been prevented by accident from leaving the city, for the diversion of hawking, till an hour after the time originally appointed for their departure. Several domestics belonging to the emperor were captured, together with his hawks, his horses, and his litter. This, however, was not the only instance in which Ferdinand was indebted to fortune. Had the frost, by continuing only a few days longer, allowed time for the allies, by passing the Danube, to have blockaded Ratisbonne on the opposite shore, there can be little doubt that want of provisions must very soon have compelled the emperor to have surrendered with all his adherents. Determined,

however, at all events not to relinquish the enterprise without throwing the assembly into consternation, the confederates advanced with their artillery to the banks of the Reger, (which unites with the Danube under the walls of Ratisbonne, after giving its name to the city,)\* and having gratified their vanity by gratuitously insulting the chief of the empire with a discharge of artillery, abandoned the undertaking.†

The firmness of Ferdinand at this alarming crisis did infinite honour to his understanding. Undaunted by the danger with which he was surrounded, he endeavoured to impart the same intrepid spirit to all the members of the diet; many of whom were so frightened, that they were actually preparing to ensure their personal safety by a hasty and precipitate flight.‡

No sooner had the allies regained their camp, than a difference arose respecting their future proceedings. Immovably attached to his former opinion, Banner again endeavoured to prevail upon Guebriant to co-operate in the conquest of Bohemia; but neither entreaties, nor promises, could induce the latter to alter his intention of marching directly into Franconia. The event predicted by the former, as the necessary consequence of an imprudent separation, was shortly accomplished; as Piccolomini was no sooner informed that his enemies were retiring by different routes, than he resolved upon attacking the Swedish column, which he hoped to destroy before Guebriant was apprized

\* Called in German, Regensburg.

† 1641. *Histoire de Guebriant*, vi. Puffendorf, xiii. 1, 2. Le Vassor, xiv. 400.

‡ *Ibid*, 403.

of his danger. A commander less skilful and active than Banner would have been exposed to inevitable ruin ; but his prescient genius had not only foreseen the perils which awaited him, but had taken every precaution to avert them.\* Courier after courier had been dispatched to Guebriant, imploring him by every motive, most likely to influence the feelings of a soldier, not to abandon him at that critical moment, and promising to leave him the choice of quarters, provided he would again consent to a junction.

The difficulties to which Banner was subsequently exposed, are usually attributed by the French historians, to his want of punctuality in fulfilling this promise. Guebriant, they say, upon hearing of the distress of the Swedes, immediately altered his route, in order to put himself in communication with Banner ; but being disappointed in the expectations which he had been taught to entertain, he was under the necessity of receding to Bamberg. The exhaustion of the country was soon complete, and he was again preparing to gain the fertile banks of the Maine, when he learned that his allies, after sustaining considerable loss in a partial action, were compelled to seek an asylum in the forests of Bohemia.† Without a moment's hesitation the gallant Frenchman flew to his assistance ; and when some of the officers attempted to divert him from this generous resolution, by expatiating upon the hardships to which the soldiers must be exposed in their passage through dreary forests, and even ventured to suggest, that it might be more agreeable to the dictates of prudence, to at-

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\* Puffendorf, 3.

† Ibid, 9. Le Vassor, 405. Guebriant, v. 6, 7, 8.



tend solely to their own preservation, instead of hazarding the lives of numbers for the sake of a man, by whom they had been treated so ungratefully. "God forbid!" exclaimed Guebriant with noble enthusiasm, "that I should punish an individual at the expense of my country! Should the Swedish army be destroyed, on what are we to depend for assistance? Besides, were it only to save the reputation of a general, so deservedly celebrated for military skill, no perils should deter me from the undertaking. The only species of revenge to which I aspire, is to give him an unequivocal proof of my esteem."\*

The skill and activity with which this magnanimous resolution was carried into execution, entitled Guebriant to no less praise than the generosity with which it was embraced. In spite of every impediment of climate or situation,† he arrived at Zwickau, upon the confines of Bohemia, a few hours after Banner had reached it.‡

The retreat of the latter, which is considered as one of his most splendid achievements, requires additional illustration. No sooner was the emperor delivered from personal danger by the departure of the enemy, than he issued orders for assembling a large body of troops with the utmost expedition, not only for the purpose of protecting the diet, but with a view of punishing the insult. Piccolomini, who was entrusted with the execution of this important design, by indefatigable exertion, soon collected the scattered forces of Bavaria and Austria

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\* *Histoire de Guebriant*, v.

† In a letter to Des Noiers, secretary of state, Guebriant says, that for the space of three days the soldiers were up to their knees in snow.

‡ Puffendorf, xiii. 10.

from their different cantonments, while, by his judicious dispositions, he endeavoured to conceal from the enemy the object which he had in contemplation. Perceiving the storm to be gathering fast, without being able to ascertain on which side it would burst, Banner strenuously objected to a separation, convinced, that so long as he acted in concert with Guebriant, he should be more than a match for the enemy. But the determination of the latter to establish himself in Franconia, allowed the imperialists to direct all their efforts against the Swedes. Without the possession of Neuburg, it would have been impossible for Banner to secure his retreat, and he accordingly sent the most positive orders to Schlaury, an officer who merited his highest confidence, to defend it to the utmost extremity; promising to march in person to his relief. These instructions were executed with unvarying courage by the gallant commander of Neuburg, who persisted in his refusal to open the gates, though exposed to five successive assaults; nor did he surrender at last, till perfectly satisfied by unquestionable proofs, that imperious necessity had prevented his commander from fulfilling the engagement. This obstinate resistance allowed time for Banner to effect his retreat. Yet he was still under the necessity of cutting down trees, as he traversed the Bohemian forests, for the purpose of impeding the progress of Glean, who followed close at his heels with the Austrian cavalry. Piccolomini was no sooner master of Neuburg, than he advanced with rapidity by a shorter road to occupy the defile of Prsnitz, the possession of which must inevitably have occasioned the destruction of the Swedish army. To his mortification, however, he discovered

that the activity of Banner had outstripped his own, and that he had traversed in security that dangerous pass about an hour before his arrival.\* Convinced that the fortunate moment was lost, and that it would be highly imprudent to hazard a battle against the united forces of the allies, Piccolomini gave up the pursuit, contenting himself with the glory of conducting in triumph to Ratisbonne, the prisoners and trophies taken at Neuburg.†

The constitution of Banner, though naturally strong, was now so shattered by incessant fatigue, that he was seized at Altenburg with a dangerous malady, which rendered him unequal to the smallest exertion; and he was, therefore, obliged to leave all military affairs to the direction of Guebriant. The masterly dispositions of the latter entirely defeated the projects of Piccolomini; who, when informed that his rival was incapacitated by illness from active service, had measured back his steps with the utmost celerity, that he might be ready to take advantage of any favourable occurrence.

It would be tedious to dwell with greater minuteness upon the movements of the different armies, because nothing remarkable happened on either side, for some weeks previous to the death of Banner. The mental activity of that extraordinary man was unimpaired by bodily pain. Having learned from Guebriant that the enemy's superiority rendered his position at Weissenfels insecure, he hastened in a litter, to the succour of his friend; but even this motion, gentle as it was, proving too

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\* Puffendorf, *9. Schmidt*, v. 18. Galetti, i. 527.

† *Histoire de Guebriant*, v. Puffendorf, *ibid.*

much for his debilitated frame, he was persuaded to stop at Merseburg. His repose, however, was only momentary. Finding himself incommoded by the Austrian cavalry, his active spirit, disdaining to be fettered by corporeal infirmity, aspired to recover its ancient ascendancy. Neither the intreaties of his friends, nor the expostulations of his physicians, could detain him any longer in a state of inactivity. Determined to shew that, till he ceased to breathe, he would never cease to be formidable, he again mounted his litter; but declining strength sunk beneath the effort, and when he arrived at Halberstadt, he was so entirely exhausted, that his physician advised him to prepare for death, which he did with the piety of a Christian.\*

Without recurring, with popular prejudice, to the intervention of poison, it is easy to discover, in the toils and privations he had so often endured, a cause adequate to account, in the most satisfactory manner, for the premature termination of his existence. Banner may be said to have been born a soldier. From his cradle the study of military affairs formed the favourite object of his pursuit. The theory of war, thus early acquired, was illustrated by the exploits of one of the greatest masters in that intricate and glorious science. Instructed by the example, and encouraged by the praises of Gustavus Adolphus, he passed through all the gradations of military rank with the highest distinction; and after the captivity of Horn, was selected by Oxenstiern as the person most capable of replacing that skilful commander.† Though called

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\* 1641. Puffendorf, 14.

† Guebriant's biographer sums up his character in the following words:—"Digne d'être estimé le second Gustave du septentrion, et l'un des

forth at a crisis when the stoutest hearts were hardly proof against the dictates of despair, he supported the reputation of the Swedish arms with unsullied glory through every vicissitude of fortune, and proved to the world, by a series of victories, that he was no unworthy imitator of that illustrious sovereign, whom he loved, regretted, and revered. Few generals have been more fertile in expedients, and for this reason his transcendent abilities never shone with purer lustre, than amid the difficulties and dangers of a retreat. Though frequently opposed to superior numbers, he never sustained a defeat. Convinced that decision is the soul of war, he in a great measure rendered himself independent of the council of regency, never scrupling to disobey their instructions, when they interfered materially with his own designs. Indeed his mind was so deeply impressed with the necessity of acting without the smallest control, that he has been frequently heard to impute the failures of Gallas and Piccolomini, not to want of intention, nor want of ability, but to that contemptible system of jealousy and mistrust, so prevalent at the Austrian court, which fettered the genius of the ablest commanders, by never allowing them to follow up a blow, without previously consulting the ministers.

Though he insisted upon the privilege of disposing at pleasure of every vacant commission, as

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plus grands capitaines de l'univers. Il était en haute vénération dans son pays, où il tenait rang d'un des principaux nobles, comme allié de la maison royale. Notre roi l'aimoit, (*mince éloge*) tous les étrangers l'estimoient, l'Allemagne trembloit au seul bruit de son nom, et a présent toute l'Europe le loue de toutes les perfections des plus excellents hommes, v. 9.

well as of appointing commanders to all the fortresses which might yield to his victorious arms, he does not appear in any instance to have employed this authority capriciously. On the contrary, he established, as an invariable maxim, that the senior officer should always be preferred, unless he had rendered himself unworthy of promotion. No less liberal than haughty, he permitted the colonels to fill up the vacancies in their own regiments, and even allowed them to exercise the most absolute jurisdiction over all who were subject to their authority. Reserved from habit, as well as from policy, he was scarcely ever known to converse with freedom with any of the officers, except in moments of conviviality; and even then, he was so cautious in his behaviour towards his guests, that they were never tempted to carry their familiarity beyond the pleasures of the table. No less prompt to punish, than eager to recompense, he never permitted a fault to escape without chastisement, nor a brilliant action to pass unrewarded. It was an invariable rule with him never to indulge the soldiers in plunder; because, he said, "that riches were the parents of every disorder, and inevitably ruined the discipline of an army." Though fond of expense, which he regarded as proper in high situations, he was so far from being of an interested disposition, that, notwithstanding the opportunities which he possessed for amassing wealth, he left behind him only a moderate fortune. When compared with the ferocity of most of the imperial generals, his humanity was the object of admiration; and he unquestionably merits the highest commendation, for having frequently left his magazines untouched, when forced to retire before a su-

perior enemy, rather than distress the inhabitants by destroying them. The devastation committed during his irruption into Saxony, formed a melancholy exception to this general rule, and can be extenuated only by reflecting upon the situation in which he was placed, the resentment he felt against the elector, and the necessity of deterring others from behaving with equal ingratitude. To punish the people for the faults of their rulers,\* is an act not to be defended upon any principle of justice; but how seldom is the voice of justice attended to, when man is hurried on by the impulse of passion, and armed with unrestricted authority.

These brilliant qualities, it must be confessed, were, in some measure, tarnished by the overbearing haughtiness of his disposition, which frequently led him to behave toward the German princes with an arrogance highly mortifying to the feelings of men accustomed to the most servile adulation. To the allurements of pleasure he was no less addicted than Alexander, or Mahomet II. yet he could tear himself in an instant from every sensual indulgence, when the service of his country required, and become as temperate and abstemious as Cato.†

The loss of Banner was regarded by many in the light of an irreparable misfortune, because they believed it impossible to find a successor of equal ability. His superior talents had kept together an army composed almost entirely of Germans;‡ but, immediately after his death, they conducted them-

\* *Quicquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi.*—Horace.

† Schiller, iv. *Histoire de Guebriant*, v. Puffendorf, xiii. 15. Le Vassor, xvi. 412. Galetti, i. 528. Gualdo, ii. 327.

‡ According to the testimony of Laboureur, it contained no more than five hundred Swedes. *Histoire de Guebriant*, vi. 1.

selves as if they thought that disastrous event had put an end to all military subordination. With alarming unanimity, a great number of the officers demanded their dismissal, refusing to continue in the Swedish service, except upon terms of their own prescribing. Even during the illness of their illustrious commander, various symptoms of disaffection had appeared. Too weak to contend against a desperate faction with the authority requisite to silence sedition, Banner was deliberating with himself in what manner to proceed, when he was fortunately extricated from his embarrassment by the arrival of Beauregard, with money sufficient to satisfy the most pressing demands; together with a promise that France would immediately make a diversion on the Rhine, for the purpose of recalling the Bavarians. The sight of gold produced a sudden change in the behaviour of men, by whom war was embraced as a profitable speculation. But scarcely had Banner closed his eyes, when the flame burst forth with redoubled fury. Availing himself of the discontent which was rapidly spreading, the Elector of Saxony, by bribes and promises, endeavoured to engage the disaffected regiments to abandon the Swedish standard, and enter into his service. In this attempt he was ably seconded by Montagne, an officer whose distinguished merit had raised him high in Banner's estimation, and who had contrived to render himself equally popular with the whole army, by affability, courage, and liberality. But, under the covering of these amiable qualities, he concealed a boundless ambition; and, thinking the crisis particularly favourable for the attainment of his secret designs, he persuaded the foreign colonels to enter into a combination, by



which they mutually bound themselves never again to serve under the banners of Sweden, unless their arrears should be previously liquidated; and then only upon condition, that their pay should be considerably augmented. Finding these demands not likely to be granted, Montagne, with the consent of his seditious associates, made a tender of their services to France; but the offer was positively declined by Guebriant, and the refusal accompanied with some severe remarks, which were intended to convey to the disaffected party the strongest proofs of disapprobation. "Mighty well," replied Montagne, extremely mortified at the contempt with which his proposal was received, "you will hereafter repent this imprudence. Brave men can never be in want of employment. Sweden, too, if she pleases, may treat us with equal neglect: but in that case we will join with the German princes, and the remnant of the Weimerians, who are no less disgusted with the proceedings of France, than we are with the ingratitude of Sweden; and I doubt not, that when united, we shall be powerful enough to procure a safe and honourable peace for the empire, in spite of the intrigues and treachery of those, who call themselves the champions of freedom."\*

This lofty tone led Guebriant to suspect that he was acting in concert with the house of Brunswick, whose political conduct had in no respect varied since the death† of George; who, in spite of his failings, was universally regretted by the allies. This illustrious personage left four sons, the eldest of whom, Christian Louis, had not completed his

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\* *Histoire de Guebriant*, vi. 1.

† He died about a month before *Banner*.

eighteenth year. Though endowed with qualities to adorn a private station, punctilious in the performance of the minor duties, and remarkable for the virtues of temperance and chastity, he was totally a stranger to those higher endowments, which are calculated to shine in an age of turbulence,\* and to give renown and prosperity to a nation.

It had ever been the leading object of his father's policy, to render himself independent both of Sweden and Austria; and in this chimerical pursuit, he had been induced successively to ally himself with both those powers, by engagements which were frequently broken almost as soon as contracted.— Though firmly attached to the protestant faith, he felt humiliated at the idea that the German princes were inadequate to the maintenance of their constitutional rights, without the intervention of foreigners. This feeling, inspired by laudable pride, often led him to act with a degree of unsteadiness, which might easily be mistaken for insincerity. But the talents of his successor were designed by nature for the humbler duties of domestic retirement; and when he attempted to regulate the political balance between Ferdinand and Christina, he was engaging in a task which tended only to illustrate his own incapacity.

A heart unaccustomed to the wishes of deceit, is no less shocked at the imputation of treachery, than eager to repel the accusation; and, fortunately, it was easy for Christian Louis to establish his innocence by uncontrovertible evidence. Guebriant, however, was much too sagacious to suffer an opportunity, which afforded room for wholesome ad-

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\* Galetti, i. 530.

monition, to escape unimproved; and he accordingly took advantage of the current reports, to expatiate upon the evils that must have ensued from rendering Brunswick the seat of hostilities; an event which would have been the unavoidable consequence of its prince's adopting the improvident plan, maliciously imputed to him by his enemies.

Too wise to confide in the professions of any man, who was subject to the influence of prejudice or pride, Guebriant deemed it advisable to ensure the fidelity of the duke, by putting it out of his power to deceive him. For this purpose he contrived, by bribes and promises, to gain over Montagne to his interest; and then employed him in promoting a good understanding between the leaders of the insurgents and the Swedish officers,\* to whom Banner, on his death-bed, had confided the command, till the regency should nominate a successor.

It is natural for men of sanguine tempers, when placed in desperate situations, to consider the slightest political change as the presage of prosperous fortune. No wonder then that the presumption of the Austrian cabinet should anticipate the destruction of the Swedish army, as a necessary consequence of Banner's demise. Eager to partake in the glory of exterminating an enemy so long the object of terror, the archduke hastened at the head of the cavalry, to join Piccolomini in Saxony; in concert with whom, he formed a plan for compelling the Duke of Brunswick to abandon the siege of Wolfenbüttele, and then forcing him, together with the Landgravine of Cassel, to accept any conditions

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\* Pfuhl, Wrangel, and Wittenburg. Galetti, 530.

which the clemency of the emperor might be disposed to grant them. Following up this success with imaginary vigour, they flattered themselves, after crushing the leaders of the protestant party, that nothing would be easier than to drive the French beyond the Rhine, and force the Swedes to seek an asylum amid the inhospitable deserts of Scandinavia.

No sooner was Guebriant made acquainted with their intention, than he proposed to the Swedes to succour the besiegers with their united strength; and the project being received with unanimous approbation, not a moment was lost in carrying it into execution. A desperate action ensued, (in which Wrangel and Konigsmark were scarcely less distinguished for skill and intrepidity than Guebriant) and which terminated in the defeat of the imperialists.\* According to the testimony of Beau-regard, nothing was wanting to have rendered the victory decisive, except authority sufficient to have enabled Guebriant to follow up his success. But in an army, composed of different nations, and subject to leaders of equal power, it could hardly be expected that jealousies should not prevail. In defiance of his expostulations, the siege of Wolfenbüttele was immediately raised, though nothing had occurred to render its prosecution a work either of difficulty or of danger.

Such was the state of affairs when Torstensson arrived with considerable reinforcements, to assume the command of the Swedish army. But, before we lay before the reader the exploits of a general, who followed the steps of his illustrious master more closely than any of his pupils, it will be pro-

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\* 1641. Puffendorf, xiii. 24. Histoire de Guebriant, vi. 5.

per to take a view of the campaigns in Flanders and Italy, as well as of the negotiations at Hamburgh. In the former, La Meilleraie reduced the strong city of Aire, after a most obstinate and gallant resistance; but scarcely was the king apprised of the conquest, than it fell again into the hands of the Spaniards. The arms of France continued to maintain the superiority which they had acquired in Italy, under the conduct of Harcourt, who added to his glory by the reduction of Coni, a fortress which enjoyed the singular honour of having never been taken before. Sourdis, Archbishop of Bourdeaux, a prelate who valued himself more for nautical skill than theological knowledge, indulged the pride of his countrymen by insulting Naples with a powerful fleet; an enterprise so congenial to the national vanity, that it was celebrated at Paris as a splendid achievement, though attended with no real advantage. But the right reverend sailor was less fortunate in an attempt to prevent the Spaniards from relieving Tarragona, besieged by Houdancourt, who was sent to assist the Catalonians. This unexpected miscarriage, though insufficient to cure the imperious minister of his predilection for episcopal commanders, so disgusted the nation, that it became necessary to sacrifice the unfortunate prelate to popular indignation:\* a measure to which he more readily assented, because it served to divest the public attention from the negligence of those who really occasioned the failure.

The co-operation of Sweden was too essential to the attainment of his ambitious designs, for Riche-

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\* Le Vassor, xvii. 145. Bougeant, i. 446.

lieu to rest satisfied till he had connected both countries by such indissoluble ties, that it could no longer be possible to divide them. Yet while he sedulously laboured to surmount every obstacle which tended to obstruct his success, he was anxious to conceal, from the court of Stockholm, the high importance attached to their alliance ; but he had to treat with men of too enlightened understandings to be easily deceived by his artifices.

Hence arose a continual skirmish in diplomatic address between D'Avaux and Salvius for the arrangement of interests, which, had they condescended to discuss them with common candour, might have been speedily arranged to their mutual satisfaction. Instead of honestly stating their respective pretensions, and supporting them upon the rational basis of reciprocal benefit, they acted, not like persons desirous of co-operating in a splendid undertaking for the general advantage of Europe, but as if struggling for the attainment of some dishonourable purpose, which they were equally ashamed to avow. D'Avaux appears to have established as a leading principle, that firmness and perseverance are no less essential in conducting a treaty, than in defending a town ; and consequently, that the negociator must ultimately triumph, who possesses those qualities most abundantly. It could hardly be expected that so accomplished a statesman as Salvius should fall into a snare, which nothing but blindness could overlook ; and we accordingly find that he availed himself of the suspicions of his antagonist with consummate ability. Taking advantage of the anxiety so publicly manifested by the diet of Ratisbonne, in favour of an accommodation with Sweden, he clandestinely continued the nego-

ciation with Lutzau ; which was probably undertaken rather for the purpose of alarming D'Avaux, than from the expectation of conducting it to a prosperous issue. Not that there is the smallest reason to suppose, that delicate scruples would have deterred him from accepting a peace, provided it could have been obtained upon favourable conditions. Neither would plausible arguments have been wanting to justify his conduct to the world. The noble ambition of emancipating Sweden from the ascendancy which France was endeavouring to establish in her national councils, by taking advantage of her pecuniary distress, would have furnished a satisfactory excuse. At all events he had no doubt of being vindicated by the suffrage of those whose approbation he was most anxious to obtain, because he believed, that duplicity never needs an apology in the estimation of statesmen, provided it be crowned with success.\*

The mystery affected by Salvius, in his communications with Lutzau, was calculated to increase the apprehensions of D'Avaux. A merchant of Hamburgh, at whose house they met, was the only person privy to the correspondence ; and as he was known to be a friend of the Swedish minister, the latter visited him publicly with his usual attendants ; while the Austrian negociator arrived on foot, in the dusk of the evening, and generally in disguise.

Desirous of preventing the court of Stockholm from renewing its engagement with France, Lutzau was so profuse in his offers, that it required some forbearance on the part of Salvius to resist the temptation. The same motive, however, which had so

often induced him to withhold his assent to similar overtures, still operated with equal effect. Had the emperor behaved with less liberality, there would have been far greater reason to believe him sincere; but in proportion as the temptations held out by Austria were seducing, they tended to excite the suspicions of Salvius; because he knew, that a treaty must repose upon a precarious structure, unless it should be negotiated at a general congress, and guaranteed by all the great powers in Europe. He was besides aware, that Ferdinand was disposing of provinces, over which he had scarcely any control; and that the cession of Pomerania would not be valid, unless sanctioned by the different orders of the empire, and in particular by the Elector of Brandenburg.\*

In the course of the negotiation, however, circumstances occurred which induced Salvius to entertain a more favourable opinion of the emperor's sincerity; and, it is reluctantly admitted by the Swedish historian, that if the regency had followed the suggestions of their ambassador, a separate peace would have been concluded.† Supposing it can ever be consistent with enlightened policy, (a position very difficult to establish,) for a nation to consult its own immediate advantage at the expense of consistency and honour, many circumstances combined in favour of the measure which Salvius recommended. The situation of the army, even before the death of Banner, was truly deplorable, while the increasing vacillation of the German princes afforded a constant subject of alarm. Hanover and Brunswick were the only provinces in

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\* Bougeant 416. Puffendorf, 79.

† Ibid. 80.



northern Germany capable of furnishing even scanty supplies ; and when they were exhausted, it would have been indispensably necessary to remove the seat of war into Silesia and Moravia. That, however, was an enterprize, which could not be undertaken, consistently with prudence, before the corn was in a state of maturity, as they might otherwise have destroyed in a few weeks the crops, which, with proper management, might have sustained the army during the remainder of the year. Another object that merited serious consideration was, the danger which might arise from separating themselves entirely from the Weimerians, who, they were fully aware, would never share in the enterprise. It was likewise evident, that Richelieu would never assist in procuring for Sweden more advantageous conditions than those spontaneously offered by Austria, and that the attainment even of these would be vehemently opposed by the jealousy of Brandenburg and Denmark.

Such appear to have been the arguments employed by Salvius in order to dissipate the scruples of the regency, and it cannot be denied that, in many points of view, they were not only specious but attractive. Sweden, however, had been raised to so commanding a station, among the nations of Europe, by the virtue and valour of Gustavus Adolphus, that she could no longer pursue the dictates of interest, without disavowing in the eyes of the world those lofty professions, on which she had built her reputation. After struggling so manfully in defence of the liberties of Germany, she could not, without incurring eternal disgrace, abandon the protestants to the mercy of Ferdinand ; because that would have been confessing, that in taking up arms she was not

impelled by the noble ambition of prescribing bounds to the despotism of Austria, but was actuated solely by the mercenary hope of augmenting her dominions, at the expense of a people, whose rights she pretended to vindicate. These considerations appear to have had their proper weight with the ministers of Christina, and to have determined them to adhere to their engagements with France with inflexible fidelity.

The precautions, employed by Salvius to envelope his conduct in the profoundest mystery, did not escape the vigilance of D'Avaux. Though overwhelmed with consternation at the discovery of a secret, which threatened to deprive him of every advantage for the attainment of which he had so sedulously laboured, he determined to assume an air of indifference; for he was too well acquainted with the character of man, not to know that, in general, more may be obtained by working upon his fears than by appealing to his generosity. He, in consequence, resolved to take his antagonist unawares, and to oblige him to decide between France and Austria, without allowing him time to communicate with Lutzu; for he was persuaded, that if Salvius were compelled to make a hasty option, he would prefer the solid advantages attending good faith, to all the chimerical profit of duplicity.\*

Without manifesting any symptom either of surprise or indignation, he told Salvius accordingly, that he had long been apprized of his clandestine intercourse with the Austrian minister, but had hitherto refrained from mentioning the subject, because he flattered himself, that Sweden was too well ac-

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\* Bougeant, i. 417.

quainted with his real interests, to become the dupe of so manifest a fraud. Under this impression he had learnt with the utmost astonishment, that the negociation had already made considerable progress. Without condescending to enter into any expostulations, he proceeded to state, that he was directed to call for an explicit declaration respecting the future projects of Sweden, and he would set him the example by explaining the intentions of his own court without the smallest disguise. In case she determined to continue her connexion with France, he was empowered to augment the annual subsidy to twelve hundred thousand livres, and to offer to exchange John of Wert for Marshal Horn, who had been detained in captivity, by the jealousy of Austria, ever since the battle of Nordlingen. He further added, that with regard to all questions of secondary importance no obstacles could possibly arise, provided Sweden assented to the proposal, which he had already made, respecting the selection of towns for holding a congress. Having thus ingenuously stated the objects of France, he added, that unless these offers were instantly accepted, he had positive instructions to break off the treaty altogether; because it would be inconsistent with the interests of his sovereign to continue hostilities any longer; and he left him to decide how far the prospects of the protestants would be improved, when the king should have withdrawn from the contest.\* Resolved to support the dignity of his nation, D'Avaux proceeded to discharge all the arrears of the subsidies, before he suffered Salvius to reply.†

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\* Depeche du Comte D'Avaux au roi 27 Juin, 1641.

† Bougeant, 418.

Notwithstanding that intelligent minister was too minutely acquainted with the policy of France to give credit to her ambassador's professions, he still found himself placed in a most perplexing dilemma. By quarrelling with the only power from which she could expect any pecuniary assistance, Sweden must be left at the mercy of Austria; yet a rupture of the negociation appeared to him to be pregnant with almost equal danger, because it tended directly to confirm the ascendancy to which France so openly aspired. Perfectly acquainted with the domineering spirit of Richelieu, he knew him to be incapable of acting with generosity toward a country, whose splendid achievements attracted his envy, even when they promoted his ambitious designs. To reduce a people so celebrated for martial exploits to an abject dependance upon France was an honour, which, in his estimation, could hardly be purchased too dearly. Neither was he less anxious to subdue that magnanimous feeling of conscious desert, which, in conformity to the example of their late illustrious monarch, still directed the conduct of those to whose discretion he had entrusted the government; teaching them, under every vicissitude of fortune, to assert the honour and independence of Sweden. Desirous, therefore, to avoid committing his country by a hasty declaration, Salvius flattered himself that, by a partial confidence, he should avoid all specific engagements; and accordingly acknowledged, with apparent candour, that he had held frequent conferences with Lutzau, who had made overtures for a separate peace; but he, at the same time, protested, with diplomatic sincerity, that his only motive, in listening to these clandestine proposals, was,

the wish of ascertaining the sacrifices to which Austria might be brought to consent—a discovery, which must prove of the utmost importance to all the confederates, by enabling them to regulate their respective pretensions with greater precision whenever a congress should assemble.\* He concluded with the assurance, that nothing could be more contrary to the intentions of his government, than to behave towards France with duplicity; and promised immediately to communicate the result of their conversation to the council of regency; adding, that he did not entertain the smallest doubt of being soon enabled to produce unequivocal proofs of the honour and integrity which had invariably directed all their proceedings.

Sincerity is a quality so seldom exercised in the intercourse of nations, that, to give credit to the assertions of a professional diplomatist, would be regarded as a mark of the grossest credulity. D'Avaux, in consequence, would have esteemed himself guilty of the highest imprudence, had he paid the slightest attention to official professions, the object of which might be to deceive. He, therefore, determined to pursue a surer road, by addressing himself directly to the council of regency, and particularly to Oxenstiern, from whose enlightened judgment he expected the most cordial support.†

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\* Bougeant, 419.

† Depeche, du 12 Decembre.

It appears, by a letter written from Cardinal Richelieu, that D'Avaux was empowered, in case of necessity, to offer Sweden a reinforcement of six thousand men. This circumstance is worthy notice, because it clearly proves the high importance attached by that sagacious statesman to the Swedish alliance. This letter is dated 4th December, 1640.

It required little ingenuity to persuade the Swedish government to adopt a plan, to which they were previously disposed. Too prudent to risk the friendship of France, without any better security than the assurance of a power, whose bigotted attachment to the pontifical see would have induced it to consider the blackest perfidy as meritorious, provided it led to the destruction of heresy, they ordered their ambassador to discontinue the treaty with Lutzau. This resolution was dictated by the soundest policy, and clearly shews, that the ministers of Christina were too sagacious to sacrifice substantial advantages to vanity or caprice: for though the behaviour of Richelieu was more strongly characterized by arrogance than generosity, it would not have been consistent with worldly wisdom to have indulged those feelings, which are naturally excited by unworthy treatment; because nothing could have been easier than for a power, abundantly provided with the means of corruption, to have seduced the army, disorganized as it was after the death of Banner. And of the practicability of the undertaking D'Avaux was so sensible, that he hinted to Salvius, that it was not on account of the obstacles likely to ensue that he forbore from making the attempt.\*

Upon a subject so repeatedly submitted to discussion, it was hardly possible for fresh difficulties to arise, when both parties were disposed to meet the question with unprejudiced minds and liberal feelings. No sooner, therefore, was the intriguing spirit of Salvius fettered by a positive injunction, than the treaty was renewed with very few devia-

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\* Bougeant, 420.

tions from the original model, and its duration extended to a general peace. D'Avaux, who was more zealously attached to the Romish church than might have been expected from a mind so intelligent, was desirous of introducing some additional clauses in favour of the tenet he approved: Salvius, however, insisted with the strictest justice, that no indulgence should be granted to either religion, which was not reciprocal to the other; a demand much too conformable to the dictates of reason for his antagonist to combat it successfully.\*

The renewal of the alliance between France and Sweden was so essentially beneficial to both, that it would have been ridiculous in Austria any longer to have cherished the hope of terminating hostilities by separate treaties. But as the obstacles which presented themselves in the way of an armistice might ultimately yield to the pressure of distress, it was advisable to provide against such a contingency; and it was accordingly agreed, that a truce should not produce the smallest alteration with regard to the treaty, except in the amount of the subsidy.† The arrangement respecting the selection of two contiguous towns, when a congress should meet, was attended with greater difficulty, because the states of the empire, whom it was necessary to consult, were generally averse from the proposal of Sweden; and would have preferred Spire and Worms, or Francfort and Mayence, to Munster and Osnabruck. Finding, however, that the ministers of Christina adhered with perti-

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\* Bougeant, 429.

† In case of an armistice, it was to be reduced to 750,000 livres.

nacity to their original choice, they ultimately gave a reluctant assent; and it was accordingly determined, that the former should be allotted to the ambassadors of France—the latter to the plenipotentiaries of Sweden.\*

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\* 1641. Puffendorf, xiii. 88.



## CHAPTER XXIV.

Torstenson assumes the command of the imperial army, but finds himself exposed to great difficulties, on account of the departure of the French; determines to transfer the theatre of war into Silesia; joins Stalhantz, takes Glogau, besieges Schweidnitz, and, having defeated the Austrians, pushes forward his cavalry to the gates of Vienna. Compelled to retire by the approach of Piccolomini, he marches into Saxony, and is followed by the Austrians, whom he defeats at Leipsic.—The archduke and Piccolomini, having retired from active service, are succeeded by Gallas.—Torstenson returns to the Oder.—Guebriant defeats the imperialists at Creveld.—Death and character of Richelieu, and of Louis XIII.—Battle of Rocroi.—War with Denmark.—Torstenson enters Holstein, and is followed by Gallas, who endeavours in vain to defend it. After forcing the enemy to retire, the Swedes make an irruption into Bohemia, defeat the Austrians at Inkowitz, and carry terror and desolation to the gates of Vienna.—Torstenson besieges Brüna; but, failing in the attempt, retires into Bohemia, and resigns the command.—Operations of the French in Germany.—Battle of Friburg; its consequences.—Campaign of 1645.—The French, after sustaining great losses at Mergentheim, obtain a decisive victory at Nordlingen.

THE Austrian territories had been hitherto exempt from the horrors of war, or at least only partially exposed to its calamities; and it was reserved for Torstenson to procure them that dreadful visitation, with all its concomitant evils. The gout, which had obliged him to retire from active service previously to the death of Banner, now prevented him, till the winter was already begun, from joining the army,\* which he found without money, provisions, or discipline. Indeed, so urgent was the distress to which it had been exposed, that the

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\* Galetti, 540.

officers had connived at the greatest disorders, and even suffered the soldiers to sell their accoutrements, in order to provide themselves with food and clothing; as the scanty supplies, occasionally remitted by Salvius and D'Avaux, were totally inadequate for that purpose.\* Availing themselves of the weakness and disorganization of the Swedes, the imperialists had made considerable progress in Hanover, and were actually occupied in besieging Gottingen, after taking Minden, Einbeck, and Nordhein.†

The liberation of Gottingen, from which the Austrians retired upon Torstenson's approach, was the commencement of his brilliant career. The success of this enterprise was, however, more than counterbalanced by the secession of the French, who quitted the Swedes immediately after the arrival of their new commander.‡ By this unexpected event he was constrained entirely to alter his plans; so that, instead of marching immediately to the relief of Erfurt, which the Austrians were closely blockading, he was under the necessity of crossing the Aller, and allowing his army a few weeks repose.¶

The ill health of Torstenson, and the weakness

\* Guebriant was so much affected with these disorderly scenes, that he says, in a letter to Des Noiers, "Je vous jure, et proteste, en foi d'homme de bien, que hors la disgrace du roi mon maitre je preferai non seulement, la Bastille, mais la mort meme, a demeurer plus long tems ici. Le Vassor, xvii. 112.

† Puffendorf, xiii. 49.

‡ Guebriant, according to Le Vassor, received positive orders to gain the Rhine, under pretence of making a powerful effort in southern Germany; but, in reality, to cover the eastern frontier, while Richelieu was occupied in the conquest of Perpignan and Roussillon, xvii. 110.

¶ Puffendorf, 50.

of the imperialists, reduced by disease and fatigue, occasioned both parties to remain in a state of inactivity till the following year.\* But no sooner had the former recovered his strength, than he prepared, with the utmost diligence, for an active campaign. The Austrians, on their part, having received considerable reinforcements, hoped, by securing all the passes between Hamburg and Dornitz, to prevent the enemy from crossing the Elbe.

Torstenson was neither blind to the danger to which he was exposed, nor at a loss for means to avoid it. The superiority of the Austrians in numerical strength determined him, if possible, to avoid a battle; and yet, while he continued upon the defensive, the perils which surrounded him were likely to increase, because, by allowing the imperialists sufficient time to carry their plans into execution, he would have enabled them not only to counteract his schemes for the reduction of Silesia, but even to shut him up in a country, whose total exhaustion, by depriving him of the means of feeding the troops, must have added greatly to the difficulties of his situation.† In this perplexing dilemma, he resolved to wait till the want of provisions, or the diversion promised on the part of the French, should compel the Bavarians to quit their allies; after which he doubted not, but he should find an opportunity of attacking the Austrians to advantage.‡

The rapacity of the latter, though among the most dreadful scourges with which innocence or industry could be visited, was seldom productive of lasting benefit to themselves, as whatever could

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\* 1642.

† Galetti, i. 544.

‡ Puffendorf, xiv. 5.

be extorted from the miserable peasants was dissipated with a profusion, scarcely less culpable than the barbarity with which it had been procured. Compelled to abandon all their posts on the Elbe, they took up their quarters in Misnia and Thuringia, in spite of the remonstrances of the Elector of Saxony; while the Bavarians encountered all the hardships of a protracted march before they found comfort and repose in Franconia.

Torstenson was now at liberty to choose between two different plans, each of which had many claims to attention. Since their separation from the Bavarians, the Austrians might be attacked with the fairest prospect of success; yet it did not appear, that the results of victory were likely to prove sufficiently decisive to compensate for the enormous effusion of blood, with which it must necessarily have been purchased; and in case Piccolomini should decline an engagement, it would be impracticable for the Swedes to subsist in a province, where every thing that could contribute to the sustenance of man had been forestalled by a necessitous foe. Nothing, therefore, remained but to adhere with stedfastness to the original scheme of attempting to remove the theatre of hostilities into the hereditary provinces of Austria—a project enforced more strongly than ever by the actual situation of affairs.

The Duke of Lauenburg, to whom the formation of an army had been recently entrusted by the emperor, had met with such rapid success, that he already meditated the conquest of Pomerania. The security of a province, which Sweden had selected as an indemnity for all her exertions, was much too important for Torstenson to hesitate respecting his

future operations ; and he accordingly determined to establish himself on the Oder, from whence he might be able, as occasion should require, either to oppose the projected invasion of Lauenburg, or to attempt the reduction of Silesia? Having embraced this resolution, he waited with impatience till a thaw should unlock the navigation of the Elbe; and the moment the river was practicable for vessels, he ordered the troops to assemble at Werben. As nothing was more essential to his future success than to conceal his intentions from Piccolomini, the Swedish general caused magazines to be collected in various towns of Westphalia, and sent Konigsmark with a separate corps to alarm the enemy by desultory attacks on their foraging parties and convoys.

Having succeeded in deceiving his adversary, Torstenson joined the army about the middle of March, and crossed the Elbe without the smallest interruption.\* His first object, after effecting the passage, was to form a junction with Stralhantz, an officer distinguished for courage and activity. But as activity and courage are rarely displayed without a proportionate sacrifice of lives, he had found himself unable any longer to check the progress of Lauenburg, who was master of triple resources. Successively driven from all his strong holds, he had just been compelled to evacuate Silesia, when Torstenson assumed the command.† Though powerful enough to fetter the exertions of Stralhantz, the Austrians were too feeble to oppose a force so formidable as that which was approaching, and they accordingly retreated with the utmost precipitation, while Torstenson, availing himself of the panic

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\* Puffendorf, 3. Galetti, 545.

† Puffendorf, 10.

which he had created, immediately invested Glogau. The importance of the place determined Lauenburg to hazard an action for its relief; but while busily occupied in the necessary preparations, intelligence arrived that it had been carried by assault.\* Aware of the advantage of following up success, Torstenson pushed forward with a celerity that baffled calculation; and, after making himself master of all the intermediate towns, appeared before Schweidnitz, which an ill-founded confidence had left destitute of the means of defence. Justly alarmed at the peril to which it was exposed, Lauenburg advanced with a numerous cavalry, in hopes of being able to throw in supplies before the enemy had completed their investment. The undertaking, however, was rendered abortive by the superior activity of Torstenson, who having seized all the passes of the adjacent mountains, attacked the enemy while entangled in a defile, with so much impetuosity, that they were immediately thrown into confusion. Having received a mortal wound in the beginning of the action, Lauenburg was taken, together with several of the principal officers;† and immediately after the victory Schweidnitz capitulated.

This brilliant exploit was followed by the capture of Neiss, which surrendered to Lilienhock, while Torstenson was engaged in pursuing the imperialists, who avoided destruction by the rapidity of their retreat. Being unable to bring on a general engagement, the Swedish commander made an incursion into Moravia; and, after reducing Neustadt, Littau, Nissa, and Olmutz, laid siege to Brieg, while the light cavalry carried terror and desolation

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\* Puffendorf, 13. 28th of April, 1642.

† 2d May, 1642.

‡ Puffendorf, 14, 15.

to the gates of Vienna.\* The emperor was now in imminent danger of being driven from his capital ; and had it not been preserved by the obstinate resistance of the garrison of Brieg, the imperial palace might possibly have sustained the inexpiable pollution of falling under the dominion of heretics. Having collected the remains of Lauenburg's army, and formed a junction with Buckheim, Piccolomini advanced with the firm determination of giving battle to the Swedes, or forcing them to abandon the siege ; but Torstenson's force was so much diminished, that he thought it prudent to retire beyond the Oder, after reinforcing the garrisons of Schweidnitz and Olmutz.†

During the Silesian expedition affairs had assumed an unfavourable aspect in Saxony, where Pfuhl, who had quitted the Swedish service in disgust, was exerting all the energies of a capacious mind for the ruin of a power, which he hated, because he had betrayed it. Anxious to recover his former ascendancy, Torstenson sent Konigsmark with a formidable column to check the operations of the enemy, and promised to follow with the remainder of his forces, as soon as the situation of affairs would permit. That active commander was further directed, as a punishment for their inconstancy, to lay contributions upon all the states which had wavered in their fidelity toward Sweden ; and particularly to direct the weight of his displeasure against Augustus of Brunswick, though he was at the same time enjoined to spare the duchy of Luneburg, provided its sovereign should not refuse to furnish the necessary supplies.

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\* Puffendorf, 16.

† Ibid. 17. Galetti, 549.

Meanwhile, the imperialists treated the Silesians with the utmost severity, as if they regarded it as criminal to have submitted to an enemy, too formidable to be resisted with impunity. Having satiated resentment with gratuitous cruelty, Piccolomini sat down before Glogau, and prosecuted the siege so vigorously, that before the Swedes were in a condition to attempt its relief, it was reduced to the greatest extremity. No sooner, however, had Wrangel arrived with reinforcements from Sweden, than Torstenson suddenly appearing in sight of the Austrian camp, created such an alarm, that, forsaking their standards, the soldiers fled to the adjacent hills with disgraceful precipitation.\*

After liberating Glogau, the triumphant Swede made himself master of Heinzenberg, Buntzlau, Lemberg, and Zittau, while Piccolomini remained a tranquil spectator of his success.†

The determination of Piccolomini to avoid an engagement, and the danger of attacking him in a fortified camp, rendering it expedient for Torstenson to vary his plans, he resolved immediately to approach the Elbe, for the purpose of uniting with Königsmark; who, after levying contributions with an unsparing hand, in Brunswick and Halberstadt, was making preparations for the relief of Zeist, then closely invested by the imperialists. Piccolomini, however, though immovably fixed on remaining in a defensive posture, took care never to lose sight of the enemy; but, while he followed them closely step by step, chose his positions with such consummate ability, that it would have been the height of temerity to have attacked him. Obligated to re-

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\* Puffendorf, 20.

† Ibid. 21.



gulate his movements with the utmost circumspection, and aware that his adversary was ready to take advantage of the smallest oversight, Torstenson directed his march along the banks of the Elbe; which, having crossed at Torgau, he pushed forward with the hope of being able to make himself master of Leipsic, before the imperialists were apprised of his intentions.\*

To have tranquilly witnessed the capture of a city so valuable on account of its commercial prosperity, would not only have cast an indelible stain upon the military character of Austria, but might have irrecoverably offended the Elector of Saxony, whose cordial co-operation, in the present state of affairs, was become more essential than ever.— It was, therefore, hardly possible for Piccolomini to avoid an engagement, without exposing himself to evils more disastrous than a partial defeat; and he accordingly resolved, with his usual sagacity, to risk every thing in defence of the besieged. Having been joined on his march by a few thousand Saxons, which, at a crisis so important to his political existence; it was impossible for the elector to refuse, he advanced with the determination of giving battle to the Swedes. Upon receiving intelligence of the enemy's approach, Torstenson thought it advisable to raise the siege; and hoping to inspire the Austrians with an ill-founded confidence in their own superiority, by the apparent uncertainty of his movements, he displayed a want of decision, which tended to augment that presumptuous security, which had so often proved to them the cause of disgrace. Supposing the Swedes to be falling

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\* Puffendorf, 24. Galetti, 562.

back for the purpose of uniting with Guebriant, the Austrian generals\* resolved to attack them before the junction took place, and for that purpose drew up their forces nearly on the identical spot, where, eleven years before, Tilly had been defeated by Gustavus Adolphus. A position like this could hardly fail to awaken a thousand recollections, no less calculated to animate the courage of the Swedes, than to depress the spirit of the imperialists. Many of the Swedish officers, who were now entrusted with important commands, had shared in the glory of that memorable day, which first sapped the power of Austria. Many, also, who served under the orders of Piccolomini, recollected that veterans, who till then had enjoyed the reputation of invincibility, had fled before the massive swords of the Dalecarlians. There was hardly a single object within the scope of vision, but presented to the former a lively image of exultation and triumph, while it offered to the latter a dismal picture of confusion and slaughter.

Stathantz and Wittenberg, to whom the conduct of the right wing was entrusted, attacked the left of the Austrians, before it was completely formed, with so much impetuosity, that it was instantaneously thrown into disorder. This advantage, however, was nearly balanced by the confusion which prevailed in the opposite wing, where Schlange was slain at the commencement of the action, and Konigsmark compelled to retire before Gonzaga and Bruay. Fortunately, however, for the safety of Sweden, this temporary disorder was quickly repaired by the active genius of Lilienhock, who,

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\* The archduke and Piccolomini.

advancing at the head of some regiments of infantry, re-established order at the expense of his life; while Statbantz, returning in haste from the pursuit, fell upon the rear of the Austrians with so much fury, that he penetrated the line, and separated the left wing from the rest of the army. Notwithstanding the event of the battle was no longer dubious, the imperial infantry continued to defend themselves with invincible bravery, and could not be prevailed upon to lay down their arms, till they were reduced to half their original numbers. About five thousand perished in this obstinate conflict, and nearly as many were taken prisoners; the whole of the artillery, the greater part of the baggage, together with the plate and field equipage of the archduke, became the prey of the conquerors, whose loss did not exceed three thousand men, but was considerably enhanced by the death of Lilienhock; who, by courage, generosity, and military skill, had acquired universal admiration, and promised to become one of the brightest ornaments of a nation so fertile in heroes.\*

Torstenson being too much enfeebled by victory to follow the remains of the Austrian army, Piccolomini was suffered to reach Bohemia without molestation; but, had his situation admitted of an active pursuit, it would have been scarcely possible for a single man to have escaped. So far, however, from being able to interrupt their retreat, he was destitute of horses to carry away the cannon which had been taken. Every department of the army was reduced through poverty to equal distress; the soldiers were almost naked, and com-

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\* Galetti, 554. Theatrum Europ. 900. Puffendorf, 26.

pelled to subsist by plunder; the condition of the officers, of those at least who depended on their pay for support, was little better; while the credit of the general was so reduced, that he was greatly embarrassed to procure a sum sufficient to give the accustomed remuneration to his victorious army.\*

In this perplexing situation the wealth of Leipsic appeared his only resource, and he accordingly resumed the siege with redoubled activity. The garrison, having received an accession of strength by the arrival of numerous fugitives, at first made a shew of resistance; but the citizens, having something to lose more substantial than honour, sent a deputation to the elector, imploring permission to capitulate; and, upon the return of the delegates, a treaty commenced, which soon terminated to the satisfaction of both parties, as Torstenson contented himself with a moderate ransom, and the burghers rejoiced at being able to escape so easily from the accumulated horrors of plunder.†

After refitting the army at the expense of the Saxons, the victorious general prepared to follow the Austrians; but the delay which had taken place, had allowed them time to recover their panic, and even to prepare for a renovated contest. Justly incensed at the dastardly behaviour of the cavalry, and desirous to prevent the recurrence of a similar misfortune by a signal example of punishment, the archduke ordered the regiment, which first gave the signal for flight, to be decimated,‡ and condemned several of the officers to be beheaded.

Neither the severity of winter, nor a fit of the gout, could restrain the activity of Torstenson.

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\* 1642. Puffendorf, 27.

† 1642. Ibid. 28.

‡ Coxe, 933.

After taking Chemnitz, he laid siege to Freyberg; but, after ineffectually sacrificing many valuable lives, he was compelled by Piccolomini to retire. Yet, notwithstanding the loss which he is said to have sustained, he never would acknowledge this enterprize to have been rashly undertaken; on the contrary, he insisted, that he had acted conformably to the rules of prudence, because the evils which he had brought upon the enemy were much severer than those which his own troops had endured. Convinced that no favourable results could ensue from remaining longer in the field, he went into winter quarters, while the Austrians, who were equally in want of repose, retired behind the mountains of Bohemia. Having placed the army in a state of security, the Archduke Leopold resigned the command, disgusted at finding that the imperial ministers had greater influence with the emperor than himself.\* Piccolomini likewise had quitted the Austrian service, to command the armies of Spain; so that, to the extreme delight of the enemies of Ferdinand, Gallas was once more appointed generalissimo. Convinced that he had little to fear from the talents of such an opponent, Torstenson resolved again to remove the theatre of hostilities to the banks of the Oder, and, directing his march between Prague and the Austrian camp, established himself in Moravia, before Gallas was aware of his intention.

While the Swedish commander excited the astonishment of Europe, by the splendid temerity of his enterprises, the Weimerian army, under the orders of Guebriant, was equally successful in Westphalia.

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\* Puffendorf, xv. 2. Galetti, 557.

Eager to compensate the evils, which he had reluctantly caused by quitting the Swedes, that active commander united with the Hessians, for the purpose of compelling Lamboy to evacuate the electorate of Cologne, before the arrival of Hatzfeld, who was hastening from Thuringia with reinforcements. To attack an enemy, already superior in numbers, and possessing many local advantages, was an undertaking of considerable rashness, and required to be justified by the most brilliant results.\* And of this his biographer was so fully convinced, that he endeavours to defend him upon the plea of necessity; pretending that, after Hatzfeld had joined, the weakness of the French must inevitably have obliged them to seek an asylum in Holland. An event which must have proved extremely prejudicial to Louis, because it would certainly have diminished, if not totally destroyed, the influence which he had established in the German empire, at such an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure.†

These considerations determined Guebriant to hazard an engagement immediately. Impetuosity, which forms the characteristic feature of the Gallic soldier, was perhaps never more strikingly displayed, than in storming the enemy's intrenchments at Crevelt, a village between Cologne and Juliere. Led on by a general in whom they confided, they rushed into the trenches with irresistible fury, and having torn up the palisadoes, made themselves masters of the imperial batteries, and turned the cannon against the fugitive Spaniards. By a simultaneous effort on the opposite side, the cavalry got

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\* Puffendorf, xiv. 36.

† Histoire de Guebriant, vii.

possession of the camp, and thus occasioned irretrievable disorder. Lamboy and Merci, together with five thousand privates, were compelled to surrender at discretion. Never was victory more complete, or purchased with the sacrifice of fewer lives, as the killed and wounded, on the side of the conquerors, did not exceed two hundred.

Following up his success with unabating vigour, Guebriant advanced to engage Hatzfeld, and having forced him to retire, took Nuits and Hempen, by the occupation of which he was enabled to pass the winter in the electorate of Cologne, which, comparatively with many of the German provinces, enjoyed the blessings of plenty.\*

The splendour attending this important victory rendered Louis less sensible, than he might otherwise have proved, to the loss sustained in the peninsula, where Mareschal Guiche was defeated by the Spanish forces under the orders of Francisco de Mello. Fortunately, however, the evil was quickly repaired, by the arrival of reinforcements from France, which enabled Guiche to complete the conquest of Roussillon. The ascendancy of France appeared to be established with equal solidity in Catalonia, where the defeat of Leganes procured the government of the province for Houdancourt, and disgrace and a prison for his antagonist.†

Such a series of misfortunes was calculated to excite a general alarm at Vienna; and the imperial court appears now, for the first time, seriously to have entertained an inclination to peace. That blessing, however, was unexpectedly retarded, by

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† Histoire de Guebriant, vii. l.

† 1642, Bougeant, i. 408.

an event which was considered, by the generality of the world, as tending to produce a contrary effect. Richelieu was supposed to have cherished the flame that desolated Europe, from motives of interest and ambition; and, of course, it was thought that his death would be likely to remove one of the greatest obstacles to a general pacification. But the distinguished part which he had acted, as well as the great accession of strength which had accrued to the nation under his brilliant administration, induced many to regard the prosperity of France as essentially connected with his existence. The same association of ideas led them to anticipate defeat and disaster, as the necessary consequences of the loss of that illustrious statesman. This latter opinion universally prevailed in the cabinet of Vienna, because pride and presumption are always ready to catch at every change which flatters their sanguine expectations; and because it is less mortifying to acknowledge the transient ascendancy of superior genius, than to own themselves inferior as a nation.

There are few men, whose actions have been transmitted to posterity under a greater variety of shades, than those of the celebrated minister, who governed France with absolute sway, during the reign of Louis XIII. and, in order to form an impartial judgment of his conduct, it is essential to distinguish between the qualities which constitute an accomplished statesman, and the virtues becoming a Christian prelate. For it is, in great measure, owing to historians having confounded these opposite characters, that we meet with such a difference of opinion.

The amiable virtues of benevolence and charity are never more attractive, than when adorning a



minister of the gospel ; the talents of a sterner and more masculine stamp are required to trace the plan of a campaign, or to reduce a factious nobility to subordination. In order justly to appreciate the abilities of Richelieu, we ought to compare the situation of France when he was first entrusted with the direction of affairs, with that in which he left it at his death. He found the kingdom distracted by domestic dissensions, and the royal prerogative curtailed and fettered by the turbulent ambition of a haughty aristocracy. Before he quitted the world, he had stripped the nobility of all those dangerous privileges, which are incompatible with the good of society; and which, though frequently exercised for their private aggrandisement, were hardly ever employed for the benefit of the people. Till the cardinal was invested with absolute authority—and authority more absolute was never trusted to the hands of a subject—Europe had been accustomed to contemplate, with hopeless dismay, the overwhelming power of Austria, sweeping progressively away every feeble barrier that checked for a moment her ambitious career ; but, while he ruled in the name of a contemptible bigot, he not only raised an insurmountable barrier against her future encroachments, but laid the foundations of that extensive glory, to which his country attained during the following reign. Assuming success as the criterion of merit, and, when a proper field is opened for the display of genius it may fairly be taken as such, Richelieu unquestionably deserves an eminent station among the most illustrious statesmen, who ever excited the applause or the execration of mankind.

Such are the rude outlines of the character of a

minister, whose vigorous counsels gave strength and stability to a government, which civil dissensions and a disputed succession had rendered the seat of anarchy and confusion. The portrait of Richelieu, like every figure of colossal proportions, appears to greatest advantage when viewed at a distance; but, when minutely inspected, presents to the eye of the judicious critic many striking defects. The same haughty spirit, which, invested with the splendid form of ambition, impelled him to undertake the humiliation of Austria, when influencing his actions in private life, assumed the less dignified character of vanity. Not content with excelling the greater part of his contemporaries in valour, and wisdom, and enterprize, he had the weakness to aspire to equal celebrity for his skill in managing a horse, or turning an epigram; though, in all probability, he was much inferior in horsemanship to a common dragoon, and was indebted for the praises bestowed on his literary productions, to the borrowed pen of a poetical flatterer.

The genius of Richelieu had too long inspired the enemies of France with admiration and terror, for his death to appear unimportant. The news of that event was in consequence received at Vienna with marks of exultation, highly honourable to the talents of the deceased. Persuaded that France would be speedily reduced to the necessity of suing for peace, the Austrian ministers no longer manifested the same inclination for assembling a congress, in the hope that Louis's death, an event shortly to be expected, from his declining health, might produce an order of things more favourable than the present, for the attainment of their ambitious designs.

At Paris, however, the death of Richelieu was attended with no political change,\* because he was instantly replaced by Mazarin, a man most intimately acquainted with all the plans of his predecessor, employed by him in the management of various negotiations, and recommended by him to the king with his latest breath, as the person best qualified to direct the councils of France. Apprehensive that the loss of a minister, so decidedly hostile to the house of Austria, might weaken the confidence of the allies, Mazarin made haste to assure the Swedish government, that no alteration would take place with respect to the political system pursued by his predecessor, but that the king was determined to maintain all his engagements with inflexible fidelity.\*

Though sincerity be a virtue, to which the warmest admirers of the Italian cardinal have never pretended that he was addicted, yet, upon the present occasion, he adhered to his promise with a punctilious exactness, which, considering the principles upon which he usually acted, may fairly be denominated anomalous. Not even the plenitude of power, to which he attained under the feeble administration of a volatile woman, produced any change in his conduct with respect to foreign affairs. For that miserable phantom of degraded royalty, to which, by a strange perversion of language, flattery

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\* "Voilà un grand politique mort!" was the remark of the king, to one of his attendants, when the death of the minister was announced. There have been sovereigns, from whose lips an observation like this might have been attributed to philosophy, or to a mind indifferent to all terrestrial concerns, but in the son of Henry IV. it was characteristic of the man, and argued a total want of every amiable feeling.

† Bougeant, 504.

prostituted the title of JUST, outlived Richelieu but a very few months.\*

It has been the good fortune of Louis XIII. to meet with apologists, who endeavour to palliate the want of social affection; oppression the most despotic; insensibility the most obdurate; ingratitude toward a mother, by whom he was adored; ill-treatment of a wife, who deserved his affection;† and a heart that could sacrifice, with equal indifference, the lives of his friends and the comforts of his subjects; by ascribing whatever is odious in his character to the predominating influence of Richelieu. That a creature so weak, both in body and mind, was destined to be governed by those who had nearest access to his person, is conformable to the natural order of things; but over the feelings of his own heart he held a paramount dominion, and all there was in dissonance with humanity. In the hands of a bigot, Louis would have unquestionably proved as great an enemy to toleration as Philip II. of Spain, or the murderers of Cranmer and Ridley; but, happily for France, he was controlled by a minister too enlightened to think that a compulsory faith can be essential to salvation; and who exerted the ascendancy of superior genius, not in framing articles of belief, or torturing heretics, but in promoting the prosperity of his country.

Louis XIII. with a presumption truly monar-

\* The latter died on the 4th of December, 1642; the king on the 14th of May, 1643.

† It is the lot of some people to give popularity to those whom they persecute. "*La reine etait adoree, beaucoup plus par ses disgraces, que par son merite. On ne l'avait vu que persecutee, et la souffrance aux personnes de ce rang tient lieu d'une grande vertu.*"—*Memoires du Cardinal de Retz*, i. 93.

chical, had arranged a plan for the government of France during the minority of his son, who was only four years old when he mounted the throne. But no sooner was Anne of Austria invested with the name of regent, which was all that her husband intended her to possess, than she artfully contrived to get rid of the council, by which her authority was circumscribed; and, having assumed to herself all the prerogatives of royalty, she confirmed the appointment of Mazarin, who, though he originally derived his power from the weakness of his mistress, certainly owed its continuation to her affection.\*

We are now entering upon a reign, to which the vanity of Frenchmen is fond of recurring, as to an era of national splendour, and which they compare, for taste and erudition, to the brilliant ages of Augustus and Leo X. Influenced by his admiration for a period, when the arts and the sciences flourished under the patronage of an intelligent minister, and an extravagant court, the philosopher of Ferney† has attempted to designate the seventeenth century by the name of the monarch he admired; though, to use the words of an elegant writer, the reign of Louis XIV. "was the consummation of whatever is afflicting, or degrading, in the history of the human race."‡ Few men's characters have been less understood. The studied display of theatrical pomp has been mistaken for grandeur and magnanimity; and the murderer of the protestants, and

\* 1643. *Mem. de Retz*. 94. Bougeant, 516.

† In conformity to custom, I have honoured Voltaire with the title of philosopher, though it be one to which he has little pretension.

‡ Mackintosh, *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, 19.

the incendiary of the Palatinate, has been held up to the world as a model of heroism, and adorned with the appellation of GREAT, because he was haughty, profuse, and ostentatious; a lover of pageantry, a friend to magnificence, and strutted more majestically upon the stage of royalty, than any contemporary sovereign. Yet, if we strip off the robes and trappings of state, we shall find a miserable compound of superstition and voluptuousness: when young, wallowing in pleasure with Asiatic licentiousness, under the guidance of a dissolute mistress; but, no sooner were his passions blunted by age, than the court of Paphos assumed the gloomy appearance of a Carthusian convent, and the most gallant of princes, submitting to the fetters of an antiquated prude, affected austerities which would have disgraced the puny understanding of a friar. A libertine in youth, he sanctioned by his example that infamous commerce, which fashion tolerates under the title of gallantry, till conjugal fidelity became an object of ridicule among a vain and profligate people. But, when he was no longer sensible to the attractions of beauty, he expected that the opinions and feelings of his subjects should conform implicitly to the rigid standard of his own intolerant bigotry.

Previously to the death of Louis XIII. the Duke of Enghien, so deservedly celebrated under the title of the Great Condé, notwithstanding his inexperience, had been selected to defend the northern frontier. Unwilling, however, to trust the security of the nation to the discretion of a youth, who had just entered his twenty-third year, the king chose the old Mareschal de L'Hopital for the purpose of checking the impetuosity of D'Enghien: and is

said to have given him secret instructions to remain on the defensive, and rather to suffer the frontier to be laid waste, than hazard a battle against superior numbers. This project, however, by no means agreed with the ardent ambition of the prince, who would have preferred to fall at the head of his troops rather than tarnish the glory of his country.\*

Anxious to signalize his name by some brilliant exploit, he advanced with the resolution of attacking the Spaniards, who, under Don Francisco de Melos, were besieging Rocroi; and, when admonished by Gassion, to whom alone he confided the important secret, of the danger attending a defeat, he heroically answered, "I at least shall never witness the disaster; for never again will I enter Paris, unless as a victor."

Situated in the midst of a spacious plain, and surrounded by woods and morasses, Rocroi is accessible only by narrow defiles, which, in most parts, extend for several leagues. On the side of Champagne the forest contracts, but the ground is swampy, and so thickly covered with wood, that it is impracticable for troops to advance in compact and regular bodies. No precaution had been omitted by the Spanish commander, which seemed likely to facilitate his triumph; the camp was defended by regular intrenchments, and the outposts stationed in such a manner, that he was sure to receive the earliest intelligence of any attempt to disturb his operations. Meanwhile, the siege being prosecuted with unremitting activity, several of the outworks were already taken, and the garrison, re-

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\* Histoire de Louis de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, par Desormaux, l. 70.

duced to the utmost distress, was shortly expected to capitulate. In a word, so far from dreading any interruption on the part of the enemy, the Spanish general seems rather to have desired their approach, in order to enjoy the additional glory of rendering them spectators of his success.\*

Upon the return of Gassion, who was sent to reconnoitre the country, D'Enghien communicated his report to a council of war, declaring his intention of forcing a passage, and supporting his opinion, by remarking, that if the enemy should attempt to defend the defile, he must necessarily weaken the line of circumvallation, and of course facilitate the introduction of supplies. If, on the contrary, he should remain in his camp, the pass must be left unguarded; and, in case they should be able to reach the plain, the event must be decided by a battle. The enthusiasm of the hero was rapidly communicated to all who heard him. Even the caution of age was reduced to silence; but, if L'Hopital did not venture openly to oppose the enterprise, it was not because he approved the desperate attempt, but because he was firmly persuaded that the Spaniards, by occupying the defile, would render it impossible for them to proceed.†

The sagacity of age had miscalculated. On the following day‡ the army advanced in order of battle, without experiencing the smallest opposition. Had Melos thought fit to avail himself of the advantages which his situation afforded, the destruction of the French must have been inevitable; but, from an ill-founded confidence in his own resources, he suf-

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\* Histoire de Louis de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, par Desormicaux, l. 77.

† Ibid. 79.

‡ May 18, 1643.



ferred them to advance without molestation, convinced, that when they once should have entered the plain, it would be impossible for them to escape.† It must, however, in justice to the Spanish general, be admitted, that this opinion was not hastily embraced; but that various events had occurred to deceive him respecting the strength of the enemy. Their force had been nearly doubled during their march, and this accession of numbers had been so carefully concealed, that no account of it had reached the Spaniards. The discovery of this mistake was far, however, from abating the confidence of the besiegers, whose army was composed of veteran troops, renowned alike for valour and discipline. Relying upon his superiority, both in numbers and artillery, Melos determined not to decline an engagement, presumptuously offered by the temerity of a foe, whose rashness he imputed to youth and inexperience. Yet, though firmly persuaded that fortune was preparing for him eternal renown, he prudently resolved to omit no precaution, which could tend to facilitate victory. Orders were instantly issued for General Beck to join him with six thousand Germans; and he intended, if practicable, to postpone the conflict till the arrival of this reinforcement. D'Enghein, however, having penetrated his design, resolved to frustrate it by an immediate attack; but, at the very moment when he was going to give the word of command, he was unexpectedly forced to alter his plan by the rashness of one of his generals. Hurried on by an imprudent, and therefore culpable, ardour, La Ferté Se-

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\* Histoire de Louis de Bourbon, Prince de Condé par Desormeaux, l. 85.

neterre had unadvisedly quitted his post, in the hope of being able to throw succours into the town, and in full conviction that the importance of the service would excuse his having acted in contradiction to orders.

The time required for repairing an error, which Melos by decision might have rendered fatal, obliged D'Enghein to postpone the attack till the following morning. The armies, posted on opposite hills, were separated by a valley skirted by woods, which afforded an opportunity for the Spanish commander to place in ambush a body of musketeers, with orders to assail the enemy in flank in the midst of the battle. D'Enghein, however, no sooner discovered the project, than he charged them in person at the head of the cavalry, and cut them in pieces to a man. He then ordered Gassion to fall upon the rear, while he attacked the enemy in front. By a desperate charge their left wing was broken, when Gassion was directed to follow the fugitive, while the duke, rushing impetuously upon the Walloons and Italians, occasioned a terrible carnage.

But, while the courage of D'Enghien bore down every thing before him, L'Hopital, who was personally opposed to Don Melos, was driven from the field in confusion, and even obliged to abandon his artillery. But, at this decisive moment, when the Spaniards considered their triumph to be secure, they were suddenly attacked in the rear by the duke; and, as their ranks were disordered in the ardour of pursuit, they were quickly thrown into confusion.

Though the fortune of the day was in a great measure decided, much remained to be done. Many

of the great masses of infantry were still unbroken, and, if joined by Beck, might be able at least to secure a retreat. Gassion, on whom the duke seems principally to have relied, was accordingly sent with some regiments of horse to oppose him, while D'Enghein, with the remainder of the troops, surrounded the Spaniards. Convinced that there was no longer any hope of escaping, several of the officers quitted their ranks, and expressed by signs their readiness to surrender. No sooner was the duke aware of their intention than he galloped towards them. Supposing that he was about to renew the attack, the Spaniards fired, but fortunately he escaped unhurt. Exasperated at an act, which was naturally imputed to premeditated treachery, the French spontaneously rushed upon the enemy, and slaughtered numbers, before it was possible to restrain their ferocity. At length, however, the carnage ceased; and Gassion arrived with the pleasing intelligence, that the Germans, informed of the defeat of Melos, had retreated with the utmost precipitation, leaving all their artillery behind. The joy of the conqueror was now complete. Falling upon his knees in the presence of both armies, he returned thanks to the Almighty for the signal success with which his efforts had been crowned; and, then embracing Gassion, thanked him publicly for the important services which he had that day performed.\*

The loss of the Spaniards was immense. Out of eighteen thousand infantry, nine thousand were left dead upon the field of battle, and seven thousand

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\* Histoire de Condé, i. 105.

taken.\* The capture of Thionville, at that time reckoned one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, and besieged in opposition to the timid councils of men, who presumed to estimate the efforts of genius according to the puny standard of their own incapacity, was among the signal advantages of victory.

The enthusiastic applause with which the conqueror was received upon his return to Paris, proved no less gratifying to his personal feelings, than it was an object of jealousy to the court, weak enough to have preferred the fall of Rocroi to the popularity of a hero, whose brilliant achievements deservedly rendered him the idol and ornament of the nation, but whose elevated ambition was not likely to yield to the sordid temptations of interest.† No sooner had he begun to participate in the pleasures of the capital, than he was summoned away to the banks of the Rhine, where Guebriant, in spite of all his exertions, was compelled to retire before the superior forces of Mercè. Diminished by sickness, fatigue, and desertion, the French were reduced to so deplorable a condition, that without speedy and efficacious support, they would have been under the necessity of evacuating Alsace and Lorraine. Besides, the spirit of the soldiers was so entirely broken, that nothing but the presence of so popular a general, could have prevented their total dispersion. With a considerable rein-

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\* Castillian pride (I use that word in its noblest signification), was never exemplified in a more dignified manner, than in the following reply of a Spanish officer to a Frenchman, who inquired the amount of their infantry before the battle. "You have only to reckon," said the haughty captain, "the slain and the prisoners." Ibid. 112.

† La fameuse bataille de Rocroi (says Cardinal de Retz), donna autant de surêté au royaume, qu'elle lui apporta de gloire. i. 92.

forcement of veteran troops, and an abundant supply of provisions, the Duke joined Guebriant in the vicinity of Strasburg, and by praises and exhortations gave courage and confidence to the army.\*

Being thus enabled to resume an offensive attitude, Guebriant immediately crossed the Rhine, and invested Rotweil; but, while inspecting the works, was killed by a random shot.† This misfortune was only the prelude to others still more disastrous. Before a new commander was appointed, the Weimerian army was nearly annihilated. Eight French regiments, being surprised at Duttingen, surrendered at discretion; while a brigade of Scots, and another of Italians, suffered themselves to be hewn in pieces, rather than submit to the ignominy of a capitulation.

Such an occurrence, though always a subject of bitter regret, was particularly distressing, at a time when all Europe was tempted, by the prostration of Austria, to cherish serious expectations of peace; because, so great was the infatuation of the imperial ministers, that the faintest ray of prosperous fortune was sufficient to efface every idea of accommodation. We have seen with what reluctance they consented to treat, even at a time when the victorious banners of Sweden floated within sight of Vienna; but when the French had no longer an army on the Rhine, to occupy the attention of Bavaria, and Denmark had declared against Sweden, they no longer doubted that the welcome moment was arrived, when they would be enabled to prescribe the conditions of peace to a weak and divided confederacy.

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\* Histoire de Condé, i. 136.

† 1643. Galetti, i. 571.

The rupture with Denmark requires further illustration, because it was clearly the policy of Sweden not to have quarrelled with a protestant power, provided it could have been avoided without the sacrifice of character. Since the commencement of hostilities between Sweden and Austria, Christian had beheld with jealous eyes the brilliant achievements of the former, and had never ceased to embarrass their operations, either by avowed opposition, or clandestine intrigue. For, being conscious of having merited the resentment of a government not accustomed to submit to affronts, he felt assured, that whenever a proper opportunity should occur, the conquest of Denmark would be attempted. And it was only with a view of perplexing affairs, that he was tempted to offer his mediation. The same spirit of hostility impelled him to persuade the widow of Gustavus to abandon her daughter, and her country, upon pretences no less frivolous than unfounded. The commerce of the Baltic was also fettered by new regulations and duties, and a secret treaty concluded with Austria, by which he engaged to transport an army into Sweden, while her forces were occupied in Moravia.

Too prudent to augment the number of their foes, in case the evil could have been remedied by pacific explanations, the council of regency expostulated with Christian in the mildest language, representing the injury which the nation must sustain, in case the navigation of the Baltic should be interrupted. These remonstrances, however, so far from producing the desired effect, increased the evils of which they complained; because, being regarded by the king as demonstrations of weakness, they tended to augment his presumption. Nothing,

therefore, remained for the Swedish government, except a gallant appeal to the sword; and the attack was conducted with so much secrecy, that the tempest burst upon the fertile plains of Holstein, before the smallest suspicion was entertained of an invasion.

We left Torstenson in full march for Moravia, where he arrived in safety, after braving Gallas, and insulting the capital of Bohemia.\* The temerity of the latter was so completely fettered by a positive order from Vienna, not to hazard the destruction of the only army that now remained for the protection of Austria, that he had no alternative left, except to behold the Swedes deliver Olmutz, and compel the emperor, who was on his way to join his forces, to return with precipitation to his capital.

While Torstenson was occupied in overrunning the country between the Elbe and the Danube, he received secret instructions to abandon Moravia, and return to the Baltic with the utmost expedition, in hopes that he might be able to make himself master of Holstein, before Christian should have completed his armament. Without communicating his design to a single officer, he prepared to carry it into execution; and, having deceived the enemy by threatening the Silesian fortresses, he suddenly crossed the Oder, and, following the course of the Elbe as far as Torgau, he passed in sight of Gallas, enchanted with the idea of having compelled the Swedes, by his masterly movements, to abandon their plan of attacking Bohemia.

Upon his arrival at Havelberg, the Swedish ge-

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\* Puffendorf, xv. 5, 6. Galetti, 559.

Meanwhile another army, under the orders of Horn, invaded Schonen and Bleckinghen; and, had it not been prevented by boisterous weather from crossing the Belt, would probably have planted the Swedish standard on the towers of Copenhagen.

Christian at last discovered his folly, in having braved the resentment of Sweden. Cut off from all communication with the only ally to whom he could recur for assistance, and for whose service he had hazarded his crown, he was upon the point of beholding himself stripped of his dominions, and thus fulfilling a prediction, vulgarly attributed to Tycho Brahe, who is said to have foretold, that Christian the Fourth should be driven by his enemies into exile.\*

A result so different from what he expected, could not fail of alarming the emperor, who felt that his honour and interest were equally concerned, in saving an unfortunate prince, led by his promises to the brink of a precipice. He accordingly sent the most positive orders for Gallas immediately to march to his succour, while Hatsfeld was employed in opposing Konigsmark in the archbishopric of Bremen; from which he compelled the Swedes to retire.† Gallas, on the contrary, completely failed; though he presumptuously boasted, by confining the enemy within the narrow bounds of the Cimbric peninsula, to reduce them to unconditional submission. Such a project, when counteracted by the genius of Torstenson, was not of easy execution. After forming a junction with Colorado and Bruai, Gallas hastened forward for the purpose of occupying the pass between Sleswick and Stapleholm,

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\* Schiller, iv.

† Puffendorf, xiv. 3.



the possession of which would have greatly embarrassed the Swedes, if not totally precluded their retreat. But their active commander, having penetrated his design, rendered it abortive by the celerity of his movements. Having taken possession of the defile, he offered battle to the enemy, notwithstanding they were reinforced by a Danish corps, which Christian had sent to their assistance. Gallas, however, deemed it advisable to decline the conflict by a hasty retreat; during which, he was constantly harassed by the enemy.

The remainder of the summer was passed in skirmishes, in which the imperialists were constantly worsted, and frequently exposed to such terrible hardships, that before the end of the year, the well appointed army, with which Gallas boasted of ruining the Swedes, had completely melted away;\* and the reputation of its leader was sunk so low, as no longer to inspire either confidence to his friends, or terror to his opponents. No hope, therefore, could be entertained of more prosperous fortune, while he remained at the head of the troops, and Ferdinand having in consequence consented to recall him, Hatsfeld was appointed to succeed.†

Meanwhile Götze, who commanded the Austrians in Silesia, took advantage of Torstenson's absence, to recover many places of importance. All his efforts, however, to get possession of Olmutz, proved ineffectual, though he repeatedly attempted to carry it by assault.

No sooner had Torstenson recruited his forces, by a few weeks repose, than he formed a plan for dispersing the Austrian levies before they were

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\* 1644. Puffendorf, 16.

† Ibid.

properly trained ; an enterprise which he thought might be easily accomplished during his march toward the Danube, whither he resolved to transport the torrent of war, for the purpose of approaching the dominions of Ragotzy, whose irresolute spirit required encouragement before it could be prevailed upon to make an irruption into Austria, according to the terms of the treaty. Though suffering severely from a fit of the gout, Torstenson burst into Bohemia, at the head of an army respectable for numbers, but more formidable for discipline and courage.

In order to oppose his progress, the emperor, having collected his forces from all parts of Germany, repaired in person to Prague, hoping by his presence to encourage the soldiers, whose spirits were depressed by a long series of reverses. The confidence which he was desirous of imparting to others, he felt himself in a more than common degree; because the Virgin Mary had appeared to him in a dream, and assured him of the triumph of the orthodox worship. He was doomed, however, soon to discover, that it was to the discipline of his troops, and the talents of their leaders, and not to the workings of a distempered imagination, that he ought to have trusted for success.\*

Both parties being equally anxious to determine the campaign, a battle became unavoidable. Having taken advantage of the frost to cross the Mulda, the Swedish general advanced upon Tabor, a few leagues from which he found the imperialists drawn up near Jankowily, in order of battle.†

The fate of the day being supposed to depend

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\* Puffendorf, xvii. 3.

† February 24th, 1645.

upon the possession of a neighbouring hill, detachments from both armies were sent to occupy it; but the activity of the Swedes outstripped their competitors. Yet, notwithstanding this decisive advantage, and the death of Götze, who fell at the head of his division, the Austrians defended themselves with so much obstinacy, that all the Swedes could obtain, after incredible exertions, was the barren honour of remaining masters of the field of battle; and this triumph had been purchased so dearly, that it is probable, the enemy might have effected their retreat during the following night, with little molestation, if they had chosen to avail themselves of the opportunity. But, instead of acting with the caution which common prudence suggested, and the emperor's orders prescribed, Hatsfeld improvidently suffered the combat to be renewed, which terminated in the entire discomfiture of his troops, and in his own captivity. Alarmed for the consequences with which his temerity was likely to be attended, he attempted to exculpate himself at the expense of the other commanders, and particularly of John of Wert, the Bavarian general, to whose impetuosity, in renewing the engagement, he imputed the ruin of the army.\*

Ferdinand had reposed such unbounded confidence in the assurance of the celestial messenger, that he was overwhelmed with consternation at the triumph of heresy, after its fall had been thus miraculously predicted. Deprived, at one blow of his only army, and of his ablest general (for so low was the military reputation of Austria sunk, that even Hatsfeld was looked up to with respect), and

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\* Galetti, i. 581. Puffendorf, 8.

alarmed for his personal safety, he quitted Prague on the following morning with so much precipitation, that he carried away scarcely any thing except his crown. Without allowing himself a moment's repose, he continued his journey, in defiance of cold and hunger, till he reached Pilsen, upwards of fifty miles distant from the capital of Bohemia. From thence he proceeded with equal expedition through Ratisbonne to Vienna. By an extraordinary edict he appointed his brother Leopold to the command of the forces in Upper Austria, and empowered him to call out every man capable of serving his country. Gallas, who rejoiced to discover that others possessed the talent of ruining an army, almost as expeditiously as himself, and endeavoured to justify his own incapacity by the errors and temerity of his successor, being now again restored to the imperial favour, was entrusted with the defence of Bohemia. Nothing can more strikingly demonstrate the emperor's distress, than his being obliged to confide the destinies of Austria, at so tremendous a crisis, to a man conspicuous for nothing but his presumption and his reverses.\*

Eager to push his victorious arms to the gates of Vienna, and compel Ferdinand to agree to an equitable peace, Torstenson directed his march toward the Danube. Intelligence of the victory obtained at Jankouritz was immediately communicated to the Waivode of Transylvania, who was earnestly exhorted to assist, by a powerful diversion, in the humiliation of Ferdinand, now reduced to such extremities, that a little perseverance could hardly fail to lay him prostrate at the feet of his enemies.

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\* Puffendorf, 9.

Convinced that example is the surest method of stimulating others to active exertion, the Swedish commander, proceeding forward with uninterrupted celerity, made himself master of Krems, a strong fortress on the Danube, not more than twelve leagues from Vienna, where he expected to have found a sufficient number of boats to have constructed a bridge over that river. But the vigilance of the enemy had frustrated his design, by carrying away, or destroying the vessels.\*

Torstenson's anxiety to appear on the opposite shore was greatly increased by a message from Ragotzy, declaring his resolution of remaining inactive till he was assured of meeting with effectual support. He accordingly followed the course of the Danube, convinced that he should be able to effect a passage somewhere between Vienna and Presburg; and no less persuaded that, whenever this could be accomplished, the waivode would be ready to assist him with a powerful army. Finding, however, that punctuality in performing a promise was not a Transylvanian virtue, he was obliged to relinquish his plan for the invasion of Hungary.†

The acquisition of Brünn, the strongest fortress in Moravia, would have afforded an asylum under every vicissitude of fortune, and a secure deposit for plunder and military magazines. Yet the undertaking presented so many difficulties, as almost to counterbalance these advantages. The fortifications had lately undergone a thorough repair; the town was well supplied with provisions; and the garrison, consisting of veteran troops, was commanded by De Souches, a Frenchman by birth, who had

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\* Puffendorf, 9.

† Ibid. 10.

formerly served in the Swedish army; but having been suspected by Stalhantz of betraying his plans to the Austrian commander, had deserted in order to escape the scaffold.\*

Notwithstanding the ravages occasioned by sickness and fatigue, the perseverance of Torstenson would, in all probability, have ultimately prevailed, had he not been deserted by Ragotzy, who, with premeditated treachery, availed himself of his situation to conclude an advantageous peace with the emperor, who readily acceded to any demands, which tended to alleviate his present distress, by enabling him to concentrate his remaining force for the destruction of a more formidable enemy.† During four successive months, the Swedish commander had exhausted all his military skill for the reduction of Brünn, directing the operations in person, though frequently suffering the most excruciating pain from a violent attack of the gout. But while he was pushing on the siege with obstinate valour, the imperialists had not been inactive. Every inducement, most likely to tempt the industrious peasant to exchange the ploughshare and mattock for a sword and helmet, had been held out by the sovereign of Austria, in order to allure recruits to his standard; and for this purpose the bounty-money had been raised beyond all former precedent, not excepting the prodigality of Wallenstein. By these means a formidable force had been collected, which kept the Swedes in constant alarm, and even threatened to cut off their retreat. But as it would have been impossible for the Austrians to have hazarded a battle, without endangering the

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\* Puffendorf, 12.

† Galetti, 589.

safety of the imperial crown. Ferdinand had prudently given the most positive orders, both to his brother and Gallas, to remain on the defensive; and so to select their positions, that while they kept the enemy in continual apprehension, they might themselves be secure from an attack. These considerations determined the Swedish general to raise the siege the moment he was able to support the motion of a litter; and, as all the passes toward the Danube had been previously occupied by the foe, he thought it advisable to abandon every hope of reducing Moravia, and to seek an asylum in Bohemia. During his march thither he was followed by the imperialists; but so great was the skill with which his operations were conducted, or so positive the injunctions given by Ferdinand to abstain from fighting, that he was never molested during his retreat. Upon reaching Leutmeritz, on the frontiers of Saxony, he resigned the command into the hands of Wrangel, whom Christina had appointed to succeed him; and, crowned with glory, retired to a private station, hoping to recover his health, when no longer exposed to the laborious duties of a soldier.\*

The disgrace sustained by the Weimerian army, after the death of Guebriant, at Duttlingen, made so strong an impression upon the public feelings, that Cardinal Mazarin deemed it requisite, by every possible exertion, to recover the ascendancy in Germany, which France had enjoyed since the battle of Rocroi. Turenne was accordingly sent to collect the fugitives. This was the first time of his being entrusted with an independent command; and it

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\* Puffendorf, 24. Galetti, 591.

must be admitted, that no general ever commenced his military career under circumstances less auspicious. Having employed the winter in preparations for the ensuing campaign, he endeavoured to animate his little army by a predatory incursion into Swabia ; but, upon the approach of Mercy, the Bavarian general, with a force too strong to be braved with impunity, he was obliged to retire, and even compelled to remain a tranquil spectator of the operations of the enemy, who laid siege to Friburg in the Brisgau, the most important fortress, still retained by the French in Germany.\*

Mazarin was so alarmed for the safety of Turenne, that he sent positive instructions for him to remain on the defensive, till the arrival of the Duke of Enghein, who was marching to join him with considerable reinforcements. Yet in spite of the activity of that enterprising prince, he endured the mortification of hearing upon his route, that Friburg had already surrendered. To sit down contented with fruitless exertion did not belong to the character of Enghein. No sooner had he joined the Weimerians, than he formed the bold resolution of attacking the enemy, in spite of every local advantage. To a position highly formidable from its natural strength, the prudence of Mercy had added every support, which skill the most consummate could employ. Yet the numerous obstacles which presented themselves to the assailants, served only to inflame the courage of Enghein, who, instead of calculating the difficulties which he had to surmount, thought only of the glory to be acquired by surmounting them. After exploring the country

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\* Histoire de Condé I. 166. Bougeant ii. 91.



in concert with Turenne, he resolved with his own troops to attack the enemy in front, while his colleague, at the head of the Weimerians, arriving by a circuitous route through narrow defiles, should distract their attention by assailing their flank. In case it should be practicable for both divisions to act simultaneously, it was probable, amid the confusion arising from a double assault, that the enemy's lines might be penetrated. But as the only road, by which it was possible for Turenne to pass, was long and intricate, it was extremely difficult to calculate the moment of his arrival with tolerable precision; and, hence it arose that the Weimerians were unable to reach the appointed spot till some hours after the combatants were engaged.\* Led on by a commander, whom they believed invincible, the French at length reached the enemy's intrenchments, when they paused with astonishment at contemplating the difficulties still to be surmounted. Aware that under similar circumstances deliberation in soldiers is a symptom of fear, the duke, resolving not to allow them another moment for reflection, threw his staff into the trenches, thus announcing to his followers, that no alternative remained between death and victory. This gallant action proved decisive. After a desperate resistance the Bavarians were compelled to abandon their lines, and to retire to a fort, which Mercy had constructed as a place of refuge in the event of a reverse.\*

Such was the position of the hostile armies when night put an end to the combat. Notwithstanding

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\* The battle took place on the 3d of August, 1644.

† *Histoire de Condé*, 167.

the French had displayed the utmost intrepidity, and their commander talents of the highest order, their situation was far from secure. Though they had carried their point, it had not been accomplished without considerable loss; the infantry was broken and dispersed, either through the confusion attending a repulse, or by the hurry of a too eager pursuit. Should Mercy fall upon them before they could collect, they might be destroyed with the greatest facility. At all events, he would have time to rally his forces before the dawn of day, when the engagement might be renewed upon equal terms. Under these perilous circumstances, the duke embraced the only plan which prudence prescribed. He passed the night in fortifying the redoubts of which he was master; while the incessant clash of military music pointed out to his scattered troops the point of re-union, and served at the same time to communicate to Turenne, if within reach of the sound, the welcome tidings of his partial success.

Too cautious to trust any thing to the caprices of fortune, for which vigilance was able to provide, the Bavarian general had allotted a part of his force for the defence of the valley, through which Turenne was preparing to penetrate. That able commander, by dint of perseverance, had, however, nearly surmounted every difficulty, and had advanced far enough to hear the noise of the trumpets, when he was prevented from proceeding by the obscurity of night. It is difficult to conceive a situation of greater anxiety than that in which Enghein was placed, when the sound of artillery, re-echoing through the mountains, first announced the approach of the Weimerians. The rising sun might

discover their defeat, or shew them advancing in full assurance of victory ; but before the dawn of day no assistance could be afforded, however great or urgent their distress. All that circumstances permitted was to make preparations for renewing the battle, and to this all his efforts were directed.

With anxious expectation he beheld the darkness gradually disperse, but returning light served only to unfold a scene of disappointment, no less unexpected than severe. The obstinate valour, displayed by the French in various attacks, having led Mercy to think no obstacles sufficient to impede their progress, he had withdrawn his army during the night to another position, far more inaccessible than the former, where he appeared determined to await them, in a place of apparent security. Enraged at beholding himself deprived of the glory, which his sanguine disposition had anticipated, the duke allowed his impetuosity to get the better of prudence, and hastily embraced the desperate resolution of renewing the combat under every disadvantage.\* The difficulty of the undertaking was greatly augmented by the necessity of postponing it till the following day ; because a violent storm, which had fallen during the night, had rendered the roads impracticable for artillery.

Such was the position of the Bavarians, that if their numbers had been equal to the extent of the lines, they might have reposed in perfect security ; and even deficient as they were, it was the excess of temerity to attack them. In proportion to the strength of the contending armies, the ensuing action proved one of the most sanguinary recorded in history.

Battalion succeeded battalion, and threw away their lives ineffectually. Turenne, Grammont, and Marsin in vain attempted to rally the fugitives, and lead them to another attack. The panic, inspired by the obstinacy of the foe, was proof against threats and intreaties. Hoping that the sight of a prince of the blood, exposing himself like a common grenadier, might awaken the spirit of the soldiers, the duke deliberately advanced, with a few chosen companions, within pistol shot of the palisades. Not one of his companions escaped unhurt, and his own clothes were perforated by musket balls in various places. Darkness a second time put an end to the slaughter, and saved the French from utter destruction, as the vanity of their leader never calculated the value of human blood when put in competition with glory.\*

Exasperated at their failure, the duke attempted to cut off the retreat of the Bavarians, who, in spite of their success, were too weak to retain their position; but Mercy, being aware of the design, had arranged his plans with so much ability, that, notwithstanding the French were in possession of some commanding ground, they could not prevent him from withdrawing his troops, notwithstanding he was compelled, by the badness of the roads, to leave his artillery behind.†

The Bavarians being no longer in a condition to keep the field, the French availed themselves of

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\* Mazarin, when conversing with the duke after his return to court, respecting the enormity of the loss, is said to have been affected even to the shedding of tears. Upon which D'Enghein observed, with a levity by no means creditable to his feelings, that the Parisian women would make up the loss in a single night. Schiller, iv.

† *Histoire de Gondé*, 196. Bougeant, ii. 91.

their superiority, to reduce all the country between Bale and Coblentz; while in proportion as they advanced, their numbers augmented, because most of the garrisons which submitted to their arms were happy to be received into their service.\*

The joy of the Parisians at the sight of a prince at that time the idol of a nation, too prone to admire military renown as the proudest of all human attainments, was considerably damped by the reverses sustained in Catalonia; where Marshal de la Mothe, after tranquilly witnessing the fall of Lerida, allowed himself to be beaten disgracefully. Eager to obliterate the stain his reputation had received, he invested Tarragona; but, after wasting several weeks in fruitless attempts, and losing great part of his army, he was at length compelled to abandon the enterprize.†

The campaign in Flanders, though distinguished by no striking disaster, was not productive of any event to excite the transports of the people. Jealous of the glory so justly acquired by the conqueror of Rocroi, the volatile Gaston ‡ aspired to equal celebrity, though destitute of the talents requisite to obtain it. With an army equal to almost any undertaking, his exploits were confined to the capture of Gravelines,§ an inconsiderable town between Calais and Dunkerque, but magnified by flattery into the key of the Spanish Netherlands, and industriously represented, by his numerous dependants, as likely to facilitate the conquest of maritime Flanders.

\* Bougeant, li. 95. Puffendorf, xvi. 29. Histoire de Condé, 218.

† Bougeant, 97.

‡ Duke of Orleans, and uncle to the king.

§ Bougeant, 98.

The following campaign proved more glorious for the French, though it commenced under unfavourable auspices. But, before we attend to the exploits of the principal army under Enghien and Turenne, it is necessary to give a hasty sketch of the operations in other quarters, beginning with the war in Lorraine. By a treaty, recently concluded with the Parisian court, the sovereign of that province had regained some part of his dominions ; but, instead of acquiring prudence in the school of adversity, he no sooner found himself master of a few battalions, than he displayed his attachment to the house of Austria, by employing them for the annoyance of that very power, to whose clemency he was so greatly indebted. Convinced by repeated trials that it was in vain to trust to the discretion of a prince, whom no misfortunes could humble, and no engagements could bind, Mazarin perceived the necessity of depriving him of the means of aggression, by taking possession of all the places which had been lately ceded ; and this was accomplished with so much facility, as scarcely to merit the historian's notice.

The army in Flanders was again placed under the orders of the Duke of Orleans, and was strong enough to reduce several towns in Flanders, and Artois, in defiance of the skill of Piccolomini. Mar-dyck, Cassel, and Bethune were successfully taken ; when Gaston, eager to enjoy the public applause, left Gassion and Rantzau to follow up the blow, and returned covered with laurels to Paris. After the duke's departure, a junction being effected with the Dutch, under the Prince of Orange, the combined armies forced the passage of the Scheldt, and compelled Hulst to surrender after an obstinate de-

fence, while detachments from the main army re-reduced Lens and Orchies. This brilliant success, however, was of short duration. Toward the end of the campaign Cassel was surprised by Lamboy, who was no sooner master of that important fortress than he demolished the citadel: Mardyck was also taken in a similar manner, without a single soldier being able to escape.\*

Harcourt, highly distinguished for his conduct in Italy, was sent into Catalonia with the title of viceroy. Anxious to satisfy the public expectation, he commenced his administration by the siege of Rosas, which was defended by D. Diego de Cavalleros, with all the chivalrous bravery of romance. Not content with directing the operations of the garrison, that gallant officer was frequently seen defending a breach with a pike in his hand, and intrepidly repelling the assailants. Yet in spite of his efforts, the perseverance of the besiegers ultimately prevailed; and the conquest of Rosas assured an easy communication between Ronssillon and Barcelona, an object of the highest importance. Following up his success, the viceroy crossed the Segre in sight of the Spaniards; and, attacking them before they had recovered from their surprise, soon threw them into irretrievable confusion.\*

But these operations, however brilliant their results, sunk into insignificance when compared with the exertions of the armies in Germany, where the fate of Europe was to be decided. Yet there, unfortunately, at the commencement of the campaign, affairs assumed a less favourable aspect.

No sooner was Turenne made acquainted with

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\* 1645. Bougeant, ii. 301.

† Ibid. 303.

the glorious victory obtained at Iankowitz, than he hastened to avail himself of the weakness of the enemy. Having passed the Rhine and the Neckar without opposition, he formed a plan for overrunning Franconia, before Mercy was in a situation to resist him. But that general having assembled the Bavarian forces, watched his motions so attentively, that he was prevented from undertaking any enterprise of moment.

At length the German cavalry, which formed the strength of his army, complained of being straitened in their quarters, and so continually disturbed him by their remonstrances, that he consented to their being cantoned in the neighbouring villages, while he fixed his head quarters at Mergentheim. No inadvertence could escape the attention of Mercy, who was no sooner made acquainted with the dispositions of the enemy, than he anticipated their total destruction. Without a moment's delay, he put his troops in motion; yet Turenne, whose vigilance was not inferior to his own, was apprised of his intentions, and was actually preparing for a spirited resistance, when he was attacked by the Bavarians with so much impetuosity, that no efforts of courage could avail.\* Rosa was taken, gallantly fighting at the head of the cavalry, and Turenne himself was obliged to quit the field with such precipitation, that for some days it was believed that he had either perished in the battle, or fallen into the hands of the victors. It is universally admitted by all the French writers, that at least half of the army was destroyed, and that Turenne was never able to assemble more than five thousand men, though previously to the action he

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\* April 25th.



had more than double that number under his command. With this miserable remnant he sought an asylum in Hussia, where he met with every assistance that friendship could afford, from the generous exertions of the landgravine.\*

At this calamitous crisis, which raised the hopes of the imperial ministers so high, that they again talked of prescribing the conditions of peace, all eyes were directed toward the Duke of Enghien, who appeared to the nation alone capable of retrieving the disaster; and the interests of the court for once coinciding with the wishes of the people, he received instructions to join the Weimerians, with all the troops which could possibly be assembled. The necessity of setting bounds to the progress of Mercy, induced the allies to assist him with considerable reinforcements. The landgravine recalled Geiss from Westphalia, and Königsmark was directed by the Swedish commander, to join Turenne, with the forces employed upon the Weser. So that Enghein, upon his arrival at Spires, found himself at the head of an army superior in numbers to the Bavarians.†

Anxious to retrieve the national honour by some brilliant achievement, the duke formed a plan for the reduction of Heilbrun, an important fortress on the Neckar. But, upon consulting his allies, he was disappointed to find no inclination on their part to aid him; on the contrary, both Geiss and Königsmark desired leave to retire, pretending,

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\* Histoire de Condé, 241. Bougeant, ii. 306.

† Mem. de Montglat ann. 1645. The French army consisted of 23,000 men; 5,000 of which were the remains of the Weimerians; the remainder was composed of 4000 Swedes, 6000 Hessians, and 8000 that accompanied the Duke of Enghien.

that their mission was completely fulfilled, and that they were obliged to return to their former posts, where their presence was essentially necessary. No arguments of course were left untried to induce them to relinquish the design; and Enghein at length prevailed so far, that they consented to wait the event of a battle.

Mercy, too well acquainted with the impetnosity of the French not to act with the utmost circumspection, yet hoped that, by strictly adhering to a defensive system, he should be able to wear out the enemy. This sagacious resolution did not escape the penetration of the French commanders, who endeavoured, by alarming their adversary for the safety of Heilbrun, to draw him into the plains, where he might be attacked to less disadvantage. But, upon approaching the city, they found him so strongly posted on the neighbouring heights, that they could neither pass the Neckar, nor invest the fortress, without exposing themselves to inevitable destruction.

Thus constrained to relinquish his original scheme, Enghein hoped to indemnify himself, by opening a passage into Bavaria; or at least compelling Mercy to fight upon equal terms. This project, however, by no means agreeing with the views of Königsmark, who having been accustomed to an independent command, ill-brooked the superiority of a foreigner, he positively refused to lend his assistance to its execution. The Hessian general, seeing him depart, was with difficulty persuaded to continue with his army, till the intention of his sovereign could be known. In a few days, however, a courier arrived with positive orders for

him to remain with the French, as long as his services were wanted.

The determinations of Mercy were not easily altered. From his inaccessible camp he beheld the enemy overrun Franconia, without attempting to interrupt their operations. It was equally fruitless to offer him battle; because no apparent advantages of ground could induce him to deviate from his original plan, as he was firmly convinced, that his opponents must suffer far more from fatigue than he could from inactivity. Convinced, by repeated trials, that all his efforts would prove ineffectual, the duke resolved to undertake the siege of *Dunkelsbuhl*. The dread of losing a place of so much consequence tempted Mercy to march to its defence; and the French were no sooner informed of his approach than they hastened to meet him. For some days the armies manœuvred in sight of each other, without its being possible for *Enghien* to attack the Bavarians; and he accordingly formed a plan for investing *Nordlingen*, so celebrated for the defeat of the Swedes, under *Horn* and the Duke of *Weimar*. But, before he had time to open the trenches, he was surprised with the intelligence, that Mercy was advancing with the apparent resolution of giving him battle. This was precisely the object for which he had so long panted in vain; and he accordingly determined to bring the contest to a speedy issue, if such were really the intentions of his adversary.

The Bavarians, as usual, had chosen their ground with masterly skill at *Allersheim*—a village situated in the midst of the plain of *Nordlingen*, one of the most extensive in *Franconia*. Two hills, which,

at the distance of half a league from each other, rise rapidly to a considerable height, afforded Mercy so decisive an advantage, that he is said to have looked forward to an augmentation of glory with a confidence not natural to his character. In taking leave of his wife, who always accompanied him during his military career, he is reported to have used the following expressions, while he pointed to the French as they approached:—"Behold with what confidence those madmen advance! Heaven blinds them to the danger which awaits their temerity, that they may fall into the snare which I have laid. Prepare yourself for the celebration of a glorious victory, which can hardly fail of giving peace to mankind, and restoring its ancient lustre to the imperial crown."\*

While the wings of the Bavarians occupied the two opposite hills, their centre was strengthened by the possession of Allerheim, and covered with batteries, sweeping every avenue by which it was possible for the enemy to approach. After reconnoitring their position, Enghien determined to begin the combat by a furious attack upon the left wing of the enemy, where John of Wert was stationed; and ordered Grammont, who commanded the right of the French, to move forward for that purpose. But a deep ravine impeding his progress, compelled him to alter his plan, and to direct all his efforts against Allerheim. Mercy, convinced that the fortune of the day depended upon the possession of that important post, supported the troops who defended it by continual reinforce-

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\* Hist. de Condé, 256.

ments. The village was repeatedly lost and recovered; but at length the assailants began to give ground, when their gallant commander led on the reserve; and, having by incredible exertions penetrated into the streets, set fire to the houses, in hopes of dislodging the enemy. But instead of suffering themselves to be dismayed by the spreading flames, the Bavarians tranquilly retired to the church, and some adjacent buildings, which, being constructed with stone, afforded a temporary asylum. At this momentous crisis, John of Wert, quitting his intrenchments, poured down upon Grammont's division with such impetuosity, that it was instantly thrown into disorder, and the commander taken, while attempting to rally the fugitives. The situation of the French became now so perilous, that nothing could have saved them from total destruction had Wert's prudence been equal to his courage. Instead of pursuing the routed foe, with a view of plundering their baggage, he had only to fall upon the left wing of the enemy, while engaged in a desperate conflict with the right of the Bavarians, and they must have been taken, or cut in pieces to a man.

Turenne had long been contending against the troops under Gleen, without being able to obtain the smallest advantage, and had even been compelled to retire; but, returning to the charge, reinforced by the Hessians, he at length succeeded in forcing their line, and obliged them to abandon an advantageous post with such precipitation, that Gleen, being surrounded, was unable to escape.

Such was the situation of affairs when John of Wert returned from the pursuit. Instead of finding

the French completely routed, as he expected, a scene of disorder presented itself to his eyes; which it would have been no easy task for talents the most splendid to have retrieved. The first thing he heard was, that Gleen was a prisoner, and Mercy slain.\* In this distressing situation, he resumed his former station; but, upon being more minutely informed of the extent of the loss sustained by the army, he deemed it more prudent to decamp during the following night, and to seek a refuge from the cannon of Donauwert.†

The death of Mercy proved an irretrievable misfortune to the imperialists, who had no longer a commander capable of opposing such consummate generals as Enghien, Turenne, Torstenson, and Wrangel. It is hardly possible for a soldier to receive a brighter eulogium, than that applied by the Duke of Enghein to Mercy, when he observed:—"That man always appeared as perfectly acquainted with my plans, as if he had been present at the council where they were debated.‡"

The surrender of Nordlingen was followed by that of Dunkelsbuhl, without the smallest effort being made for the relief of either. The object, however, most important in the victor's estimation, was the acquisition of Heilbrun; the capture of which must have insured the conquest of Swabia, and even left him at liberty to carry his victorious arms

\* That illustrious officer was buried upon the field of battle, with the following simple inscription upon the stone which marked the place:—*Sic, viator, heroem calcas!*

† Puffendorf, 35. Hist. de Condé, 267. Bongeant, ii. 340.—Schmidt, v. 280.

‡ 1645. Hist. de Condé, 274.

into the heart of Bavaria. But, a few days after the siege was commenced, the duke was seized with a violent fever, which compelled him to relinquish for the present every brilliant prospect, so dear to his youthful ambition.\*

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\* Hist. de Condé, 280.

## CHAP. XXV.

Great exertions made by the Emperor.—The Swedes conclude an armistice with the Elector of Saxony. Duplicity of Mazarin deranges Wrangel's plans, and exposes him to imminent danger; but, being at length joined by Turenne, he besieges Augsburg.—Bregentz taken. Maximilian signs a treaty of neutrality.—Egra besieged and taken.—The Elector of Bavaria recommences hostilities, and, in conjunction with the Austrians, drives Wrangel beyond the Weser.—Melander ravages Hesse.—The Weimerians mutiny, and pass into the service of Christina.—Turenne and Wrangel, after defeating the imperialists at Zusmarshausen, lay waste Bavaria.—Königsmark surprises Prague.—Peace concluded.—Operations of the French during the campaigns of 1646-7-8.—Siege of Dunkerque.—Unsuccessful attempt to reduce Lerida.—Destruction of the Spanish army in the battle of Lens.

THE battle of Nordlingen, though far more decisive than that of Friburg, with respect to its consequences, proved little more than an unprofitable effusion of blood. The Elector of Bavaria having signified to the imperial court, that, unless he should be enabled, by a powerful reinforcement, to protect his dominions, he must accept the neutrality offered him by France, the Archduke Leopold and Gallas were sent to his assistance, with several Austrian regiments. Troops were likewise drawn from the different garrisons; so that, in a very few weeks, the Bavarians found themselves in condition to face the enemy, whose strength was much diminished by their recent victory, but still more by the departure of the Hessians. Turenne, therefore, was reduced to the painful necessity of raising the siege of Heilbrun, and falling back upon the Rhine, till the arrival of fresh troops should



empower him to act with the vigour and activity which suited his enterprising genius.\*

This sudden change in the posture of affairs allowed the imperialists to concentrate all their forces in Bohemia. Wrangel, though at the head of a numerous army, the bravest and best disciplined in Europe, was thus compelled either to hazard a battle against a superior force, or to retire for safety into Thuringia.† Hoping to overwhelm his opponents by numerical strength, before Königsmark could join him, the imperial general advanced with the resolution of giving battle to the Swedes, whenever an opportunity should occur. But as it was equally for the interest of the Swedish commander to avoid an engagement, while the Bavarians and Austrians continued together, he crossed the Saale, leaving the enemy at liberty to overrun Franconia.‡

The Swedes, at this critical juncture, must have been exposed to imminent danger, except for the armistice lately concluded with the Elector of Saxony; who, tired with the losses so repeatedly sustained, had consented to a temporary suspension of hostilities, in spite of the remonstrances of Ferdinand, who complained of his conduct in the bitterest terms, as a violation of the most solemn engagements. Few events could have happened more fortunate for Sweden. It not only delivered her from a formidable antagonist, but was likely to serve as a precedent for the other protestant states, which

\* 1646. Puffendorf, xvii. 37.

† The Swedish force consisted of 23,000 men, independently of a detachment under Königsmark; the Austrians exceeded that number by a thousand, and had lately been reinforced by thirty Bavarian regiments.

‡ Puffendorf, xviii. 2. Galetti, i. 600.

still adhered to the Austrian interest. But, as the duration of the truce had been originally limited to six months, it was rapidly drawing toward a conclusion, when Wrangel entered Thuringia; and, as no exertions were omitted on the part of the emperor to prevent its renewal, there was much reason to apprehend that the constancy of the elector might not be proof against his intreaties. Fortunately, however, for the Swedes, the prudential advice of the Saxon princes prevailed over the promises of Austria, and the armistice was extended to a general peace, upon conditions more favourable than could have been expected. John George solemnly bound himself to supply the imperialists neither with arms, ammunitions, nor provisions; nor even to suffer them to recruit in any part of his dominions. The Swedes, on the contrary, obtained permission to pass unmolested through the electorate, whenever their plans might require it; and, were farther to receive a monthly supply of corn, together with a regular stipend in money.\*

This important treaty was concluded before Torstenson retired; but, notwithstanding he had ostensibly resigned his authority, he continued, during his residence at Leipsic, where he remained some time for the sake of medical advice, to direct the operations of the army, and for that purpose maintained a regular correspondence with Wrangel. After much deliberation he recommended the latter to abandon the hope of making a lasting impression upon Moravia, and to keep for the present within reach of the Rhine, for the purpose of acting in concert with Turenne, who had promised to take the

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\* Galetti, i. Puffendorf, xviii.

field the beginning of June, if Wrangel would meet him at Marburg.

This project, however, which, if steadily pursued, might have led to the most important results, was frustrated by the jealousy of Mazarin, to whom the ascendancy of Sweden appeared almost as pregnant with danger, as the most brilliant successes on the part of Austria. Apprehensive that, when acting in union with the French, the Swedes might reduce the common enemy to unconditional submission, and avail themselves of their power to humble the catholics, he ordered Turenne to detach a part of his force for the defence of the Netherlands, endangered, as he pretended, by the inactivity of the Dutch; but promised as a covering for this shameful duplicity, that in a very few weeks, he should be enabled to join them with a more formidable army.\*

This want of punctuality proved a bitter disappointment to the Swedish commander, who had regulated his plans for the ensuing campaign, in conformity to the wishes of Turenne. Much time had been lost in waiting till the French had completed their preparations; and Wrangel now found himself entangled in a mountainous country, where it was impossible for him long to continue with safety, and from which it was almost equally difficult to extricate himself with honour. After maturely weighing the perils which he had to encounter, he resolved, at all events, to maintain himself in Hessa, as his departure must have unavoidably left the landgravine at the mercy of her implacable enemies.

Meanwhile the imperialists advanced with the

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\* Puffendorf, xviii. 13.

design of giving battle to Wrangel, before he could call in the detachments from Westphalia and Silesia. The prudent commander, however, remained upon the defensive, and by his skilful selection of posts, made up for his inferiority in numbers. During several days the armies continued in sight of each other. The Swedes, who drew their provisions from Cassel, were tolerably supplied with all the necessaries of life, while the Austrians, who resorted to distant magazines, were often reduced to the greatest distress; and in consequence soon forced to quit their position, in search of more plentiful quarters.\*

According to the pitiful policy of Mazarin, the scales of war were now so equally balanced, that it was time for him to turn them in favour of his allies, lest they might be induced to conclude a separate treaty with Austria, and he accordingly granted permission to Turenne to act in concert with Wrangel.†

The allies being now decidedly the strongest, formed the bold design of penetrating to Vienna by following the course of the Danube. This plan was adopted by Gustavus Adolphus, as the reader was informed in the preceding volume, and would probably have been attended with complete success, had he not been prevented from carrying it into execution by the dread of exposing the Elector of Saxony to the implacable resentment of Wallenstein. The Duke of Weimar alone, of all his pupils, attempted to follow his steps, and had actually proceeded to the frontier of Austria, when he was

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\* Puffendorf, 16.

† Ibid. 17.

compelled, by the approach of a numerous army, to abandon the enterprise altogether.

The utmost consternation prevailed at Munich, when intelligence arrived that the allies had crossed the Danube, as no assistance could be expected from the imperial army, which was several days march in the rear, and would be obliged to take a circuitous route through Franconia and the Upper Palatinate. Even Maximilian grew alarmed at the impending storm, and fled to Brannau, a strong fortress near the confines of Austria.\*

All Bavaria now lay open to invasion; the road to Vienna was equally unobstructed. Yet, instead of advancing to the imperial capital, and prescribing conditions for a general peace in the palace of the Cæsars, Wrangel wasted his time in a fruitless negotiation for the surrender of Augsburg, which was intended merely to interrupt his progress, and afford time for the Austrians to arrive. Having discovered that he had been the dupe of the catholic party, who had obtained the preponderance in all civil affairs, he gave way to his indignation, and swearing that the magistrates should have cause to repent their duplicity, ordered the city to be regularly invested. Though there can be little doubt that his resentment would have been ultimately gratified, yet the loss even of a day was important. The Austrians advanced by rapid marches; the citizens derided his threats; and the want of provisions soon compelled him to abandon the undertaking.†

The imperialists were again placed in so com-

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\* Puffendorf, 22.

† Galetti, ii. 5. Puffendorf, 25. Schmidt, v. 22.

manding a situation, that they might have prevented the allies from entering Bavaria, if that would have satisfied their ambition: but the triumph obtained by delivering Augsburg inspired hopes the most presumptuous and extravagant. To crush their opponents by one irresistible effort was now considered as an attainable object; but, in order to effect it with greater facility, it was necessary to draw them into the plains of Swabia; and for this purpose they directed their march toward the Rhine, in full expectation of being followed. The allies, however, being aware of their intention, suddenly took an opposite direction; and crossing the Lech without the smallest opposition, overran the electorate in every direction, spreading terror and desolation around. The arrival of the Austrians, who hastened with celerity to the assistance of Maximilian, served only to increase the general misery, by adding to the consumption of provisions.\*

The projects of Wrangel were too gigantic to suit the intriguing spirit of Mazarin, who being secretly resolved never to ruin Maximilian, had probably regulated his instructions accordingly; because, nothing can be more inconsistent with the enterprising character of Turenne, than to have relinquished an enterprise on account of its difficulty. The wants of the soldiers, however, constantly afforded a plausible pretext for separation, and the winter now proved an additional motive for terminating the campaign. Perceiving that it was impossible to shake a resolution prescribed by a superior power, Wrangel was forced to comply with the proposal of Turenne, that the French should establish them-

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\* Schmidt, v. 20. Puffendorf, 27.

selves in the Duchy of Wirtemberg, while the Swedes occupied the banks of the lake of Constance.\*

Wrangel, whose restless ambition was incapable of inactivity, when glory or plunder invited, had no sooner cantoned his troops in the vicinity of the lake, between Lindau and Uberlingen, than he formed a plan for surprising Bregentz, a place of great importance to Austria, as it commanded one of the principal passes which lead from Switzerland to Italy. The place, however, possessed so many local advantages, and was so extremely difficult of access, that it had been left to the defence of an ill-trained militia, who, though little acquainted with military tactics, were by no means deficient in courage. These troops, after ineffectually sacrificing many valuable lives, at length discovered their error in supposing, that undisciplined valour can long resist the approaches of a regular army; and, feeling that the enemy must ultimately prevail, they thought it most prudent by opening the gates to avoid a general massacre.†

This bold undertaking, having brought the Swedes in contact with the Helvetic republics, created a general alarm throughout the neighbouring cantons; and the intrepid mountaineers, who had formerly withstood all the efforts of Austria, prepared again to assert their independence. Twelve thousand militia, not such as defended the walls of Bregentz, but men accustomed from their youth to wield the halbert, and level the arquebuse with fatal precision,

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\* 1646 Galetti, li. 6.

† The booty was enormous, and is estimated by many of the German historians, as well as by Puffendorf, at forty tons of gold:—a vague calculation, which enables us to form no accurate idea of its real value.

assembled on the confines, and seized every pass, by which it was practicable to invade a nation, whose proudest possession was freedom. But, before they proceeded to actual hostilities, the government dispatched a formal deputation to the Swedish commander, in order to ascertain his designs; and to offer him every assistance, which it might be in their power to afford, consistently with their other political engagements, provided he adhered to the treaty of neutrality concluded with Gustavus Adolphus. Wrangel returned for answer, that nothing could be farther from his intention than to violate a single article of that convention; for that he hoped always to live upon terms of amity with a people whose spirit and principles he so highly respected.\*

The acquisition of Bregentz upon such easy terms led Wrangel to imagine that an attempt upon Lindau might be attended with equal success, as the want of men had obliged the emperor to reduce the strength of the garrison, and the inhabitants for the most part were zealously attached to the opinions of Calvin. Lindau, on account of its insular situation, could only be approached by water; but, as the Swedish commander was provided with vessels, sufficient to contain fifteen hundred men, he trusted he could accomplish his purpose, without being exposed to the difficulties of a regular siege. But the obstinacy of the garrison having proved that this was but a chimerical expectation, he abandoned the project; and the exhausted state of the surrounding country exposing the troops to continual hardships, he resolved, after levelling the fortification of Bregentz, to remove to the vicinity of Ratisbonne.†

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\* Puffendorf, 32.

† Ibid. 7.



Dissimulation and artifice were far more agreeable to the timidity of Mazarin, than the decisive measures of war; and the natural tendency of his temporising policy was never perhaps more strikingly illustrated, than in his conduct respecting Bavaria. Notwithstanding he had it now in his power to reduce the elector to unconditional submission, or compel him to abandon his country, he preferred to detach him from the Austrian interest by the slower means of intrigue. Estimating the feelings of other men according to the standard of his own implacability, he was satisfied, that if Maximilian could ever be persuaded to abandon his ancient ally, the injury would never be forgiven. By the mode of conduct which he intended to pursue, he also hoped to establish such a permanent interest with the elector, that he might rely upon his assistance in case of a quarrel with Sweden; an event by no means improbable, because the prevaricating duplicity of Mazarin's character was exactly calculated to excite the contempt of a people, who had been taught by the proud example of Oxenstiern, to consider courage and integrity, and not fraud and contrivance, as the most splendid endowments of a statesman.

Formed in the school of so great a master, it was natural for Wrangel to spurn at the idea of an armistice, which tended to diminish his resources, by excluding him from a country, which, in spite of the misery it had recently endured, was still one of the least impoverished in Germany. To remain inactive, with arms in their hands, appeared to the Swedes to be no less derogatory to their military reputation, than inconsistent with their political interests: for it was to their swords that they looked not only for respect, consideration, and

renown, but for money, clothes, and provisions. For these reasons they wished to prosecute hostilities with unremitting ardour against Ferdinand and all his partisans, till they had forced them, by a fair and honourable peace, to secure the protestants in the uninterrupted enjoyment of every political privilege, and had procured an ample indemnity for themselves.

It was equally the object of Mazarin to humble the emperor, but he aimed at accomplishing it by different means. By offers of neutrality, he hoped progressively to deprive him of all his adherents; after which, he doubted not of being able to dictate the conditions of peace. From this mode of proceeding, he expected to derive one important benefit, which was not likely to accrue from the more manly system of his allies. In case the humiliation of the catholic power should be effected by the sword, he foresaw that the pillars of the Romish church must be shaken to their very foundation; whereas by the proceedings, which he intended to adopt, it would be always in his power to restrain the zeal of the friends of the Reformation, in case they should venture, in the intoxication of victory, to outstrip the bounds of moderation.

From the commencement of the war we have seen Maximilian adhere to his engagements with the imperial court with unshaken fidelity. Neither the triumph of Gustavus, the insolence of Wallenstein, nor the promises of Richelieu, could affect it. This steady attachment was unquestionably prompted by the suggestions of interest, no less than by the impulse of honour; yet, such is the admiration universally inspired by political firm-

ness, that no prince in Germany stood higher than Maximilian in the estimation of his countrymen. It may be alledged, that his pretensions to the electoral dignity depended upon the issue of the contest, and, that in case the protestants should ultimately triumph, the Palatine would of course recover those honours, of which he had been unjustly despoiled: but, on the other hand, there is every reason to believe, that, in order to induce him to abandon Austria, France had repeatedly promised, that whatever might happen, he should never lose his seat in the electoral college, because that might easily be obviated by adding another member. The death of Ferdinand II. the friend and companion of his early youth, must naturally have weakened his attachment toward Austria. Age too may be supposed to have blunted his feelings, stilled the voice of ambition, and rendered him more sensible to the charms of domestic repose, than to the proudest visions of glory. Yet, in spite of every motive most likely to inspire an inclination for peace, he steadily withstood the offers of Richelieu, and shared in every peril that threatened the imperial throne, till he beheld Wrangel and Turenne lay waste his dominions with remorseless barbarity; while Mazarin menaced him with a repetition of the dreadful scene, unless he averted it by abandoning Austria.\*

A cessation of hostilities was so repugnant to the real interests of Sweden, that nothing less than the apprehension of a quarrel with France would have induced Wrangel to send a plenipotentiary to Ulm, the place appointed for conducting the nego-

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\* Schmidt, v. 21. Galetti, ii. 8. Puffendorf, xix. 5.

ciation. And even when he yielded to the solicitations of Mazarin, it was with so much reluctance, that he expressly prohibited the minister from bringing forward any project of his own, directing him to content himself with objecting to the proposals of France and Bavaria, when there was the smallest room for opposition; and, so far as might be consistent with common decency, to throw every possible impediment in the way of the treaty. At the earnest request of Maximilian, an Austrian army attended the congress; but, it soon became evident, that in spite of all his protestations, nothing could be farther from Ferdinand's intentions than to bring the discussion to an amicable termination.\*

Finding it impossible to include the emperor in the treaty, the elector considered himself at perfect liberty to attend to his personal safety; and, as the French negociators supported his pretensions upon every occasion, it required all the firmness and intelligence of Wrangel to vindicate the interests of Sweden. According to a plan suggested by Maximilian, and openly supported by the French, it was proposed, that the Swedes should in future be restricted to Northern Germany, every part of which was so completely exhausted, that it was no longer practicable even for military despotism to extort the necessary supplies. After repeated threats on the part of the Swedes to abandon Uln, a convention was concluded, by which it was agreed, that they should be allowed to occupy Swabia and Franconia; and, that the Bavarians should be confined to their own circle, and the Upper Palatinate. The

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\* 1647. Galetti, 20.

places upon the Danube in the possession of Sweden were exchanged for those still retained by the enemy in the Duchy of Wirtemberg. Cologne and Hesse Cassel were included in the armistice; by which it was stipulated, that Maximilian should recall his troops from the imperial army, and no longer afford the smallest assistance, either in money, men, or provisions, to any power engaged in hostilities with France or Sweden. The agreement, as it respected the immediate interests of the former, was arranged upon similar principles. Heilbrun was delivered into the hands of Turenne, who likewise retained all his conquests between the Ulm and Donauwert, upon condition that the rest should be restored.\*

During the time consumed in regulating the terms of the armistice, no event of importance had occurred; but no sooner was this important business settled, than Wrangel resolved to concentrate all his forces for the humiliation of Austria. After taking Schweinfurt, and enrolling the imperial garrison, he formed a plan for the reduction of Egra, one of the strongest fortresses in Bohemia, the possession of which was likely to lead to the entire conquest of that kingdom.† Had it accorded with the insidious policy of Mazarin to have assisted in that important undertaking, its success must have proved rapid and certain; but in order to carry the points which were nearest his heart, at the Westphalian congress, it was requisite to prevent either Sweden or Austria from obtaining a decided superiority. Instead, therefore, of availing himself of the emperor's weakness, to give him the finishing blow, he sent directions to Turenne

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\* Galetti, 20.

† Ibid. 24.

to proceed with his forces into Flanders, alleging, in excuse for this sudden resolution, pretences the most frivolous and unfounded. In his way thither, Turenne compelled the Elector of Mentz to sign a treaty of neutrality, and to contribute largely toward the support of a war, professedly carried on for the destruction of every principle most dear in his estimation as a sovereign and a bigot.\*

The united impulse of avarice and ambition had hitherto led the Margrave of Darnstadt to side with the enemies of his country and his religion; and as every argument had failed to bring him back to the protestant party, Turenne was eager to seize the present opportunity of punishing this political apostate. Overrunning the margraviate without the smallest opposition, he levied contributions with so unsparing a hand, that the margrave, unable to comply with his demands, was obliged to sell the bells belonging to the churches, and when that expedient failed of procuring the necessary sum, he had the mortification to behold several of the nobility carried away as hostages for the payment of the arrears.†

Convinced by fatal experience, that nothing was to be expected from the co-operation of the French, Wrangel ordered Königsmark and Wittemberg to join him; and immediately after their arrival commenced his march toward Bohemia, hoping to make himself master of Egra, before the Austrians were ready to interrupt his designs. These expectations were fully realized, as the city surrendered a few hours before the imperial army appeared, commanded by the emperor in person; who might have been in time to

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\* Galetti, 28,

† Puffendorf, 29. Galetti, ii. 15.

prevent its fall, had he not been persuaded to take a circuitous route, lest the passage of the troops should injure the property of a favourite minister.\*

Fortunately for Austria, Gallas was no more; yet such was the want of talent in a country once famed for military skill, that Ferdinand was under the necessity of trusting the defence of the catholic faith to a Calvinist. The Austrian forces had lately been placed under the orders of Melander, a rigid sectarian, who formerly commanded the Hessian troops, but had been dismissed by the Langravine, upon a strong suspicion of treachery. By indefatigable exertions, the new commander had restored discipline to an army which he found in a state of total disorganization. Yet, though the Austrians were superior in numerical strength, they were not disposed to hazard an engagement; neither was Wrangel inclined to quit his position; till the fortifications of Egra, materially injured by the Swedish artillery, had undergone a thorough repair. Observing, however, from the opposite bank, (for the armies were only separated by a river) that the enemy were remiss in their attention to military duties, Wrangel formed a scheme for surprising their outposts; and having selected an officer of acknowledged ability, left him at liberty to follow up any advantage he might obtain, as his own discretion suggested. The boldness of the enterprise, as is frequently the case, contributed to facilitate its execution. The advanced guards being taken unawares, fell an easy prey, and the assailants were actually in the midst of the camp, before the Austrians were apprised of their danger. Fear multi-

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\* Count Schlick, president of the council of war. *Paffendorf*, 32.

plied the number of the foes, and the fugitives added to the general consternation, by spreading the most exaggerated reports. Availing themselves of the terror their temerity inspired, a troop of horse penetrated the imperial tent, and were actually preparing to carry off the emperor, when he was luckily rescued by a superior force.\*

Whatever good effects the presence of Ferdinand might have produced upon the courage of the troops, it was certainly far from augmenting their comforts; as they loudly complained, that they had never been exposed to greater distress, than since their monarch had commanded in person. Disease and desertion, the unavoidable consequences of neglect, were multiplied to such an excess, that it was absolutely requisite, by frequent executions, to prevent the infantry from abandoning their standards. Mortifying as it must have appeared to imperial pride, to fly before an enemy, whom flattery had represented as unable to resist the valour of troops; animated by the presence and praises of a patriot prince, Ferdinand found himself constrained to decamp, leaving Bohemia open to the incursions of a foe, whose favourite occupation was to destroy.†

Few wars have been marked by more sudden revolutions of fortune; and no event which occurred, from the defeat of the Palatine under the walls of Prague, to the final termination of hostilities, was productive of consequences more widely different from its apparent results, than the neutrality of Bavaria. We have already seen, that nothing was omitted by the Austrian court to prevent Maximilian from withdrawing from the contest; but when

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\* 1647. Puffendorf, 36. Galetti, 18.

† Puffendorf, 37.



amicable endeavours had proved ineffectual, it scrupled not to employ the basest means for the despicable purpose of debauching an army, so long its companion in every danger. A great number of officers, whose fortune depended upon their swords, were suddenly deprived of employment. Among these was John of Wert, so eminent for courage, activity, and cruelty. To a military adventurer, the termination of bloodshed appears the greatest of human calamities; because it precluded every prospect of acquiring riches by the plunder and destruction of his fellow creatures. The man who supports himself by rapine and oppression, must necessarily be a stranger to all those feelings which influence the conduct of civilized nations, under the titles of patriotism, loyalty, and domestic affection. The country which promises the largest pay he readily adopts as his own; and the sovereign by whom rapacity is subjected to the fewest restrictions is the master he most willingly obeys. Equally enraged and disappointed at the conduct of the elector, these mercenary leaders conspired, for the purpose of delivering the Bavarian army into the hands of the emperor, by whom they were to be liberally rewarded for their treachery. Not content, however, with secretly favouring the conspirators, Ferdinand carried his contempt of justice so far, as openly to address a proclamation to the troops, in which he unblushingly stated, that notwithstanding they had hitherto been commanded by Maximilian, in quality of general of the "Catholic League," they in fact belonged to the empire, and of course were subject to the authority of its sovereign. Fortunately for the elector, the plot was discovered in time to prevent its execution. Several of the ringleaders

were seized, and severely punished; but John of Wert, by far the most culpable of any, found means to escape, notwithstanding a price was set upon his head. The officers of inferior rank, who were totally unacquainted with the designs of their commanders, returned with alacrity to their duty.\*

This ungrateful return for steady attachment was sufficient to have justified an open declaration of hostilities, but Maximilian was too prudent to listen to the dictates of resentment, when policy taught him placability. Instead, therefore, of yielding to the impulse of passion, which suggested an union with France and Sweden as the readiest means of revenge, he began seriously to examine the consequences which had already resulted, or were likely to ensue, from the treaty of Ulm. So far from accelerating the conclusion of peace, his secession had produced a contrary effect; because the allies had availed themselves of the emperor's situation, to raise their demands in proportion to his distress. Neither were the benefits which his own subjects derived from the neutrality, by any means adequate to his expectations; for though they were perfectly secure from hostile depredations, they were obliged to provide for the maintenance of the army, which could not be disbanded with safety. These considerations determined him to break the armistice about six months after it was concluded.†

Had it suited the views and policy of Maximilian to have sent his forces immediately into Bohemia, it would have been difficult for Wrangel to have escaped; but, like the generality of mankind, the

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\* Schiller, iv. Schmidt, v. 21. Galetti, ii. 21. Bougeant, iii. 257.

† Puffendorf, 39.

elector was accustomed to consider his private advantage, before he attended to the general good. The recovery of Memmingen appeared to him more important than the delivery of a kingdom, belonging to an ally, for whom his attachment could not be very strong, after the ungenerous treatment he had experienced.

No sooner, however, was a junction effected between the Austrians and Bavarians, than Wrangel was compelled to evacuate Bohemia, after having publicly boasted, that he was about to terminate the contest in a single campaign, by driving the emperor out of Germany. Independently of his inability to face the united forces of Ferdinand and Maximilian, before the arrival of Königsmark, the Swedish commander was impressed with the necessity of preventing the enemy from entering Saxony, because he was too well acquainted with the elector's inconstancy to entertain the smallest doubts, but that he would always adhere to the triumphant party.

But all the efforts of Wrangel to protect the electorate proved ineffectual. On the contrary, he was compelled to retire, while the imperialists followed him to the Weser, laying waste the country, through which they marched, with that wanton ferocity which characterized their military system. He had not a moment to lose, because it was impossible for him to have avoided destruction, had he been overtaken by the enemy before his junction with the Hessians and Königsmark. His safety, however, was ultimately due to the policy of Maximilian, who would not suffer his troops to pass the Weser. His motives for stopping in the full career of victory have been imputed to different causes. By some

writers it is suggested, that he deemed it unadvisable to place the imperial power on too lofty an eminence, lest by reviving the hopes of a presumptuous administration, he might retard a general pacification. By others it is asserted that, Mazarin, desirous of averting the ruin of his allies, had threatened that Turenne should re-enter Bavaria, if Maximilian continued the pursuit. Both causes, however, may be supposed to have influenced the decisions of a prince, so able thoroughly to appreciate the consequences of the measures, which he was about to embrace.

During their painful retreat, the Swedes were exposed to such dreadful privations, that they were frequently upon the point of disbanding, and it required all the popularity of their enterprising leader to subdue this mutinous spirit. Fortunately, however, Melander was either totally unacquainted with their situation, or had other objects in view, which directed his attention to a different quarter. After the departure of the Bavarians, he gave up the pursuit, and, directing his vengeance against Hesse, appeared among a people, whom he had formerly defended, under the hateful character of a destroyer. Eager to avenge the indignity to which he had been exposed from the well-founded suspicions of its sovereign, he resolved to render that devoted country a scene of universal desolation. The cruelties, however, committed by the invaders, proved scarcely less prejudicial to their barbarous perpetrators, than to the miserable wretches who endured them. A province, abounding in mountains and forests, affords peculiar advantages to the desultory attacks of a desperate peasantry, and is usually inhabited by a hardy race, accustomed to brave the

rigours of an inclement sky, and to support their families by incessant exertion. Men of this description are not likely to submit to the yoke of the oppressor with tameness. Avarice having rendered the Austrians enterprising, they occasionally ventured to a considerable distance, attracted by the prospect of a richer booty. During these predatory incursions, the natives, in bodies, sallied out of the woods, and falling upon the marauders, when laden with plunder, destroyed them by hundreds.\*

The reader must recollect, that the Weimerian troops, when they first entered into the French service, stipulated for the enjoyment of various privileges, which Richelieu was induced to accord. Of the greater part of these they had been progressively stripped, till they were reduced nearly to the situation of common mercenaries. The patience with which they had borne these successive infringements of the original compact, induced Turenne to treat them with greater severity than they had experienced from any of his predecessors. Nothing, however, excited their indignation so much, as to find the different vacancies, as they gradually occurred, filled up by Frenchmen, and not by Germans, as it was settled by the treaty of Brissac. For a long time they confined themselves to complaints and remonstrances; but when the armistice with Bavaria had totally changed the views of Mazarin, and rendered him less attentive to the transactions of Germany, they were frequently left without pay or provision. Determined to seize the first favourable opportunity for asserting their claim, they positively refused to follow Turenne, when he

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\* 1647. Puffendorf, 57.

received orders to proceed to the Netherlands.\* Clandestine meetings were held at Strasburg, in which it was determined, that nothing should tempt them to move, till all the arrears were discharged. Turenne, as is usual under similar circumstances, had recourse to threats and protestations. The want of money sufficient to satisfy their demands was alleged as a plea for delay; remunerations were held out as inducements to patience, and severity hinted at as the consequence of protracted resistance. Exasperated at finding every argument ineffectual, and unwilling to proceed to extremities, he resolved previously to try the effect of contempt; and telling them haughtily, that they were unworthy to partake in those glorious scenes to which he was called, he quitted them with a look of disdain. This experiment, however, was attended with no better effects. Nine regiments of cavalry, and one of infantry, persevered in their mutinous conduct, declaring their resolution of never suffering themselves to be conducted into France, where they knew that they must be placed at the mercy of their general, without the smallest hope of redress. At the same time, they professed themselves ready to serve in Germany, according to the original terms of their agreement, provided they were no longer commanded by Frenchmen.

The popularity of Rosa pointed him out to Turenne as the fittest person to treat with the mutineers.. But, instead of listening to his admonitions, for returning to their duty, they declared that they would serve under no other leader, and tumultuously elected him general; an office he undertook

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\* Puffendorf, 69. Galetti, 29.

at the instigation of his friends, in the hope that, when occupying that distinguished post, his advice might have greater effect. A few hours, however, were sufficient to shew that his authority was merely nominal, and that all real power was vested in a committee of officers, composed of men of desperate fortunes, but distinguished for personal bravery. The conduct of Rosa, in this trying situation, appears to have been dictated by the earnest desire of re-establishing order and discipline, though it was imputed by the French to very different motives. Exasperated at being foiled in every attempt to reduce the mutineers to subordination, Turenne gave way to his unfounded suspicions, and caused Rosa to be arrested, and conducted to Nancy, where he remained upwards of a year in confinement.\* Had any proofs been required to substantiate the innocence of that unfortunate officer, the behaviour of the insurgents would have furnished them; as they beheld their commander deprived of his liberty without expressing the slightest indignation. Convinced that Turenne would proceed to every extremity, rather than suffer himself to be braved with impunity, they deemed it expedient to withdraw from the reach of his resentment; and, directing their march toward Stuttgart, conducted themselves with as much order and regularity, as if they had been led by the most experienced officers. The approach of a column, disclaiming obedience to all legitimate authority, created universal consternation; but the alarm was soon dissipated by their quiet behaviour, as they contented themselves with receiving what was

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\* Puffendorf, 72.

barely necessary for their subsistence, and punished every transgression against justice, and humanity, with exemplary severity.\*

The high reputation for courage and military skill, universally enjoyed by the Weimerians, induced the emperor to offer them a large donative, provided they would engage in his service. But their rigid attachment to Lutheran principles proved an insuperable obstacle to his wishes. For the Swedes they evinced a decided predilection; and in order to treat more conveniently with the generals of Christina, directed their march toward Westphalia.

Being now fully convinced that nothing could be effected by conciliating methods, Turenne rashly resolved to reduce them by force, and collecting all the troops that could possibly be spared, fell unexpectedly upon the mutineers while they were entangled in a defile; but the reception he met with was by no means calculated to induce him to repeat the attempt.†

Notwithstanding the Swedish service was avowedly that which the insurgents preferred, yet Wrangel was placed in so delicate a situation, that he was doubtful on what to decide. If not taken into the pay of some protestant power, it was evident that distress must shortly compel them to accept the emperor's offers; yet he felt it impossible to accede to their wishes, without exposing himself to the suspicion of having secretly favoured the conspiracy. It could not however be denied, that it would be far more conducive to the interests of France, to have them acting in concert with her

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\* Puffendorf, 73.

† Galetti, 31.



allies, than augmenting the strength of her enemies. This consideration at length determined him to commence a negotiation: but little time was left for reflection, because they declared, that unless they were immediately engaged by some Lutheran prince, they would make a tender of their services to Lamboy, who commanded for the emperor in Westphalia.\* Before the Swedish general had finally settled his plans, the Weimerians had again shifted their quarters, and approached the army under the orders of Königsmark. The conduct of the treaty was in consequence entrusted to that intelligent officer, who before he entered into any specific agreement, thought it advisable to consult the French ambassadors, then resident at Osnaburg, that he might escape the imputation of duplicity. Another trial was in consequence made to subdue the obstinacy of the insurgents: but when they solemnly protested, that they were ready to encounter the cruellest death, rather than submit to the tyranny of Turenne; and farther declared, that in case nothing satisfactory should be concluded in the course of the day, they must be under the necessity of providing for their future subsistence by agreeing to the emperor's proposal, all hopes of reconciliation being abandoned by the French, Königsmark took them into the pay of Christina.†

This reinforcement, though unquestionably composed of the best troops in Europe, proved very inadequate to the wants of the Swedes, who were obliged successively to evacuate all the Swabian fortresses. These losses were the more afflicting, because they might have been avoided, had Maza-

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\* Puffendorf, 74.

† 1648. Ibid. Galetti, 32.

rin felt that it was inconsistent with the glory of France, to suffer Maximilian to remain in repose, after violating his engagements with Sweden.

The proceedings of the imperial ministers at the Westphalian congress coincided so little with their professions in favour of peace, that Mazarin grew sensible, that in order to bring the contest to a speedy termination, it was necessary to employ more efficacious weapons than those of intrigue. This conviction determined him to put an end to the armistice, and to allow Turenne to co-operate with Wrangel, who had employed the early part of the winter in recruiting his army, while the forces of the enemy had gradually melted away, the victims of disease and disorder.

With regard to the necessity of compelling the imperialists to pass the Danube, no variety of opinion existed; but the French and Swedish commanders differed materially, respecting the measures to be subsequently pursued. After forcing the enemy to take refuge in Bavaria, Wrangel proposed to remain in the Upper Palatine, till the return of spring should facilitate the conquest of the electorate. The idea of removing to a distance from his magazines by no means suited the inclination of Turenne. Such at least were the motives alleged by him for declining the proposal: though it is probable, that he was influenced by regard for Maximilian, whom Mazarin, in spite of every hostile appearance, was afraid of pushing to extremities, lest he should oppose the exorbitant pretensions of France in her treaty with Ferdinand. So that all which Wrangel could obtain from a treacherous ally, was to take a position between Bamberg and

Wutzburg, till the Swedes should be able to throw a convoy into Egra.\*

Being now delivered from all apprehensions respecting the safety of a place, which facilitated his designs upon Bohemia, the allies directed their arms against the imperial army, which had again ventured to shew itself on the northern bank of the Danube. Notwithstanding Maximilian had strained every nerve to provide for the safety of his dominions, he was by no means exempt from apprehensions; because he was persuaded, if Wrangel should succeed in establishing himself in Bavaria, the miserable inhabitants would be subjected to every calamity which an irritated conqueror could inflict. He therefore issued an order, enjoining his subjects to transport their corn and cattle, and other valuable property, into the nearest fortified town, and to destroy every thing that could not be removed.

At the approach of the allies, the imperialists directed their march toward the Lech, laying waste the country they traversed, that the enemy might be prevented, for want of provisions, from molesting their retreat. Nothing, however, could shake the resolution of Wrangel, who persisted in his determination of forcing Maximilian to abandon the emperor, or to see the electorate converted into a desert. Previously however to accomplishing this barbarous design, it was requisite to bring the enemy to a battle, and he accordingly followed them with unremitting activity, till he found them posted in an advantageous situation at Zusmarshausen, an

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\* Bougeant, iii. 414. Puffendorf, xx. 18.

inconsiderable village, at nearly equal distance between Gunsburg and Augsburg.\*

The decline of day made it necessary for the allies to defer an attack on the Austrian lines till the following morning; and, in the course of the night, they learned from some prisoners, who were accidentally taken, that orders had been issued for the army to march at the dawn of morning, for the purpose of retiring to Augsburg. The movements of the allies were so skilfully combined, that they soon fell in with the rear of the enemy; and, notwithstanding they were opposed with obstinate valour, cut several regiments in pieces. Melander, while advancing at the head of the reserve, was mortally wounded. The loss of the general occasioned such consternation, that the troops fled in every direction, so that it is highly probable not a man would have escaped, had not Duke Ulric of Wirtemberg arrested the conquerors at the passage of a small river, where, with a few squadrons of horse, he maintained himself till night, against all the efforts of the victorious army.†

The principal direction of military affairs now devolved upon Gronsfield, a Bavarian officer, whose short command was distinguished only by the celerity of his flight. With the utmost precipitation he fell back upon the Lech, apparently determined to dispute the passage, which might not have proved difficult, because the river had been so swollen by the drifting of the Alpine snows, that no practicable ford could be discovered. But, neither the rapidity of the current, nor the formidable bat-

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\* May 8th. Puffendorf, 23. † Bougeant, iii. 415. Galetti, ii. 30.  
Puffendorf, 24.

teries which defended its banks, could check the impetuosity of the conquerors, who, determining that nothing should impede their career, selected the very spot where Gustavus Adolphus had formerly crossed, in defiance of Tilly. Notwithstanding the imperialists at first shewed a strong inclination to resist, they no sooner discovered that a bridge was constructing, than they thought it expedient to provide for their safety, leaving the greater part of their baggage behind.\*

Not deeming themselves secure, while within the reach of an enemy, whose ardour no obstacles were sufficient to restrain, the imperialists crossed the Inn, destroying all the bridges behind them. At no period of the war do they appear to have been overwhelmed with equal consternation. Giving up every thing for lost, the soldiers, in a state of utter insubordination, plundered the towns and villages through which they passed with brutal ferocity. This total destruction of military authority arose in great measure from the want of a general. Piccolomini, to whose veteran talents the emperor had committed the destiny of the house of Hapsburg at this alarming crisis, was not yet arrived from the Netherlands, and Gronsfeld was expiating in a prison at Munich his want of ability or courage. The fortitude of Maximilian was now so shaken by age and misfortune, that he was scarcely less terrified at the rapid progress of the enemy, than the most timorous female in his dominions. Seeking an asylum at Saltzburg, he submitted to the humiliation of desiring personal security from the generosity of a prelate, to whom he had often behaved with injus-

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\* 1648. Puffendorf, 27.

ice, and always with haughtiness and asperity, but whose benevolent soul, forgetting the injuries which he had received from Maximilian, remembered only that he was unhappy. With a bleeding heart and broken constitution, the elector abandoned his states to the discretion of a foe, justly incensed at the violation of a solemn engagement, and eager to punish his perfidy. The example of the sovereign afforded a precedent too inviting for timidity to resist. No preparations were made to oppose the invaders; on the contrary, those, whose situations enabled them most accurately to appreciate the resources of their country, had hastily quitted their posts, and carried away with them every thing of value, which it was possible to remove. Why, then, should men in more humble stations, who had little to lose except their lives, expose themselves to the swords of the invaders? Reflections like these would naturally suggest themselves to the meanest capacity, and prompt the peasant and mechanic to regulate their actions after the example of their superiors. Impelled by the impulse of an irresistible panic, they fled in troops beyond the Inn, leaving the cattle, which they were prevented from taking away, to wander at liberty about the fields and commons, without any one to feed or attend them.\*

Meanwhile, the Austrians had not been idle; recruits had been collected from every quarter, and the army inspired with fresh spirit and activity by the exhortations and example of Piccolomini. The desolation so wantonly occasioned by the allies, preventing them from remaining any longer in Bavaria, they retired into the Upper Palatinate; and, as

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\* Galetti, 41. Bougeaut, 418. Puffendorf, 29.

they almost immediately received the welcome intelligence that peace was concluded, an end was put to all further hostilities.\*

While Wrangel visited the offences of their ruler, upon an injured and innocent people, Königsmark was increasing his brilliant reputation by the splendour of his achievements in Bohemia. The question concerning the disposal of the Weimerian troops having occasioned continual disputes between Wrangel and Turenne, the former prudently resolved to put an end to the contest, by employing them in Bohemia under the orders of Königsmark. After reducing several places in the Upper Palatinate, that gallant commander proceeded to Egra, where he was joined by detachments from the different garrisons in Pomerania, Silesia, and Saxony. During his residence there he became acquainted with Ernest Odowalsky, who, after rising by merit to the rank of colonel in the Austrian service, had lost an arm, and being, in consequence, dismissed as an useless burthen, had retired to a little hereditary farm, which he possessed in the vicinity of Egra: though he regulated his expenses with the strictest economy, he could not guard against the evils inflicted by war. The produce of a year was destroyed in an hour; his barns were burned, and his cattle stolen; so that he found himself constrained, as his only recourse, to resume his former occupation: but neither employment nor pension could the mutilated veteran obtain from the imperial ministers, and he was in consequence forced to seek a more bountiful master. Either Odowalsky's distress, or his personal qualities, attracted the attention of the Swedish commander, who promised

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\* Puffendorf, 46.

him a regiment, and, till an opportunity occurred for fulfilling his promise, afforded him the most liberal assistance. A generous action seldom goes without its reward; and we should not so often be tormented with complaints of ingratitude, if bounty was less ostentatious in its gifts, or less extravagant in its expectations. In return for the kindness with which he was treated, Odowalsky is supposed to have suggested the possibility of capturing Prague by a sudden attack, if conducted with vigour and secrecy. The temerity of the undertaking accorded so exactly with the enterprising courage of Königsmark, that he resolved immediately to make the attempt. Concealment, however, was the most material point, and in order the better to cover his design, he made preparations for the investments of Elnbogen; but, as the strength of that fortress was too well known for the enemy to believe him in earnest, he altered his plan, confining himself entirely to predatory excursions, as if his only object had been to draw away part of the imperial army allotted for the defence of Bavaria.\*

Determined that no precaution should be omitted, which might tend to facilitate the enterprise, Odowalsky was sent to blockade Raçowitz, with positive injunctions to prevent any intercourse between that place and the capital. Patrols of cavalry were likewise stationed at regular distances, between Pilsen and Prague, for the purpose of interrupting all communication. These orders were executed with so much punctuality, that none of the inhabitants appear to have entertained the smallest suspicion of their danger. All his arrangements

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\* Puffendorf, 48.



being now completed, Köningsmark having mounted the infantry on artillery horses, or transported them in waggons, proceeded with such celerity, that before the close of day he arrived within a short distance of Prague. It was there, for the first time, that he explained his design to the officers, who heard with delight that they were about to engage in an enterprize, which held forth the strongest temptations to rapacity. To prevent the soldiers from mistaking each other, during the tumult and confusion of a nocturnal assault, they were ordered to wear green boughs in their caps—a wise and necessary precaution.

The city of Prague is divided by the Mulda into two unequal parts, connected by a bridge; the possession of which, being of the highest importance, the assailants were instructed, after having secured the gates, to direct all their efforts against it.

These regulations having been imparted to the leaders of the different columns, they proceeded to the work of devastation. Just as they reached a convent of capuchin friars, which is situated close to the walls, the bells rang, and the noise of the soldiers, parading the streets, was heard distinctly. Köningsmark, alarmed, began to suspect that his plan was discovered, and that preparations were making to oppose him; but these apprehensions were quickly dissipated by an assurance from Odowalsky, that the bustle was occasioned by the relieving guard, and that the bells of the monastery regularly sounded at midnight, to summon the friars to matins.

As soon as the patrol had finished its round, the signal was given for commencing the attack. Led on by Odowalsky, who was perfectly ac-

quainted with every spot, they mounted the walls, and having seized the sentinels before they were prepared to resist, hurled them from the ramparts into the ditch below. Pushing forward in silence, they made themselves masters of the nearest gate before the enemy were roused from their sleep; and, having thrown it open, Königsmark entered at the head of the cavalry, and, without experiencing the slightest resistance, got possession of the other gates, together with the bridge and principal avenues. All this was accomplished with so much rapidity, that the New Town was actually garrisoned by a hostile force, before the greater part of the inhabitants had received the slightest intimation of the calamitous fate which awaited them.

It would be difficult to describe in adequate language the terror and consternation that prevailed, when the rising sun disclosed to the citizens the many dangers with which they were surrounded. Unable either to venture into the streets, or even to appear at their windows with safety, because all who were seen were instantly shot at, they climbed in despair to the tops of their houses, stretching out their hands in speechless agony, endeavouring by signs to communicate to the inhabitants of the Old Town their forlorn and wretched situation. That they were suddenly exposed to some dreadful calamity their frantic agitation proclaimed, but the cause of their affliction was still veiled in obscurity. At length a soldier swam across the river, and carried the melancholy tidings to their astonished neighbours. Soldiers, students, mechanics, flew instantly to arms, and lined the bank of the Mulda, waiting in awful suspense till more accurate information, respecting the strength of the victors, could be pro-

cured. This was indeed a most necessary precaution, because they were exposed to the fury of a foe, in whose estimation nothing was sacred that tempted avidity, or kindled brutal desire. From the opposite shore they plainly distinguished the shrieks of women, imploring death in preference to violation; and the cries of men frantically rushing upon the swords of an infuriated banditti, rather than witness the sad destiny of those, in whom their whole happiness centred. During the long period of three successive days was this dreadful scene of lust and rapacity inhumanly protracted. Immense was the booty collected from the pallaces of the nobility, the rich convents and churches, and particularly from the Austrian treasury.

Considering the small force by which this important conquest was achieved, it ranks among the most surprising events recorded in history; and, it becomes still more an object of wonder, when we reflect that, in accomplishing it, only one soldier was slain, and no more than two wounded. Brilliant, however, as the adventure must appear, it was not likely to lead to permanent benefit, because the extent of the fortifications would have required for their defence a force three times greater than that which was placed at the disposal of Königs-mark. To extend his conquests was an object of still greater difficulty, because the Old Town was guarded by a competent garrison, assisted by a numerous militia, all animated with the warmest enthusiasm. No obstacles, however, were formidable enough to intimidate the impetuous courage of the Swedish commander, who, trusting more to the operations of terror, than to the power of arms, invested the city without further hesitation. A cou-

rier was dispatched, imploring Wittenberg to hasten to his assistance. An invitation so tempting was accepted with alacrity by the Silesian general. After defeating Buchheim, and capturing Tabor, that active commander reached Prague with a considerable reinforcement. Five batteries were immediately opened from the Ziskaberg,\* which soon silenced the fire of the garrison, whose means of defence were much circumscribed by want of artillery, the greater part of which, on account of the arsenals being situated in the New Town, had fallen into the hands of the besiegers.†

Fortunately for the emperor, the arrival of Conti, a skilful engineer, gave additional animation to the besieged, who daily beheld fresh means of defence created by the active powers of genius; new bastions arose in the place of those which were damaged by the enemy's batteries, and the construction of mines, those tremendous engines of mischief, supplied the want of artillery.

At this critical juncture, Charles Gustavus, Prince Palatine of Deux-Ponts, joined the army with new levies from Sweden. This prince, who succeeded to the crown upon the resignation of the volatile Christina, had been lately nominated generalissimo of her forces in Germany. The appointment of a commander nearly allied to the throne, and universally designated by public opinion as the future husband of their sovereign, gave universal satisfaction; because many of the officers, and particularly Königsmark and Wittenberg, were disgusted at being placed under the orders of Wrangel, who, though

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\* So called from Zisca, the disciple of Huss.

† Puffendorf, 60.

deservedly admired for his military talents, was inferior in years and experience to both, and exercised his authority with too little regard for the feelings of those he commanded.

The siege being resumed by the orders of Charles Gustavus with additional vigour, numerous breaches were made sufficiently wide for a waggon to pass with facility ; but, the resources of Conti kept pace with the danger: the ditches were filled with crows feet and arrows ; and, whenever the assailants effected a lodgment, a mine was exploded with fatal celerity. Every artifice which cunning, or bigotry could suggest, was at the same time employed by the Jesuits to inspire the citizens with a pious abhorrence for the religion and ferocity of the besiegers. And their attempts proved so successful, that all classes of people, either from an unshaken attachment to the catholic faith, or the dread of incurring the imputation of disloyalty, assisted in defending the ramparts. The students in particular were highly distinguished for acts of the most daring intrepidity. Every summons to surrender having been rejected by the governor with disdain, a general assault was attempted. Four thousand veterans with determined resolution rushed toward the breach, but no sooner had they gained a footing on the wall, than a mine being sprung, great numbers were buried amid the ruins ; and the survivors, being attacked with irresistible fury, were with difficulty extricated from the danger. It now became evident that protracted perseverance would only occasion an useless effusion of blood. Charles Gustavus therefore resolved to terminate the siege, too humane to sacrifice the lives of his soldiers, at a time when intelligence was hourly expected an-

nouncing the conclusion of peace. It is a singular circumstance in the history of this destructive war, that it terminated at Prague, where it begun.\*

Having for a considerable time attended exclusively to the military transactions in Germany, it becomes necessary to revert to the operations of the French in the different countries, where they simultaneously prosecuted hostilities. It was probably more from jealousy of the glory acquired by the Duke of Enghien, than from a mistaken opinion of his own military talents, that the Duke of Orleans was desirous of again commanding the armies in Flanders, notwithstanding the voice of public admiration universally designated his illustrious rival, as alone competent to fill that station.† Mazarin appears to have been fully sensible of this, and to have brought forward every argument best calculated to prevail upon Gaston to wave his pretensions. But it was for the advantage of those, who flattered his incapacity, that he should be invested with power and patronage; and the weakness of the regent did not allow of her offending the first prince of the blood, by openly thwarting his inclinations.

The presumption of Gaston was not the only difficulty against which the minister had to contend. By what equivalent could he satisfy the ambition of Enghien, who naturally regarded the most important command as belonging to himself

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\* 1648, Puffendorf, 46.

† Cassion, who had lately obtained the rank of marshal, being questioned by Mazarin, respecting the state of the Flemish army, and asked if any thing more was wanting to ensure its success, laconically replied, with the bluntness of a soldier, "Nothing, except a commander like the Duke of Enghien."—*Histoire de Condé*, i. 285.

by every claim of superior genius, and unvaried success. He was however delivered from all his embarrassment by the magnanimity, or artifice, of that accomplished prince, who, to the astonishment of mankind, spontaneously offered to serve under Gaston. Whether this resolution was inspired by patriotism, or as many people suspected by the wish of obtaining an ascendancy over the weaker mind of the duke, he treated him with no less deference and respect, than if he had really valued him for intellectual pre-eminence, executing his orders with undeviating precision, and exerting his own abilities with unwearied industry, to conceal the incapacity, or rectify the blunders of the commander in chief.

The campaign was opened by the siege of Courtrai, which, in spite of the gallant resistance of the garrison, was soon compelled to surrender.\* This however was only preparatory to a more arduous enterprise, in which the Dutch had promised to co-operate: but, during the whole of the summer, they evinced so little disposition to molest the Spaniards, that it was generally believed at Paris, that a good understanding had been secretly established between the two nations, though they thought it advantageous still to keep up the appearance of hostility.

As years resolve, intrepidity and ardour give place to indecision and the love of repose. Though these are invariably the attendants of age, the sudden change which was remarked in the character of the Prince of Orange was attributed by the French to the unbounded influence of his consort,

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\* 1646. *Histoire de Condé*, i. 295. *Bougeant*, iii. 34.

whom they openly accused of having sacrificed the reputation of her husband, and the interests of the republic, to the gratification of her private resentment. In support of this charge, historians pretend that Mazarin, in order to secure the friendship of the princess, promised her a magnificent present of jewels. Finding however that the money, originally destined to purchase them, might be employed in a manner more agreeable to his sordid disposition; or thinking that he should be able to accomplish his purpose, without her assistance, he neglected to fulfil the engagement. Determined to punish the intriguing Italian for his meanness and infidelity, she endeavoured to excite in the public mind a jealousy with respect to his real intentions, by artfully representing him in his true colours, as a man totally destitute of every principle of honour, justice, and morality, and ready to sacrifice character, country, or friends, to his inordinate avarice and ambition.

Anxious to ascertain the real intentions of the Dutch, the Duke of Orleans summoned them to fulfil their engagements, and received for answer, that they were unable to undertake any enterprise of moment, unless they received a reinforcement of six thousand infantry. This strange request was by no means calculated to efface the unfavourable impression; but as the French general was determined that nothing on his part should afford a plea for want of punctuality, he resolved instantly to comply, notwithstanding he was assured that the republican army was already nearly equal in numbers to his own. Many difficulties however were to be overcome before the plan could be carried into execution, as the French had



to traverse a country intersected by numerous rivers and canals, all of which were in the enemy's possession. At any other period, it is hardly probable that they would have pushed their delicacy to such an extreme; but, during the Westphalian congress, it was essentially requisite for the attainment of those important objects, to which their ambition aspired, to impress Europe with the belief, that no dangers were great enough to repress their ardour, when the safety of their friends was concerned.

The execution of the enterprise afforded fresh opportunities for displaying the abilities of Enghien. Upon approaching Bruges, the Spanish army was discovered in order of battle, advantageously posted upon a hill, which, when compared with the flatness of the adjacent plain, has some pretensions to the appellation of lofty. But no sooner were the necessary dispositions made for attacking them, than the enemy retired under the cannon of Bruges, and their retreat having removed the only impediment to the advance of the French, they continued their march unmolested: but, being weakened by the loss of the troops placed at the disposal of the Dutch, it became a more difficult labour to return. By the prudence of the Spaniards they were however delivered from all their apprehensions, as it soon became evident that the enemy was resolved not to hazard a battle, though repeatedly exhorted to it by the enterprising courage of the Duke of Lorraine.

Mardyck and Bergues were successively compelled to open their gates, when Gaston, satisfied with the laurels already obtained, or persuaded that nothing brilliant was likely to be achieved by

an army debilitated by fatigue and disease, resigned the command to the Duke of Enghien, and hastened to reap his most pleasing reward, in the shouts and applauses of the Parisians. The report which he made respecting the condition of the troops, having satisfied the cardinal, that the most which could be expected in their shattered state was to preserve the advantages already obtained, he wrote in confidence to Gassion, imploring him to moderate, by his sagacious advice, the juvenile impetuosity of his commander.\*

The esteem of the nation was however far more precious in that prince's estimation than the favour of a minister, with whom he was justly offended, and whose insolence and ingratitude laid the foundation of those intestine commotions, which agitated France during the turbulent minority of Louis XIV. This quarrel was attended with such important consequences, that it merits some farther explanation.

An expedition had been prepared, during the preceding winter, against the coasts of Tuscany, for the purpose of intimidating Pope Innocent X. who openly favoured the Spaniards. The command had been offered to the Duke of Enghien, and, upon his refusal, was given to Prince Thomas of Savoy, an officer of reputation, but more celebrated for science than success. The Duke of Brezè, who enjoyed the office of high admiral, and was destined to assist in the undertaking, was unfortunately killed in a naval action, after deciding the victory by his gallant behaviour. The loss of an officer, so deservedly valued for magna-

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\* Histoire de Condé, 334.

nimity, courage, and generosity, having entirely disconcerted the plan of the campaign, occasioned the return of the fleet.\*

To succeed to an office of such dignity and emolument was an object worthy the ambition of Eng-hien, who instantly explained his pretensions with the confidence of a man who feels a refusal to be impossible; but the distinguished merit of the candidate proved a serious obstacle to his wishes. The timidity of Mazarin grew alarmed at the idea of augmenting the power and fortune of a prince, already the idol of the nation, and whose influence with the army was unbounded; yet, to reject a demand universally sanctioned by public opinion might expose him to still greater danger. In this dilemma he flattered himself with having discovered a happy expedient, in persuading the queen to accept the appointment herself; a measure which served still more to exasperate the house of Condé, because it secured to the cardinal not only the extensive patronage, but, what he valued much higher, the princely emoluments belonging to that distinguished situation.†

Incapable of acting with candour or dignity, Mazarin, by the basest arts of adulation, attempted to appease the resentment of Condé and his son; and, for this purpose, entrusted the latter with unlimited powers, leaving him at perfect liberty to act, as he should think most conducive to the glory and interest of the nation.‡ Had the cardinal desired to sully the reputation of a prince, whom he equally hated and feared, he probably would have adopted this very plan; because the weakness of

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\* Bougeant, iii. 37.

† Histoire de Condé, 355.

‡ Ibid, 357.

the army apparently precluded every hope of success.

Notwithstanding the season best adapted for military operations, in a northern climate, was already far advanced, the Duke of Enghien was of opinion, that there still remained sufficient time for the execution of a project, which would not only raise his own reputation to the highest pitch of glory, but could not fail to give a fatal blow to the commercial prosperity of the Spaniards.

The city of Dunkerque, regarded as the bulwark of the Spanish Netherlands, united to various local advantages all the strength which the imperfect art of fortification was in those days able to bestow. The convenience of a secure and extensive harbour rendered it the seat of mercantile enterprise. Every summer a numerous fleet transported thither the rich productions of America, which were gradually distributed, by various routes, into the different countries of northern Europe. A great number of privateers were also stationed there, always ready to attack the mercantile fleets of Holland, when returning from Batavia, or Ceylon, with their valuable cargoes, and which thus occasioned severer losses to that wealthy republic, than all the rest of the Spanish navy combined.

But, in proportion to the advantages attending success, the obstacles to be encountered were alarming. The garrison, composed of veteran troops, was commanded by Leyda, a skilful engineer, and deservedly celebrated for defending Maestrich against the most formidable army that the Dutch had ever assembled. Accustomed to the fatigues and perils of the ocean, the greater part of the inhabitants were soldiers; and not only sin-

cerely attached to the Spanish government, by which they had been treated with the greatest lenity, but animated with the most implacable hostility against France, because she was the ally of a people whom prejudice had taught them to execrate as rebels, and interest to envy as rivals. The adjacent country, a sandy desert, and totally destitute of wholesome water, was incapable of furnishing supplies for the army. Provisions of course must be brought from Calais, but the loss of a convoy might be fatal; and, as the surrounding flats were easily inundated, all intercourse with Piccardy must of course be precarious. Besides, the approach of winter left little time for military operations; and, in case the siege should be protracted to any length, the elements alone, without the co-operation of human valour, must ensure the destruction of the besiegers.\*

Though perfectly aware of the difficulties which awaited him, the duke did not regard them as insuperable; but as the possession of Furnes appeared a necessary step, it was immediately invested and taken. Dunkerque was then besieged in form, while the united squadrons of France and Holland blockaded the harbour. The sufferings of the soldiers augmented daily; many of them lost their sight, from being constantly exposed to clouds of sand tempestuously whirled by contending winds in every direction. These tremendous squalls were followed by cold and almost incessant showers, productive of all those destructive maladies that prevail in rainy autumns.

The dread of interruption from the Spaniards,

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\* Bougeant, iii. 43. Histoire de Condé, 358.

which at first kept the besiegers in continual alarm, was at length dissipated by the movement of the Prince of Orange, who, after wasting many weeks in suspicious delay, at length prepared for the investment of Venloo.

Meanwhile, the Duke of Enghien pressed the siege with so much activity, that he scarcely allowed the soldiers the necessary repose. Attack succeeded attack with uninterrupted rapidity, so that every day was rendered memorable by some fresh exertion of heroism, on the part of the besiegers, or the besieged. Mounds were elevated with a celerity almost exceeding the efforts of human industry, in order to prevent the works progressively raised from being destroyed by the violence of the waves. The various perils, to which every convoy was exposed, kept the duke in a state of constant suspense; he regularly attended every morning at the principal magazine, to see that provisions were distributed with order and economy: yet, in spite of his vigilance, the army was often scantily supplied. No murmurs, however, were heard; for so unbounded was the confidence reposed in the general, that every soldier felt assured, that he should never be subject to any privation, which it was possible for human vigilance to avert.\*

Meanwhile Piccolomini, having assembled a formidable force, sent to reconnoitre the position of the enemy; but finding, to his astonishment, that their camp was already completely fortified, he prudently resolved not to hazard a battle, as a defeat might be attended not only with the loss of

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\* Bougeant, iii. 43. Histoire de Condé, 379.

Dunkerque, but with that of all Flanders. And he probably flattered himself that Leyda would be able to defend the town, till the besiegers, diminished by sickness and fatigue, might fall an easier prey. This calculation, though founded upon plausible ground, was disappointed by the energy of his opponent, who, when the works were finished, requested Leyda's permission to send an officer of rank upon business of the highest importance. The Spanish commander returned for answer, that, consistently with the regulations prescribed by the Spanish government, he could not permit an enemy to enter the gates, but that a person of confidence should be immediately dispatched, for the purpose of receiving his highness's commands. The following morning the officer arrived, when the duke frankly told him, that, notwithstanding the fate of Dunkerque was virtually decided, yet the esteem which he felt for the brave garrison, and their gallant commander, made him desirous of affording them every indulgence which he could grant, without infringing his duty. They might, in consequence, depend upon obtaining an honourable capitulation, provided they made haste to capitulate; but if, on the contrary, they persisted in an useless defence, they must expect to be treated as prisoners. This conference having led to further negotiations, it was finally agreed that the town should surrender at the expiration of three days, unless it should be previously relieved; and no attempt having been made for that purpose, on the eleventh of October, 1646, the French entered Dunkerque in triumph.\*

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\* Bougeant, 34. Histoire de Condé, 403.

The Duke of Enghein, whom we must henceforth call by the name of Condè, as he had recently succeeded to that title upon the death of his father, having been rashly induced to accept the command of the Catalonian army, the conduct of the war in the Netherlands was jointly entrusted to Gassion and Rantzau; both elevated to the dignity of marshals. The inconvenience resulting from divided authority has seldom been exemplified more strikingly, than in the operations of the troops under the direction of men, both eminently distinguished for military talents, but who appear to have agreed in one only point, that of thwarting each other's designs. Availing himself of their dissensions, the Archduke Leopold, who commanded the Spanish forces, took Commynes, Lens, and Landrey. An effort made for the relief of the latter, from the judicious dispositions of Gassion, would probably have been attended with a fortunate issue, had not Rantzau, who was much addicted to wine, and had spent the night with a convivial party, positively refused to move the following morning, notwithstanding the earnest solicitations of his colleague. This unfortunately created so much unnecessary delay, that before the marshal recovered his senses, the moment for action was lost irretrievably. Indignant at being robbed of an opportunity for signalizing his name, Gassion determined upon recovering Lens, while Rantzau laid siege to Dixsmude; but when animating the troops by his own heroic example, he was mortally wounded. The death of an officer, universally esteemed for independence of character, no less than for personal bravery, was severely regretted by the army. That he was no favourite with the minister may be easily inferred from the eulogium he has al-



ready received; but to an accurate knowledge of every branch of his profession, he united every quality that constitutes an accomplished soldier, and which could be acquired in the school of Gustavus. He was no less distinguished for sobriety, temperance, and a thorough contempt of dissipation and pleasure, than for indefatigable activity, unconquerable perseverance, and a spirit too proud to flatter the vices of an imperious minister, for the attainment of those honours, to which his services justly entitled him.\*

The defeat sustained by Harcourt, before the walls of Lerida, after a long and tedious siege, having entirely disconcerted the projects of Mazarin, he vented his indignation by ungenerously depriving that able officer of all his employments; and might have carried his injustice to still further extremities, had not Condè embraced the defence of the unfortunate general, notwithstanding he was descended from a family, which had long been hostile to his own: for though he was emulating the splendid talents of Richelieu, the present minister was an admirable copyist of all his defects, and of none more so than that of punishing commanders not for want of capacity; not for want of zeal, but for want of success, even when the failure arose from his own inadvertence.

To desert the Catalonians, after they had voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of France, was a measure too repugnant to every generous feeling, even for the meanness of Mazarin to embrace; and, in case the war was to be continued, Condè appeared the only chief capable of re-ani-

mating an army, disheartened by distress and disaster. Besides, if he could prevail upon the prince to cross the Pyrenees, the cardinal felt secure of accomplishing one important point; either of reducing Lerida and Tarragona under the dominion of France; or, what he probably regarded as a "consummation most devoutly to be wished," of lowering the reputation of a hero, whose rare endowments attracted his envy, no less than he excited his apprehensions. All those splendid qualities which rendered the prince the idol of volatile people, conspired to facilitate the scheme. The difficulties of the enterprise awakened his ardour, the confidence of the Catalonians excited his generosity, while his own unshaken integrity prevented him from attending to the admonition of his friends, when warned against the cardinal's insidious designs. All he required of Mazarin was to accelerate the necessary preparations, that he might be enabled to strike some decisive blow, before the heat of the summer, more formidable and destructive than the swords of the enemy, should compel him to relax in activity.\*

No man was ever more prodigal of promises than the cardinal, and no man less exact in performing them. Enchanted with his good fortune in having persuaded Condè to hazard his reputation in Spain, he was too much occupied with domestic intrigues for maintaining his authority in defiance of the murmurs of an insulted people, to think of providing for the wants of an army, the destruction of which might possibly have delighted him more than any conquests which it was likely to achieve.

Upon his arrival at Barcelona, the prince at

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\* Histoire de Condè, 430.

length discovered that the suspicions of his friends had not been chimerical. No cannon nor reinforcements were sent; nor had any magazines been provided. Though indignant at finding himself the dupe of his own credulity, he felt that his character was at stake, and that the glory to be acquired must necessarily augment in proportion to the obstacles surmounted. With indefatigable zeal he accordingly undertook to create the resources of which he was deprived by the inattention or treachery of Mazarin: yet, in spite of his exertions, he was obliged to wait at Barcelona for several weeks, before he received any reinforcements from France; and even when they arrived, he was still in want of ships, without the assistance of which, it was impossible to undertake the siege of Tarragona. At length a small squadron entered the port; but, instead of consisting of well appointed frigates, as he had been taught to expect, it was composed only of galleys, and even those were in so shattered a condition, that he was forced to send them back to Marseilles.\*

The siege of Lerida was now the only practicable enterprise, and even that was attended with so many difficulties, that few generals would have ventured to undertake it. Lerida, though regularly defended with bastions, ditches, and a citadel, according to the system of fortification which at that time prevailed, was less indebted for its uncommon strength to art, than to the singularity of its situation, being built upon the summit of a steep and craggy rock, so hard that it was scarcely practicable for the efforts of man to make the smallest

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\* Histoire de Condé, 439.

impression upon it. Since the loss of Barcelona, it was regarded as the key of the kingdoms of Valencia and Arragon; and, on account of its local importance, had been entrusted to the valour of D. Georgio Britta,\* a Portuguese officer, no less distinguished for skill and intrepidity, than for the chivalrous virtues of honour and generosity.

Every thing most conducive to the security of a fortress had been carefully provided, a numerous garrison of veteran troops, provisions and ammunition in the greatest abundance, and an excellent train of artillery.

Upon arriving before the town,† the French took possession of the lines which had been traced by Harcourt, and which the indolence, or the presumption, of the Spaniards had prevented them from destroying. Notwithstanding the city was completely blockaded, no progress could be made for want of the heavy artillery, which was stopped by a sudden inundation. At length the flood abated, and the cannon arrived; this however proved of little importance, because in proportion as the sappers advanced, the rock became still more impenetrable. It was in vain for Condé to encourage the workmen by promises, praises, and prodigality: night after night was consumed in indefatigable labour, yet no visible progress was made; while frequent sallies interrupted his toils, and annihilated in

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† Grammont gives him the following character:—*La place n'était rien, mais Don Gregorio Brice étoit quelque chose. C'étoit un de ces Espagnols de la vieille roche, vaillant comme le Cid, fier comme tous les Gusmans ensemble, et plus galant que tous les Abencerrages de Grenade.*—As a reward for his service, On le mit à l'Inquisition.—*Mém. de Grammont*, 122.

\* They appeared before Lerida on the 15th of May, 1647.

a few hours the exertions of several days. The painful severity of a dangerous wound was insufficient to check the ardour of Britta, who when too weak to support himself on his feet, was carried to the ramparts, and placed in a chair, in order to direct the operations of the garrison, and animate them by the presence of greater perseverance. Inspired with those romantic sentiments, which were once the distinctive ornaments of the Spanish nation, the governor never suffered a day to elapse, without sending a present of the most delicate fruits to his illustrious adversary. The prisoners on both sides were restored unransomed; so that it was not only a struggle for glory and dominion, but a contention for superiority in the splendid virtues of urbanity, benevolence, and magnanimity.\*

Reiterated efforts having led to no decisive results, Condè was convinced, that with an army disheartened, and reduced by the ardour of a solstitial sun, perseverance must expose the remainder of his troops to slow, but certain destruction. Nothing therefore was left, except to raise the siege, or attempt the desperate alternative of an assault.—The latter, though most congenial to the prince's character, was rejected after mature deliberation. It was an invariable maxim with that illustrious chief, to regulate his operations without consulting even his most intimate friends, till every thing was finally settled. Being now determined to abandon the enterprise, he communicated his intentions to Grammont, who no sooner received his instructions for carrying them into execution, than he gave vent to his joy in loud ejaculations, returning thanks to

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\* 1647. Histoire de Condè, 456.

Providence with religious enthusiasm, for having inspired the prince with a resolution so honourable to his feelings, as a soldier, a man, and a citizen.\*

The talents of Condè being required in another quarter, Schomberg was placed at the head of the Catalonian army the ensuing campaign; during the greater part of which, he confined his troops to desultory incursions into the neighbouring province of Valencia; but, toward the end of the summer, having received reinforcements, he made himself master of Tortosa, a populous city on the Ebro.

Notwithstanding the culpable neglect with which he had been treated by a vain and arrogant minister, Condè was unable to resist the allurements of glory, when it appeared before his eyes in all its attractions. It therefore required little rhetoric to undertake the defence of Flanders, where the Archduke Leopold had opened the campaign with more than usual vigour and success. While the French were employed in reducing Ypres, an enterprise pregnant with difficulty and danger, the Spaniards presented themselves unexpectedly before the walls of Courtray, and carried it by assault with so much ease, that the garrison had barely time to retire into the citadel, which, after a vain parade of resistance, was surrendered with disgraceful facility.†

An unsuccessful attempt to surprise Ostende, undertaken at the express injunction of Mazarin, and in contradiction to the wishes of Condè, contributed to weaken the army, for which, in the distracted situation of Paris, it was in vain to solicit supplies. The archduke, taking advantage of his present superiority, penetrated into Picardy,

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\* Hist. de Condè, 460.,

† Ibid. ii. 44.

and threatened Peronne, distributing as he proceeded, incendiary proclamations, inviting the inhabitants to assist him in overturning a government, by which they were grievously oppressed.\*

Notwithstanding Condè was reduced to the necessity of remaining on the defensive, a situation little suited to his enterprising spirit, he added greatly to his reputation by the almost prophetic discernment, with which he anticipated the enemy's projects, and protected the frontier wherever it was threatened.

Disappointed in his expectations of tearing from France a portion of Picardy, Leopold traversed in haste the contiguous provinces of Hainaut and Flanders, in the hope of being able to recover Dunkerque, before Condè was prepared to defend it: but such were the vigilance and activity of the prince, that no material advantages could be obtained by the enemy. After vainly attempting to deceive his antagonist by multiplied and contrary marches, the archduke resolved upon investing Lens, a place of considerable importance. Condè was no sooner apprised of his intentions, than he marched to its relief, and, upon entering the extensive and undulated plain, in the midst of which that city arises, he to his inexpressible delight discovered the Spaniards arrayed in order of battle.†

It has so often been my task to delineate scenes of bloodshed and desolation, that it is hardly possible any longer to transpose the groupe, or vary the colours. I shall therefore confine myself at present to a hasty outline, leaving to the reader's imagination to fill up the canvas.

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\* Histoire de Condè, 53.

† Ibid. 61.

The combat was obstinate, and for a long while doubtful. Every advantage that numbers, health, or discipline could afford, was decidedly in favour of the Spaniards; as the French, weakened by fatigue and disease, were rendered almost uncontrollable by their sufferings. All their reliance was placed in the talents of their commander, in which their superiority was unquestionable. But, notwithstanding, Leopold was greatly inferior in skill, his want of experience was in some measure supplied by the veteran genius of Beck, who, born to the lowly condition of a shepherd, had attained by the claims of unprotected merit to the highest military honours; and that, in a country more prejudiced than any in modern Europe, in favour of the prerogatives of illustrious descent.

The position of the Spaniards upon an elevated spot was too formidable to be attacked with impunity; Condè therefore endeavoured by various stratagems to draw them into the plain; but finding his efforts ineffectual, he commenced a regular retreat. Beck, eager to avail himself of superior numbers, and regarding the retrograde movement of the enemy as a tacit confession of weakness, immediately quitted his post, and fell upon their rear with so much violence, that it was instantly thrown into disorder.

The situation of the French was now so critical, that it required all the talents and intrepidity of Condè to prevent an ignominious defeat. Firmly resolved either to perish, or conquer, he changed his dispositions in face of the enemy with so much promptitude, that they were unable to avail themselves of a circumstance, which might have been attended with the most disastrous consequences.



Each party fought with obstinate bravery, till the impetuosity of the French at length prevailed, and the Spanish line being broken, a horrible slaughter ensued. After exposing himself with the desperate courage of a volunteer, the archduke was hurried from the field of battle amidst a torrent of fugitives. Beck, after receiving a dangerous wound, fell into the hands of the victors, in a state so overwhelmed with sorrow, that he rather courted death, than strove to avoid it by submitting to medical discipline.\* Thus perished the remnant of those veteran bands, which had escaped from the carnage of Rocroy, and which had formerly excited the admiration and terror of Europe. Few, however, were the benefits derived by the conqueror from this brilliant exploit; because the presumption of Mazarin had kindled a flame, which threatened to spread in every direction, and which created such an alarm in the breast of the regent, as well as in that of the contemptible favourite whom she rashly supported in defiance of the nation, that they saw no hope of escaping from the impending storm, except by the powerful protection of Condè.†

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\* Histoire de Condè, 91.

† Ibid. 98.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Characters of the different negociators employed at the congress of Munster and Osnabruck, with the views and pretensions of the different powers.

**T**HE celebrity and importance of the treaty of Westphalia, which gave a new and more permanent form to the great commonwealth of civilized society, and served as the basis and model of all subsequent negotiations, so long as Europe retained the smallest vestige of independence, impose the necessity of entering into various details, which the generality of readers may possibly regard as tedious and uninteresting, but which cannot but appear in a very different light to the statesman, the civilian, and the philosopher.

Although the proposal of France and Sweden to select Munster and Osnabruck, as the theatres of negociation, had been accepted by their adversaries, various obstacles still remained to be overcome, before a congress could possibly assemble. Peace was indeed in every mouth ; but the hearts of those, upon whom it depended, were far from being peaceably inclined. The influence of France, when acting in concert with Sweden, was become so extensive, that the tranquillity of Europe for a long time depended upon the pleasure of Richelieu. And he had so cruelly sported with the feelings of mankind, that his professions at length were universally regarded as the offspring of policy and deceit.

With bitter anguish and disappointment the Germans beheld themselves alternately the dupes and the victims of a power, which never hesitated to sacrifice the comforts of others, even for the attainment of a trifling advantage, and which would have regarded a province as cheaply purchased by the misery and destruction of thousands.

A congress had been summoned to meet at Cologne in 1636, to terminate hostilities between France and Austria;\* and Cardinal Ginetti had been selected by the pope as mediator. Ambassadors also were appointed by Spain and Austria, who actually proceeded to Cologne; but whether with pacific intentions, as the German historians in general believe, or merely with a view of throwing upon their enemies the odium of protracted hostilities, as the French assert with greater probability, it is impossible now to decide. Certain, however, it is, that the papal legate remained for four years at Cologne in solitary pomp, before Richelieu condescended to fix upon a negociator; and this unnecessary delay proved a grievous disappointment to the Germans, and led them to credit the accusations of Austria. It is probable, however, that both parties were playing an artful game; but, upon the present occasion, the imperial ministers managed their cards with the greatest address. Had Richelieu been sincere, he never would have brought forward the preposterous project of selecting Lubec for the treaty between Austria and Sweden, while the French plenipotentiaries remained at Cologne, because the remoteness of those cities from each other rendered

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\* Bougeant, i. 261.

it extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible for the two treaties to proceed with equal steps, which had been made an indispensable article in the negotiation.\*

As the death of Richelieu had produced no visible change in the general policy of France, and the character of his successor was still less calculated to inspire either confidence or esteem, few were sanguine enough to expect a speedy termination to their miseries.

After a sanguinary contest of twenty-five years, supported by the blood and treasure of Germany, nothing could be more natural than for the wretched victims of Austrian ambition to regard peace as the greatest blessing which the bounty of Providence could bestow. After the frightful picture so repeatedly presented to the reader's imagination, it can hardly be necessary to expatiate farther upon the deplorable state to which a country was reduced, formerly abounding in every thing most essential to the happiness of man, but whose exhausted fields could no longer provide for the subsistence of its diminished population. Extensive plains, once remarkable for fertility and cultivation, were converted into barren deserts; and large cities, lately conspicuous for wealth and industry, were become the melancholy receptacles of poverty and despair. Neither was this unfortunate change confined to the external condition of man—it had reached and perverted his moral feelings. Every bond of union was torn asunder; every sentiment of humanity was

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\* Wallman's Geschichte des Westphälischen Friedens. A work professedly written as a supplement to Schiller's history of the "Thirty Years War," and executed with considerable ability.

eradicated. Born amid the crimes and turmoil of arms, without education, or the prospect of honest employment, the rising generation was taught to consider murder as the allotted occupation of man; ferocious courage as his noblest attainment, and plunder as the surest of emoluments.

Peace alone could afford an effectual remedy for these evils; but, amid the complicated interests of the hostile powers, each struggling to obtain some personal advantage at the expense of those whom he undertook to protect, how was that inestimable blessing to be secured? The difficulties to be encountered had been fully ascertained in the proceedings of the diet, assembled at Ratisbonne, in 1641; for though, among many important concerns, its attention had been directed to the attainments of peace, various impediments had arisen, sufficient to prove, that nothing but the most decisive success on the part of the allies could conquer the obstinacy of Austria. A war undertaken for the protection of commerce, or a disputed frontier, is easily brought to a conclusion, because those are tangible objects, the value of which may be easily ascertained; but when men are contending for speculative theories, pride and prejudice are too deeply affected to allow room for rational discussion. Opinions, however erroneous, that have been current for many centuries, acquire, from habit, a prescriptive orthodoxy, which bids defiance to reason. Without enquiring on what foundation they rest, the generality of the world, having once imbibed them with their native tongue, respect them as parts of their religious creed, and, as such, defend them with a pertinacity not to be overcome, because it regards discussion as heretical:—transmitted as

heir-looms from father to son, they are preserved with a veneration approaching to idolatry, and appear as invaluable in the eyes of superstition, as the most precious relics of martyrology. In the present instance, however, it was not only the obstinacy of religion, but the pride of power which must be subdued. Since the reign of Charles V. the house of Hapsburg had entertained such exaggerated notions of the imperial prerogative, that they scarcely deigned to treat the other sovereigns of Europe as equals; and most of the catholic states in Germany had been so long accustomed to these extravagant pretensions, that they foolishly imagined their own consequence would be impaired, by reducing the authority of their illustrious chief within the bounds of moderation. In weak understandings the admiration of royalty assumes the character of a political mania; and a people must have made no little progress in philosophical researches, before they are enabled to perceive, that the kingly office was instituted not to flatter the vanity, nor to gratify the passions of an exalted individual, but for the benefit of society. An age of ignorance gave birth to this humiliating theory, and it required all the influence of enlightened reason to destroy it.

Fortunately, however, that influence was vigorously exerted for purposes the most patriotic and meritorious. I have already noticed the celebrated publication of Chemnitz,\* in which the connexion subsisting between the different members of the empire and its chief, was examined with candour and freedom; and the privileges of the subject, and

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\* In chapter xxiii.

the prerogatives of the monarch so clearly defined, that it was no longer possible for ignorance to confound them. The main object of this patriotic writer was to prove, that the splendour and dignity of the Germanic confederacy did not reside in the pomp or profusion of its political head, but in the collective body of the states. The sensation produced by this extraordinary work was so lively and universal, as clearly to shew, that the public mind was prepared for the reception of the boldest truths. Had the negociation been restricted to the internal politics of the empire, they even in that case would have embraced questions of the most difficult solution, but the claims of France and Sweden contributed to involve them in still greater perplexity.

Cardinal Rosetti had been originally destined by the papal court for the important office of mediator at Munster; but his intimacy with Madame de Chevreuse,\* joined to his well-known partiality to Spain, determined Mazarin to exclude him. By rejecting the negociator first selected for a mission

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\* The character of this lady is thus drawn by Desormeaux. La Duchesse de Chevreuse avoit porté à la cour de Louis XIII. le sceptre de la beauté et des graces; elle avoit vieilli dans l'agitation des intrigues, et l'empoiement des passions; favorite de la reine, chassée de la cour, retablie ensuite, exilée de nouveau, poursuivie par Richelieu, dont elle dedaignoit la puissance, et les hommages, elle avoit rempli toutes les cours de l'Europe de son nom, de ses charmes, de son esprit, et de ses aventures galantes; sa vie n'offre que le tableau interessant et deplorable des erreurs et des passions; on voyoit en elle un melange presque incroyable de genie et de pusillanimité, de grandeur et de foiblesse, d'applications et de distractions, d'ambition et des desinteressement, d'activité et de mollesse. Au reste personne ne foula jamais aux pieds, avec moins de scrupule, la decence et la reputation; et n'enviasoit avec plus d'audace et de mepris, les dangers de toute espece; elle ne connoissoit d'autres soin, d'autres devoirs, que ceux de plaire à celui qui avoit subjugué son ame.—Histoire de Condé, t. 306.

of such infinite consequence, Mazarin flattered himself that he should acquire a considerable influence over his successor, who would be indirectly indebted to him for his employment. Without openly opposing the wishes of the sovereign pontiff he had recourse to his favourite system of intrigue, which completely answered his purpose. Wearied with waiting at Cologne for several years, without advancing a single step, Cardinal Ginetti returned to Italy, under pretext of recovering his health. Availing himself of this circumstance, the minister of Louis insisted, that it would be contrary to diplomatic etiquette, to appoint another legate, as Ginetti's powers had never been officially revoked. Mortified at an opposition, which they little expected, the Barbarini family resolved to revenge themselves by acceding to the wishes of Mazarin, and to leave the negociation in the hands of Ginetti, who was destitute of the abilities necessary for conducting such intricate concerns. But the legate continuing too much indisposed to resume his station, Chigi, who had acted as nuncio at Cologne, was directed to proceed to Munster, in order to be present at the opening of the congress. This indeed was a most fortunate occurrence, as Chigi was gifted with every quality, which could enable him to fill the important office with dignity. Disappointed at finding him less devoted to France than her presumptuous minister had expected, the national historians accuse him of leaning toward the interest of Spain; the Germans, on the contrary, with greater reason, applaud his discernment and impartiality. That he felt a strong prepossession in favour of that religion, from which he derived all the advantages of wealth and distinction, it is impossible



to doubt; but, whatever may have been his private sentiments, he certainly concealed them with so much ingenuity, that the protestants believed him zealously bent upon restoring peace to the Christian republic. Though, undoubtedly, not a genius of the highest order, he possessed a clear understanding, an accurate judgment, and insinuating manners. Such indeed was his address in gaining the good opinion of all who approached him, that although the acute and suspicious D'Avaux for a long time considered him devoted to France, the opposite party never ventured to question his probity.

Certain it is, that, without the utmost exertion of patience and perseverance, it would have been impossible for Chigi to contend against the pride of the Spaniards, the levity of the French, and the presumptuous variety of the Austrians. In his instructions from Rome the most rigid impartiality was enjoined. He was also positively forbidden to bring forward any proposition of his own, or even to declare his private sentiments respecting those of the different plenipotentiaries; but was to confine himself entirely to receiving their projects in uniting and communicating them to the opposite party. His visits were to be regulated, with scrupulous attention, to the established rules of precedence, while he studiously avoided, either by word or action, to give umbrage to any of the parties. It cannot, however, be supposed, that Urban could remain an indifferent spectator of the event. On the contrary, it would have been totally inconsistent with his station, as head of the catholic church, not to have felt a deep interest in the result of a discussion, intended to establish the political rights of a rival re-

ligion, to determine what portion of wealth and authority should be wrested from the orthodox clergy, and to regulate the balance of power in Italy.\*

This latter consideration, being equally interesting to the Venetians, was particularly recommended to the attention of their ambassador, Luigi Contarini, who, in conjunction with the papal nuncio, was chosen to mediate between the belligerent powers. Highly distinguished for address and capacity in various missions, he united the craft and cunning of the Italian character to the coolness and caution of the German. When unable to extort from the silent prudence of the Austrian ambassadors a disclosure of their lofty pretensions, he addressed himself directly to the imperial cabinet, by means of the Venetian envoy at Vienna; and thus frequently succeeded in finding a clue to the labyrinth, in which he must otherwise have been entangled. It is the characteristic of a Frenchman to believe himself endowed with every talent that can adorn or dignify a mortal. In the conduct of a campaign, or the arrangement of a ball, in diplomatic dexterity, or colloquial refinement, he fancies himself superior to the rest of mankind. The same extravagant pretensions, which influence the individual in his private capacity, are extended to political concerns. Other nations were formed, in his estimation, to flatter his passions, forward his views, and smooth his ascent to universal dominion; and the people, who venture to contest this ridiculous claim, are treated as ignorant, or ungrateful. Under this impression, the Venetians were expected, by unbound-

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\* Waltman, i. 81.

Bougeant, ii. 2.

Galetti, ii. 80.

ed support, to shew their gratitude to France, for having extinguished the flame which threatened to desolate Italy. And accordingly, the conduct of the mediator afforded matter for serious complaints, when he was found to prefer his duty to every consideration of personal attachment. This steady adherence to the precepts of honour was studiously represented as a culpable partiality to Austria; and the French negociators were highly offended at his refusal to receive the deputies from Portugal and Catalonia, though he could not have assented to this extraordinary proposal, without openly violating the rules of propriety, which forbade him to acknowledge men as accredited agents, the representatives of men who were at that time regarded by the greater part of Europe as rebels and traitors.\*

The mediation of the Pope was avowedly restricted to the catholic powers, but that of Venice extended to the protestants, and the Swedish negociation had been left entirely to the management of Contarini, since the rupture with Denmark. One great difficulty, however, remained, before this arrangement could be carried into effect; because it would have proved derogatory to the dignity of the ambassador to give him a colleague, and the pride of Sweden was offended at the idea of leaving their affairs in the hands of a simple secretary. In order therefore to obviate every possible objection, it was agreed that the Swedish and imperial plenipotentiaries should carry on the negociation in writing; a mode of intercourse by no means unusual in Germany. Contarini's mission thus embraced a wider

field than that of his colleague, yet, in all affairs relating to the catholic states, the superiority of the latter was undisputed. To him alone were addressed the proposals and answers of the different ambassadors, and by him alone were they signed. The representative of Venice attended his summons, whenever he had any thing of consequence to communicate; and it was to his house that the plenipotentiaries repaired, when desirous of conferring with the mediators.\*

After what has been said in the preceding pages, it can hardly be requisite to recapitulate the names of the different powers, whose representatives assembled in Westphalia. Though comprehending a greater variety of nations than had ever met for diplomatic discussions, they may be divided into two distinct classes—Spain and Austria, with their numerous adherents on one side; and, on the other, France and Sweden, with their protestant allies. Diverging into a thousand subordinate channels, their interests and pretensions embraced every question most material to the welfare of society.

Though the choice of the negociators was a consideration of the highest moment to every power engaged in the treaty, it was particularly important to the emperor, who had not only to contend against foreign ambition, but also to defend the imperial prerogatives against the violent attacks of domestic enemies, the greater part of whom were struggling for commercial or territorial advantages, while they pretended to be fighting in defence of liberty, and vindicating the cause of toleration.

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\* Bougeant, 7. Galetti, 82,

The destined head of the Austrian embassy, Maximilian, Count of Trautmannsdorf, did not arrive at Munster until some months after the congress was opened, when he was universally hailed as the harbinger of peace; because his irreproachable probity was regarded as a pledge, that the emperor at length had yielded to the wishes of a suffering people, and was seriously desirous of terminating hostilities. In the mean time, the Count of Nassau presided over the mission, not because he was endowed with the talents necessary for conducting an intricate negociation, but because he was eminently gifted with every personal attraction, and fond of magnificence and expense. Educated by his parents in the Lutheran tenets, he had been induced by circumstances to embrace the catholic faith, and had, in consequence, become a considerable favourite at Vienna, where a rigid attachment to orthodox opinions proved the surest road to preferment.

While Nassau was acquiring admiration by his external accomplishments, his want of ability was amply supplied by the splendid talents of Wolmar, the friend and instructor of his youth. Born in an inferior station of life, and destined for the humble office of village pastor in the Lutheran church, Wolmar felt himself designed by nature to shine in a more exalted sphere, and probably, with a view of obtaining those envied situations, contributed to his pupil's conversion. Honour and riches now presented themselves in a tangible shape, and, allured by the seducing prospect, he pursued them with unremitting assiduity. Deeply versed in all the intricacies of the Germanic constitution, and tho-

roughly acquainted with the interests of Austria, he soon gained admission into polished society, and, by attending to the manners and conversation of the great, exchanged the pedantic stiffness of a college for the captivating politeness of a courtier. His reputation for integrity, as well as knowledge, inspired the emperor with so much confidence, that he was entrusted with all the secrets of the Austrian cabinet, and sent to Munster to retard the negotiation by every impediment that artifice could create, without openly exciting suspicion. But when Trautmannsdorf was entrusted with ample powers to conclude a general peace, Wolmar was obliged, in appearance at least, to second the views of that enlightened statesman, though strongly suspected, upon various occasions, of having clandestinely thwarted them. Trautmannsdorf was decidedly hostile to Spain, and had frequently endeavoured to convince the emperor of the impolicy of his conduct, in sacrificing so much to the pride of a nation, from which no adequate return could be expected. Wolmar, on the contrary, was secretly devoted to the court of Madrid, and often started unnecessary doubts, to protract the discussions. The proved integrity of Oxenstiern accorded so exactly with the feelings of the former, that they soon entertained for each other the warmest esteem; while Salvius and Wolmar, to national jealousy united the bitterness of personal rivalry. Universally regarded as superior to their colleagues in political sagacity, they were constantly at war with each other; hence the Swede became more active, than he might otherwise have been, in support of the protestant claims, while his antagonist endeavoured to prove the sincerity of his conversion, by the ob-

stinacy with which he defended the religion to which he owed his present elevation.\*

During the time that Nassau and Wolmar were employed at Munster, in devising expedients to protract the treaty, Count d'Aversberg and Crane were occupied at Osnabruck in a similar manner. The former, impressed with the most extravagant ideas of imperial prerogatives, and thinking every concession disgraceful to a sovereign, who represented the majesty of the Roman Cæsars, would have left the question to the decision of arms, rather than meanly attempted to avert the storm by condescension and compromise; while the latter, whose only claim to celebrity was derived from his thorough acquaintance with those pedantic forms, to which prejudice attaches such infinite importance, was far better calculated to occupy a professor's chair in some catholic university, than to shine among men too enlightened to mistake the knowledge of languages for wisdom.

With the interests of Spain hardly less complicated than those of Austria, three negociators were entrusted. The Count of Pegnerandes, who commenced his career by delivering lectures upon civil war, in the university of Salamanca; but having unexpectedly inherited a large estate, exchanged the gown of a pedant for the plumes of a courtier, and aspired to signalize his entry into public life by filling some post of distinction. Family connexions, supported by the influence of a beautiful wife, placed him at the head of the Westphalian embassy, although his acquirements were entirely scholastic, and his ideas narrowed by early habits of seclusion. Having never, till he was vested with the

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\* Boucant, Galetti, Wallmon.

dignity of an ambassador, passed the confines of Spain, and but rarely diverged from the regular road from Madrid to Salamanca, he was firmly persuaded that no earthly power, with the single exception of Austria, was strong enough to resist the sovereign of Peru, and he departed for Munster, in the fullest conviction that, in conjunction with the representatives of the imperial crown, he was deputed to prescribe the conditions of peace to the humiliated champions of heresy. With these prepossessions it is easy to conceive that he was equally proud and opinionated; but, being told that mysteriousness was a proof of capacity, he made a secret of the most trifling concerns, and by a pompous affectation of impenetrability, exhausted the patience of all who approached him. Though he beheld the Spanish monarchy crumbling in pieces, and progressively stripped of its foreign dominions, he persisted in refusing to make the smallest concessions, lest it should be considered by the world as an acknowledgment of weakness, and a proof, that the successors of Ferdinand and Charles were no longer arbiters of Europe.\* His colleague, Suviedra, had been likewise a professor at Salamanca; but having suddenly acquired considerable wealth, and purchased the title of count, he was sent to the congress at Munster, where he was equally distinguished for pride and for address. The weight of the negotiation, however, principally rested upon the capacity and experience of Brun, a man of cultivated understanding and polished manners, and perfectly acquainted with all the delicacies of the French

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\* Bourgeant, ii. 312. Galetti, ii. 86.



and Latin languages, both of which he spoke with classical elegance. But, however brilliant his genius, or extensive his information, his most admirable talent was that of diplomacy. Entirely free from that weak and insulting affectation of national superiority, the offspring of ignorance and bigotry, which led Castillians to regard themselves as the greatest and wisest of mortals, he was easy of access, unassuming in his behaviour, and lively and amiable in conversation. Never at a loss for expedients to conceal his own plans, or to discover those of his opponents, he disguised profound dissimulation under the semblance of frankness, and gave to reports, which he had privately circulated from interested motives, the strongest appearance of probability. Less desirous of procuring an honourable peace, than of disconcerting the projects of Mazarin, whom he personally hated, the leading object of his ambition was to detach Sweden and Holland from their connexion with France; and, with respect to the latter, he succeeded.\*

Among the adherents of Austria two only have claims to the reader's attention—the Dukes of Lorraine and Bavaria: for it would be useless to waste our time in illustrating the venal policy of the ecclesiastical princes, among whom it is hardly possible to discover one, who had the sagacity to appreciate the true interests of his country, or the spirit requisite to pursue it. But Maximilian of Bavaria was abundantly gifted with that worldly wisdom, which is far more useful in the conduct of political affairs, than the splendour of genius, because it enables its

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\* Galetti, 86. Bougeant, 15.

possessor to turn every occurrence to his own advantage, and frequently to derive an accession of power from circumstances which, to men of inferior abilities, would have brought only ruin and disgrace. The various situations in which he has acted, must have so fully illustrated his projects and principles, that it can hardly be necessary to add, that he was attached to the house of Austria by the double tie of interest and ambition. Ardently bent upon transmitting to his descendants the electoral dignity, he was afraid that, should Sweden obtain a decisive superiority, she would exert it in favour of the Palatine. This led him to support the Austrian cause with unshaken fidelity, but it induced him also to carry on a clandestine correspondance with France, that he might never be in want of a protector, whatever were the result of the contest.

Though the Duke of Lorraine was endowed with military talents, and personal bravery, sufficient to have attracted universal admiration, yet his volatile disposition, by hurrying him on from folly to folly, prevented him from conducting himself with prudence or consistency in any situation.

As Austria and Spain were the most distinguished champions of the catholic church, so Sweden and France were placed at the head of the protestant party: for, although Louis XIII. was no less hostilely inclined to the doctrines of the reformers than Philip or Ferdinand, and persecuted their followers with equal severity, he had been led by circumstances to act in contradiction to his natural feelings, and to advocate the cause of religious freedom in Germany: but as prejudice and policy were frequently at variance, both during his reign and that of his successor, many striking inconsistencies

may be discovered in the conduct of the French negociators, and particularly in that of D'Avaux, so blindly devoted to the ancient religion, that he often opposed the projects of Oxenstiern, when, by a firm union, he might have carried a point of the utmost importance.\* Though deeply versed in the refinements of diplomatic intrigue, and perfectly acquainted with the politics of Europe, D'Avaux was by no means a favourite with Mazarin, who gave all his confidence to Servien, and thus excited between them an unconquerable jealousy, which led them frequently to act in contradiction, and even to censure each other's proceedings in satirical pamphlets.

It must however be admitted, that the talents of the latter, in some degree, justified the cardinal's partiality. Servien had occupied the place of secretary of state during the brilliant administration of Richelieu, by whom his understanding had been so highly appreciated, that he had been entrusted with the management of an important negociation in Italy. Animated by the proud feeling of conscious ability, he ill brooked the affected superiority of his colleague, who disdained to treat as his equal a man as decidedly his inferior in the prerogatives of birth, as he excelled him in intellectual attainments. D'Avaux's acquirements were the result of labour, which had fertilized a soil naturally unprolific: Servien, on the contrary, possessed a brilliant genius, and a quickness of intellect, which enabled him to

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\* The bigotry of D'Avaux was so inconsistent with his general character, that it has often been attributed to interested motives; and he has in consequence been accused of defending the papal see, from the hope of obtaining a cardinal's hat, and succeeding Mazarin as minister. Galetti, ii. 85.

seize all the bearings of a question with the utmost facility. The manners of the former were polished, attractive, and courtly; those of the latter rough and repulsive. Trusting entirely to the soundness of an argument, he was often inattentive to the language in which it was arrayed; yet, when he deemed it important to dazzle his auditors, he could adorn his discourse with all the beauties of rhetoric.

It is a singular phenomenon in the diplomatic history of France, to find a prince of the blood at the head of an embassy; but the unquiet temper of the Duke of Longueville having excited the jealousy of Mazarin, he employed all the artifices of which he was master, to persuade that prince, that the splendour of so illustrious a name would give dignity and importance to the mission. But so little confidence was placed in his capacity, that considerable progress was made in the treaty before his arrival at Munster, and he was permitted to leave it before it was brought to maturity.\*

The same unfortunate jealousies, which occasioned a coldness between Servien and D'Avaux, rendered Salvius the secret enemy of Oxenstiern. The exalted character of the chancellor, his eminent services, and unrivalled talents, had deservedly raised him to that pitch of reputation, to which only wisdom and virtue can attain. The lustre of qualities

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\* The Duke of Longueville's portrait is drawn as follows, by the lively pencil of Cardinal de Retz:—"Monsieur de Longueville avoit, avec le beau nom d'Orléans, de la vivacité, de l'agrément, de la dépense, de la libéralité, de la justice, de la valeur, de la grandeur; et il ne fut jamais qu'un homme médiocre, parcequ'il eut toujours des idées qui furent infiniment au dessus de sa capacité. Avec la capacité, et les grands desseins on n'est jamais compté pour rien; quand on ne les soutient pas, l'on n'est pas compté pour beaucoup, et c'est ce qui fait le médiocre." i. 294.

so rare and pre-eminent, reflected dignity on all his connexions, but more particularly on his son, who, in conjunction with Salvius, was appointed to conduct the negociations at Osnabruck. Convinced, from experience, that the professions of France were seldom sincere, he was strongly impressed with the necessity of guarding continually against her insidious designs. Aware also that she possessed the amplest means of corruption, together with the inclination to employ them, he strenuously exhorted both Salvius and his son to be constantly upon their guard against her intrigues; and, lest either of them should be tempted to swerve from their duty, by the insidious offers of Mazarin, he took care that they should never have reason to alledge distress as an excuse for venality. Besides, he flattered himself, that the French would relinquish every hope of corrupting his son, when they beheld him surrounded by a princely retinue, and living with the magnificence of a sovereign.

The idea of restoring peace to Europe, and confirming the ascendancy of Sweden, was so congenial with the feelings of the chancellor, that he would probably have managed the negociation in person, had he not been convinced, that his presence was necessary at Stockholm, to watch Christina, whose partiality to France might otherwise have induced her to barter the glory of Sweden for the praises of a people, so skilful in giving to the basest adulation the attraction of novelty, and the appearance of sincerity.

In the selection of substitutes, Oxenstiern appears to have acted with his usual discernment; for, though greatly inferior to his father in solidity of judgment, in the vastness and variety of his know-

ledge, and the extent and magnificence of his plans, young Oxenstiern was endowed with personal merit to entitle him to the highest employments. The best education that Sweden could supply had awakened in his mind a taste for literature, which never forsook him through life; and his views and understanding had been subsequently enlarged by visiting the different courts of Europe, at that time in alliance with Sweden. Upon his return from his travels, he embraced a military career, and served with distinction under his maternal uncle, Marshal Horn. But as his talents were better adapted to the cabinet, than to the field, his father initiated him in all the mysteries of Swedish politics, particularly as connected with Germany; and, during that period, when he represented the crown of Sweden, and directed the protestant confederacy, he made him acquainted with the most secret transactions in which he was engaged. With such peculiar advantages, even moderate abilities might have appeared respectable; but the Swedish ambassador to a strong understanding united judgment, consistency, and prudence. These qualities, however, were impaired by considerable defects. No less haughty than D'Avaux, his pride assumed a more disgusting form, because it was not softened by elegant manners. The splendour of his establishment perhaps was carried to a ridiculous excess, as he never appeared in public without a royal retinue, and never sat down to dinner without announcing to the world, like the Khan of the Tartars, the hour of his repast by the sound of trumpets.

With feelings such as these, it was natural for him to treat Salvius as a dependent, rather than an equal; because the pride of aristocracy is apt to

regard the splendour of birth as more honourable than that of genius. Salvius however judged more discreetly, and refused to acknowledge the superiority of a man, whose understanding was inferior to his own. Apprehensive of the consequences likely to ensue from this want of cordiality, he endeavoured to strengthen himself by a connexion with the party, in opposition to the chancellor; and was so successful in the attempt, that he not only obtained their cordial support, but even insinuated himself into the favour of Christina, whose good opinion he is supposed to have required, at the expense of his colleague.\*

As the reader must by this time be thoroughly acquainted with the characters of those, to whose management the negotiation was entrusted, it is time to enquire to what particular objects each was directed to attend.

Never before were the sovereigns of Austria opposed to so formidable a confederacy, nor had they ever been reduced to greater distress: for, though the imperial armies had upon various occasions supported their ancient renown, the blow inflicted by Gustavus Adolphus had shaken the monarchy to its very foundations. Every succeeding campaign had gradually weakened the colossal fabric erected by the ambition of Charles V. at the expense of so much blood and treasure; and, should hostilities continue a few years longer, there was great reason to apprehend, that the emperor might lose even the little influence, which he still retained among the protestant states. The insurrection in Bohemia, at the commencement of the war, and

Wallenstein's conspiracy in the sequel, had manifested too plainly for presumption to mistake, how much a sovereign, however absolute, has to fear from the resentment of his subjects and generals, when the former are exasperated by intolerance and oppression, and the latter attached by no tie except personal interest. A spirit of insubordination prevailed throughout the hereditary dominions, which wanted only the countenance of a victorious foe to kindle into a general conflagration. Every hope of again connecting the members of the empire in the ancient bonds of association, had long been relinquished even by the most sanguine catholics. No ally remained capable of affording effectual support, except the Duke of Bavaria, who, though zealously devoted to the papal communion, was still more warmly devoted to ambition, so that if called upon to decide between Rome and Maximilian, there could be little hope of his seeking the crown of martyrdom: and, should the want of resources to continue the contest, or the prospect of gain by abandoning it, induce him to conclude a separate peace, Ferdinand foresaw, that he should be left alone to contend against the united strength of France and Sweden, aided by all whom resentment for former injuries, or the hope of obtaining a share in the spoil, rendered hostile to the pretensions of Austria.

The Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony had suffered so severely from their own imprudence, that they no longer desired to take an active part in the contest, but gave the emperor to understand, that they thought themselves entitled to his warmest thanks, for not openly opposing him in the field.



The loss of Holstein had convinced the King of Denmark of the danger of contending with Sweden; so that instead of deriving any benefit from the folly of Christian, Ferdinand was compelled either to leave his hereditary dominions exposed to the fury of Torstenson, or to abandon his friend in distress.

Peace alone could save the house of Austria from impending destruction, but it was in vain to expect it, without sacrifices, at which the pride of Ferdinand revolted. The dismemberment of the empire for the indemnification of those powers, by which he had been reduced to distress, together with the limitation of the imperial authority, were the probable consequences of a treaty; and a severer lesson than any which he had hitherto received, was requisite to teach him humility. Presumption also whispered, that by persevering in the contest, it was far from impossible some opportunity might occur of negotiating to greater advantage. With the victory at Duttlingen his hopes revived. Another such triumph, and he still might be able to dictate the conditions of peace.

The utmost address however was required to deceive the public, whose aversion to war had been unequivocally manifested at a diet assembled at Francfort in 1644, ostensibly with the view of reforming certain abuses in the administration of justice, but in reality for the purpose of ascertaining what fresh resources could be extorted from the German people in their present calamitous situation. Instead however of attending to the representations of the imperial ministers, the members of this assembly almost unanimously voted, that the restoration of peace should be the primary object of their attention. Another question of the highest

political importance was next brought under discussion; viz. whether the college of princes, and that of the imperial cities, should be allowed to send deputies to the congress. This was likewise decided against the wishes of the emperor, who insisted, that the claim was not only unsupported by former precedents, but tended directly to embarrass the mediators, by occupying their attention with questions relative to the internal policy of Germany, most of which had been already decided, either by the treaty of Prague, or by the diet of Ratisbonne. These arguments, however, failed to produce the desired effect; because the occasion appeared particularly favourable for establishing those rights, which had long been neglected, or overlooked. But while the diets supported their privileges with becoming spirit, they deemed it prudent to efface all suspicion of hostility to the imperial throne, by publicly declaring, that they did not mean to attack the just prerogatives of their chief, nor even to require that their deputies should be present at every debate, but solely at those which involved the general interests of the empire, respecting which nothing ought to be determined without their concurrence.\*

Convinced that the result of the negotiation must ultimately depend upon the success of the armies in Germany, the imperial ministers beheld with indifference all other events, provided they could obtain an ascendancy there. Victory, they hoped, might enable them once more to unite all the members of the empire, and when acting in concert, no European power could resist the de-

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\* Bougeant, i. . Puffendorf, xvii. 30.

scendants of Arminius. Under this impression it was natural for them to behold with secret satisfaction the efforts of France simultaneously directed against Spain, and the Netherlands, while Sweden was left by the jealousy, or imprudence of Mazarin, to support the whole brunt of the conflict. The commencement of hostilities between Sweden and Denmark was hailed by a presumptuous administration as the prelude to prosperous fortune; and the consequences of that ill-advised measure were productive of the bitterest disappointment. Too proud and opiniated to profit by experience, the imperial cabinet no sooner beheld one project disconcerted by the wisdom, or valour of their foes, than they caught at another, no less hollow, with equal eagerness. Influenced by similar motives, Ferdinand suffered ambition to get the better of prudence, and directed his ambassadors to protract the negociation by every possible artifice.\*

Though Spain had hitherto taken no very active part in the German war, it was in vain for Europe to look for permanent tranquillity, till she should terminate hostilities with France, and acknowledge the independence of Holland. Impoverished by the conquest of Mexico and Peru, because a sudden influx of wealth, which ignorance regarded as inexhaustible, had rendered the lazy Castillian more indifferent than ever to the improvement of agriculture, and the encouragement of manufactures. Exhausted by fruitless and impolitic attempts to subjugate a people, whom the enthusiasm of liberty had rendered invincible, and debilitated by the fatal consequences of internal disaffection, which burst

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\* Bougeant, ii. 14.

forth simultaneously in Catalonia, Portugal, and Naples, a country destined by Providence to have been the garden of the world, was converted into an uncultivated desert; and a people possessing every advantage of climate, soil, and situation, had been degraded into a nation of beggars. Though nearly reduced to a state of political inanition, and with nothing to support him but pride, the Spanish monarch appeared doubtful, whether peace were desirable, because it could not be obtained without various sacrifices, which would blazon his weakness to the world, and compel him to descend from that eminence, where he endeavoured to conceal disease and decrepitude under the trappings of pride and ostentation.

Inflated with the recollection of former glory, as with the chimeras of a flattering dream, D. Louis de Haro, who with the place of Olivares had inherited his extravagant principles, could ill brook the humiliation of submitting to the ascendancy of a people, one of whose sovereigns had been formerly a prisoner at Madrid. Accustomed to acquire an extension of territory by every treaty, neither the king, nor the minister, possessed that firmness of intellect which instructs man to yield to necessity; for it is as much by bending opportunely to the current of fortune, as by manfully struggling against it, that true dignity and fortitude are displayed.

Instead of concentrating his forces for the recovery of the Netherlands, in conformity to the sagacious counsel of Spinola, the vanity of Philip—for the motive by which he was impelled deserves not the elevated title of ambition—induced him to render all his efforts abortive, by multiplying the

objects of attack. While every attempt to enrich himself with the spoils of the Palatine had been frustrated by the vigilance of Oxenstiern, and France, in conjunction with the Duchess of Savoy, had impeded his progress in Italy, the Dutch established their power on so solid a foundation, that they were enabled every year to enlarge the republic by additional conquests.

Under similar circumstances a wiser monarch would have endeavoured to secure himself against future losses by a prudent compromise with the victor. Not so the King of Spain; who was too dull to discover, or too proud to admit, that commercial enterprize is the true source of prosperity, and that a nation may be poor, contemptible, and impotent; though fleet after fleet enter its harbours, with rich cargoes of gold and silver. A temporising policy was far better suited to the incapacity of Philip than the decisive counsels of wisdom, because it left every thing open to the operations of chance, and required little mental exertion.\* Hoping that France, distracted by internal commotions, would be compelled to recall her armies for the protection of the capital; and, trusting to the insolence and intemperance of Mazarin, and his own secret emissaries for fomenting the flame, Philip directed his ambassadors to counteract every project for a general peace, but earnestly to endeavour by flattery and concessions to promote a reconciliation with Holland.

Most of the German princes, who still adhered to the papal religion, were guided by the example of Austria and Bavaria; the circles were influenced

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\* Bougeant, ii. 17.

by the conduct of their directors, so that, though many of the members were individually anxious to terminate hostilities, they were hurried away by the impetuosity of a stream, against which they were too weak to contend.\*

The reader has been long acquainted with the motives by which Cardinal Richelieu was originally impelled to declare war against Austria, and has seen the policy of that enlightened minister completely justified by events. Mistress of Roussillon, and the greater part of Catalonia, France had opened a road to Madrid, and was thus enabled to carry the war into the very heart of the Spanish dominions. The acquisition of Casale, and various other places in the north of Italy, might lead to the conquest of Milan, ever a favourite project with the Parisian court, to the attainment of which she had repeatedly sacrificed torrents of blood, and incalculable treasures. Alsace, in conjunction with the forest towns, created a barrier on the eastern frontier, which secured her against the dread of invasion; and the occupation of Philipsburg not only afforded an easy communication with Hessa, but opened a passage into the heart of the empire. In the Netherlands she had made considerable progress, as well as in the electorates of Treves and Cologne.†

Never had the resources of France appeared so formidable as during the brilliant administration of Richelieu, and even after his death the impulse given by his genius to the political machine continued to operate with unabating energy, urging it forward in the career of glory. It is true, indeed,

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\* Bougeant, ii. 22.

† Ibid. 24.

that the internal prosperity of the nation by no means corresponded with its external splendour. Great and oppressive were the burthens under which the people were destined to groan ; but by a government as absolute and unfeeling as that of France, during the reign of Lewis XIII. and his despotic successor, the sufferings of peasants and manufacturers were accounted as trifles, when put in competition with the caprices of the sovereign, or the attractions of military renown.

It was generally believed to have been the intention of Richelieu to carry on the war so long as soldiers or money could be procured, and the heart of Mazarin was a stranger to all those tender feelings which might have induced a less vain and absolute minister to consider, that laurels might be too dearly purchased by the sacrifice of every domestic comfort which can enliven the labours of honest industry. But while he amused the vanity of a people, invariably the slaves of external appearance, with the pomp and pageantry of arms, he certainly consulted his own private advantage by continuing the contest, because it afforded employment for a turbulent aristocracy, whose talents and influence he dreaded.\*

But as it could no longer be doubted, that the Dutch were tired of the war, and would, in consequence, seize the first favourable opportunity for concluding it; that the resources of Sweden were so completely exhausted, as imperiously to prescribe a similar conduct, Mazarin determined, at all events, to amuse the world with the bustle of a treaty, though it should lead to no decisive results ;

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\* Boucant, ii. 25.

for there was nothing he dreaded so much as to see France abandoned by her protestant allies, a situation to which she was likely to be reduced, by opposing the current of popular opinion.

That his professions, however, were entirely delusive, may be fairly inferred from the proceedings of D'Avaux and Servien in Holland, where they stopped to negotiate with the States General, before they proceeded to Munster.

In private life gratitude is often displayed by deeds the most heroic and noble; but to suppose it likely to influence the actions of a nation, is a chimerical idea; nor can it be denied, even in a moral light, that the claim upon the latter is infinitely weaker. The soft feelings of benevolence, by which man approaches more nearly to the perfections of his Creator than by any other of his virtues, impel him to alleviate the sufferings of a fellow-creature, even by the sacrifice of his individual comforts; but interest is invariably the master-spring of national munificence; and it rarely occurs, that kings or ministers confer an obligation, without having accurately calculated all the advantages with which it is likely to be attended. Every thing connected with freedom was so decidedly abhorrent from the despotic principles of Richelieu and Mazarin, that, in subsidising Holland, they could not be regarded as conferring a favour, but concluding a bargain of barter and exchange. In consideration of certain stipulated services to be performed by the Dutch, these cautious ministers contracted to pay a settled sum, and the moment the republic had fulfilled her part of the agreement, the obligation was perfectly cancelled.

Nothing, therefore, could be more ridiculous,



than for the French to accuse the Dutch of ingratitude, because they refused to immolate the interests of their republic to the preposterous ambition of Mazarin.

Upon their arrival at the Hague, the French plenipotentiaries found the leading men much divided in opinion respecting the measures which ought to be adopted in the actual crisis of affairs. One party seemed inclined to continue the war against Spain, not only for the purpose of acquiring additional colonies, but because they feared that the cessation of foreign hostilities might lead to domestic dissensions. The opposite faction considered the extent of the debt already contracted for the support of the army and navy, as an irresistible motive to terminate the contest, the moment Spain should acknowledge their independence. Besides it was difficult for patriotism to behold with indifference the rapid progress of the French in Flanders, because, in spite of their professions of disinterested friendship, the latter were quite as formidable neighbours as the former. The sentiments of the Dutch were no less divided respecting the proper mode of terminating hostilities; for while the friends of democracy preferred a treaty of peace, guaranteed by the principal powers of Europe, the partisans of the Prince of Orange contended, that the object, for which they professedly struggled, was more likely to be obtained by a truce, which, while it proved far less humiliating to the vanity of Philip, might procure equal advantages to the republic.\*

It was of little importance to the Parisian court which opinion prevailed, provided the Dutch would

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\* Bougeant, i. 534.

engage not to enter into a treaty, except in concert with France. The points, therefore, to which the attention of the ambassadors was particularly directed, were the following:—to establish a general system, to which both countries should conform during the course of the negotiation; and to regulate the demands, which they should respectively make. And, when this was ascertained, they were instructed to propose a preliminary convention, by which both countries guarantee each other's possessions, and settle the conditions of a future alliance, in case the congress should separate amicably.

Persuaded that his wishes would meet with a ready assent, Mazarin was extremely mortified at finding a nation of merchants fully as capable of appreciating its real interests, as the most crafty ecclesiastic in Italy, and equally obstinate in defending them. The proposal of D'Avaux was accordingly rejected with the utmost disdain. The answer of the republic was firm and sagacious, and manifested a resolution in no event to sacrifice the welfare of Holland to the ambition of an ally, whose sincerity was justly suspected.\* Other questions was debated with equal acrimony; particularly that which regarded the termination of hostilities by a truce, or a permanent treaty. For though Mazarin was persuaded that Spain might be more easily prevailed upon to leave France in possession of her conquests for a specific period, than consent to their final alienation, and was therefore by no means averse to the idea of a truce, it would have been inconsistent with his general

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\* Bougeant, i. 537.

principles, to have communicated this opinion to his allies; because he scorned to pursue the plain road of sincerity, when it was possible to attain the object in view by the torturous path of intrigue.\*

While differing so materially upon points of importance, it was not likely that the discussions should speedily terminate; and we accordingly find, that many months elapsed, before any plan could be finally arranged. At length a treaty was signed, by which both parties engaged to favour each other's pretension at the Westphalian congress, and not to conclude a separate peace. Should hostilities be recommenced either by Austria, or by Spain, they bound themselves reciprocally to assist each other, in conformity to the stipulations of the treaty made in 1635.† This was justly regarded by the court of France as a concession of the highest importance, because it entirely deranged the projects of Spain, who expected, as Saviedra had incautiously boasted, to settle, in the course of a single evening, all existing differences with Holland. Nothing now remaining to prevent the departure of the ambassadors, they prepared for their journey to Munster. Previously however to their quitting Belgium, D'Avaux addressed the states in a florid harangue, in which, after pompously expatiating upon the various benefits likely to accrue from their union with France, he imprudently suffered his attachment to the catholic worship entirely to overcome his judgment. With the zeal of a missionary, rather than the discretion of a statesman, he pleaded for the papal religion, in terms highly offensive to the

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\* Bougeant, i. 547.

† Ibid. 567.

greater part of his audience, who regarded all interference with their domestic concerns, not only as insulting to the dignity of an independent republic, but even as intimating a claim of superiority, which they were too proud and too prudent to admit. Servien availed himself of this occurrence to discredit his colleague in the opinion of Mazarin, who felt delighted at an opportunity for censuring a minister, who in the judgment of Richelieu had never committed a single error in the whole course of his diplomatic career.\*

It is extremely curious to trace, in the instructions given by Mazarin to the French ambassadors, the inordinate ambition by which he was actuated, and which can be equalled only by the futility of the arguments, by which his extravagant claims were supported. Assuming possession as the criterion of right, he declared his resolution never to allow the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, to be mentioned as indemnities.† Grasping the duchy of Lorraine with insatiable rapacity, he insisted that it had legally devolved to the crown of France, in consequence of the infraction of the most solemn treaties, as well as by cession and conquest. Aware that it might be objected to this claim, that the Duke of Lorraine was not bound to fulfil an engagement contracted at Paris, any more than Francis I. had been to execute a convention entered into at Madrid, he contended that the situation of the parties was by no means similar; because the King of France was a prisoner when he signed the treaty with Charles; whereas, the duke was in full enjoyment of personal liberty,

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\* Bougeant, i. 580.

† Ibid. ii. 25.

when he ceded his dominions to Louis. Immediately after his return to Nancy he had ratified the deed by a voluntary act, and had even sent a deputy to the diet at Ratisbonne to signify his entire satisfaction with the treatment he had received during his residence at Paris, as well to efface any unfavourable impression that might arise from a misconception of the different arrangements into which he had entered. Anticipating the opposition likely to arise upon final pretences, Louis declared his readiness to submit to every contribution to which the Duke of Lorraine would have been subject, and even to double the amount, should he be allowed the privilege of sending a deputy to the diet in quality of a member of the empire.\*

The views of France, with respect to Germany, were influenced by similar principles; for Mazarin not only refused to relinquish Brissac, but positively insisted upon the cession of Alsace, which he claimed under the title of indemnity. Concealing ambition under the mask of benevolence, he pretended that the dismemberment of that fertile province would prove essentially beneficial to the Germans; because it tended to reduce the emperor's authority within more moderate limits, by giving to the King of France a legitimate right to interfere in the internal politics of the empire, and to employ the resources, with which Providence had entrusted him, in defence of toleration and freedom.†

Roussillon and Catalonia were equally tempting to avidity. The claims of France to the former

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\* Bougeant, ii. 27.

† Ibid. 28.

were founded upon a title too ancient and authentic to admit of dispute, and it was therefore impossible to restore it. Her right to Catalonia was equally clear, though it rested upon a different basis. It was perhaps an act of imprudence for a despot to talk about contracts between princes and people, as the only source of legitimate power; but, as it was difficult to discover any better plan, Mazarin boldly asserted, that Philip, by violating the conditions upon which the Catalonians anciently submitted to Spain, had forfeited every claim to their allegiance, and that they were accordingly at liberty to chuse a protector from the different sovereigns of Europe. With regard to Flanders he was equally obstinate. Should the Spaniards require the evacuation of Artois, D'Artois was directed to demand the restitution of Navarre, the claim to which had been reserved by a specific article in the treaty of Vervins.\*

Italy had been long regarded, by the great continental powers, as the field of military enterprize and legitimate plunder. Though the treaty of Quierasco had been formally ratified by the Duchess of Savoy, it had been only partially executed. The French plenipotentiaries were consequently instructed to insist upon its entire completion; and, as the surest means of preventing all future misunderstandings, the king suggested an alliance between the sovereign of Mantua and a princess of Savoy. With ostentatious liberality the cardinal proposed that France should restore all her other conquests in Italy, provided she were permitted to retain possession of Pignerol, already ceded by

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\* Bougeant, ii. 28.

treaty. The temporary occupation of Casale by a French garrison was regarded as a necessary precaution, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Spaniards.

Such were the leading objects recommended to the attention of the ambassadors, and they are generally supposed to have been framed after the model of a treaty, sketched by the masterly genius of Richelieu. This project, if realized, would not only have exalted the glory of France to the highest pitch of elevation, but would have enabled her to balance the power of Austria, so long a source of constant disquietude. To a temper less sanguine than that of Mazarin, the obstacles might have appeared insurmountable ; but he incautiously flattered himself, that the same prosperous fortune, to which he was indebted for the attainment of absolute power, would befriend him in every situation. In order the better to establish the ascendancy of France, he conceived a chimerical project for forming two confederacies ; one of which should comprehend all the German, the other all the Italian states—to act independently, though still in subserviency to one general principle—that of preserving the tranquillity of Europe. It is easy to conceive with what sensations a similar proposal would be received by a high-minded people, fully able to appreciate the blessing of freedom, and accustomed to receive the professions of France with some little degree of suspicion.\*

But in spite of vanity and presumption, the cardinal was too well acquainted with the lofty feelings of pride and ambition, by which the Austrian

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\* Bougeant, ii. 34.

family were actuated, not to foresee that the issue of the negociations in Westphalia must ultimately be regulated by military events; because it could not be expected that either Philip, or Ferdinand, would accept the degrading conditions proposed by France, till all their resources were exhausted. It was therefore essential to the success of his schemes, that the war should be prosecuted with unabating activity, while the terms of the treaty were in discussion; and it was no less important for France to inspire her allies with the firmest confidence in her disinterestedness and sincerity. Hence that ostentatious display of generosity so inconsistent with the character of Mazarin; hence also that affectation of delicacy and honour, at a time when his heart, a perfect stranger to every elevated sentiment, would not have hesitated to immolate half the human race, could the sacrifice have established his authority on a solid foundation, or enabled him, by preserving all the national conquests, to eclipse the reputation of his illustrious predecessor.\*

He was however fully aware of the difficulties which must remain; while the catholic princes adhered to the emperor; yet he had little doubt of carrying his point, provided means could be found to weaken their attachment, and render them less adverse to the pretensions of France.

To accomplish this was no easy undertaking; be-

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† In his History of Condé, ii. 202, Désoremaux speaks thus of Mazarin: Ce fut sous son ministère, et peut-être à son exemple, que l'honneur commença en France à passer pour une chimère, la gloire pour vanité: le vil et sordide intérêt s'empara des esprits et des cœurs, et chacun se rendit basement avare, croyant n'être que judicieusement prévoyant.



cause the Duke of Bavaria was too sagacious to give credit to the cardinal's professions, when he declared, that the sole object which had induced his master to enter into a war with Austria, was the wish of rescuing a suffering people from the yoke of tyranny. Though Maximilian's understanding was too strong to be influenced by such flimsy pretexts, his heart was not equally unassailable, provided it were attacked by the allurements of power, or the blaze of personal glory. The possession of the Palatinate guaranteed by treaty, and the uncontested enjoyment of the electoral dignity, might outweigh his zeal for the religion of Rome, as well as his friendship for the Austrian family.

This plan was particularly applicable to Germany; but, with respect to Spain, a truce appeared much the easiest method of terminating hostilities, because it was by no means improbable, that Philip might consent to a temporary cession of the territories occupied by France, though he would not hear of their irrevocable alienation. But as Mazarin was firmly persuaded, that the most inviolable secrecy was requisite for attaining this object, he recommended the ambassadors to conceal this project with impenetrable caution; an injunction which they executed with so much address, that neither the friends nor the enemies of France seem ever to have penetrated the mystery.\*

Although the dangers, to which the protestant religion and the liberties of Germany were exposed, had originally induced Gustavus Adolphus to take up arms against Austria, it cannot be denied, that after the death of that illustrious monarch, the views

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\* Bougeant, ii. 37.

of the Swedish government had changed with the circumstances in which they were placed. The enormous sacrifices, to which Sweden had been exposed, gave her an indisputable right to some reward, and a territorial establishment in northern Germany was the only one adequate to her expectation. The commercial advantages arising from its maritime situation, and the facility it afforded for an uninterrupted intercourse with the protestant states, rendered Pomerania the most eligible of all the provinces contiguous to the Baltic. A sort of unauthenticated claim, founded, as it was pretended, upon an ancient treaty between the sovereigns of Sweden and those of Pomerania, was urged as an additional plea, though it required the support of a victorious army to give it the slightest appearance of validity. The Pomeranian fortresses were occupied by the Swedes, and in such cases possession is nearly equivalent to right. Perceiving that every power, which had united for the humiliation of Austria, was struggling to obtain a larger share in the spoil, Oxenstiern secretly determined not to sheath the sword, till Pomerania should be annexed to the crown of Sweden, or some equivalent given for any portion of it, which might be ceded to the Elector of Brandenburg, whose claim to the whole, as collateral heir to Bogislaus, could not be justly disputed. Amid the general seizure of ecclesiastical property, the ministers of Christina by no means despaired of acquiring in addition to that valuable province some of the northern bishoprics, to be held as temporal principalities. These pretensions, though resting upon a more solid foundation than those of their rapacious ally, clashed so entirely with the interests of France, that Mazarin was re-

duced to the greatest distress, when called upon to support the Swedish ambassadors according to the spirit of the treaty. By an open refusal he ran the risk of offending a nation too proud and powerful to submit to ingratitude, and too enlightened to be duped by intrigue, yet he clearly foresaw, that he could not assist in secularizing the domains of the church, without being accused by the zealous catholics of sacrificing religion to temporal purposes. The states-general were still more jealous of Sweden; because they apprehended, that the acquisition of an extensive line of coast might decide her preponderance in the north, and perhaps enable her to establish an exclusive trade in the Baltic, to the lasting prejudice of Holland.\*

The views of that republic having been already discussed, it remains only to examine the situation of those powers, whose fortune depended upon the protection of France. The preservation of the crown, so unexpectedly acquired, was of course the principal object to which the hopes and wishes of the Duke of Braganza were directed. But however unanimously he might desire to emancipate his country from the Spanish yoke, he could hardly hope to effect it; because the ministers of Philip seemed resolved to hazard the very existence of the monarchy, rather than acknowledge the authority of a man, whom they with reason treated as a rebel. Though John IV. had been officially recognized by no protestant in Europe, he was anxious to appear at the Westphalian congress, among the legitimate sovereigns of Europe; but, as it was evident that the King of Spain would have dis-

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\* Bougeant, ii. 41.

solved that assembly rather than agree to a proposal, which would have virtually seated the Duke of Braganza upon the throne of Portugal, Mazarin recommended to the latter to lay aside every idea of public representation, and to content himself with sending a confidential agent, who, while he attentively watched over the interests of his master, might pass unobserved amid the numerous retinue of D'Avaux and Servien.\*

The same expedient was adopted by the Catalonian deputies as the only practicable mode of communication with the congress. The prospects of Catalonia were however far more gloomy than those of Portugal; because the latter possessed internal strength, sufficient at least to command respect; while the former depended upon the generosity of a minister, the slave of interest and ambition. According to the confession of Bougeant, one of the cardinal's warmest admirers, Mazarin would have preferred to establish the independance of a province, which had thrown itself upon the protection of France, not from motives of humanity, or principles of honour, but because the dismemberment of so important a possession would have weakened the power of Spain. The ambassadors of Louis were in consequence instructed to assert the rights of the Catalonians with loquacious pertinacity, that they might impress the world with a favourable idea of the magnanimity of their protector; though he appears never to have entertained any sanguine hopes of preserving a country, unexpectedly acquired by one revolution, and likely to be lost by another. He therefore proposed—and

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\* Bougeant, li. 46.

the project deserves the most serious attention as a rare specimen of political intrigue, to avail himself of its resources, for the annoyance of Spain, so long as it remained under the dominion of France ; but to abandon it to the resentment of its ancient oppressor, whenever a favourable opportunity should occur, for the largest price he could obtain. But as the benefit to be derived from this infamous traffic might be lost in case the destined victims of his treachery should be apprized of their fate, he never suffered the smallest hint to transpire, lest, indignant at a scheme of such consummate depravity, they should frustrate the design by making their own bargain with Philip.\*

Independently of the Swedish and Austrian interests, a third party had gradually arisen, professing the most perfect neutrality between them. Besides the electoral houses of Saxony and Brandenburg, and the Duke of Luneburg, this confederacy comprehended several of the Italian states, the Helvetic republics, most of the imperial cities, the Hanseatic league, the Teutonic order, together with all the minor princes of Germany, who had either religious dissensions to appease, or territorial privileges to assert: for so unbounded was the veneration in which the congress was held, that it was almost universally regarded as a paramount tribunal, to which the oppressed might confidently resort, and by which the complicated interests of the Christian commonwealth would be examined with candour, and decided with impartiality. This celebrated assembly in consequence attracted the attention of the civilized world, and was attended

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\* Bougeant, ii. 47.

by ambassadors from every European power, except England, Denmark, Russia, and Poland: for though the Pope and the Venetians appeared only under the sacred character of mediators, they felt a lively interest in the issue of the negotiation, so far at least as it affected the authority of the church, or regarded the safety of Italy.

After the rupture with Sweden, Christian pretended to behold the progress of the treaty with contemptuous indifference, attending occasionally to those objects alone which interested his son, as Archbishop of Bremen. Charles I. was so entirely occupied in protecting the prerogatives of the crown against the attacks of the parliament, that he had no leisure to think of foreign affairs. Russia was placed at such a distance from the scene of action, and had so little intercourse with the polished nations of Europe, and so little idea of the balance of power, that her semi-barbarous despot might never have known that Austria and Sweden were desolating Germany, had it not been for his treaty with Gustavus Adolphus; and, so long as the Poles were unmolested by the savage hordes which inhabited the banks of the Volga, or cultivated the shores of the Bosphorus, they indulged in the gratifications of intemperate pleasure, and sluggish repose, without enquiring whether Torstenson was besieging the Silesian fortresses, or driving the Austrians out of Holstein.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

## Progress of the Negotiation.

**T**HE death of Urban VIII. gave a different face to the negotiation, because he had always been favourable to the pretensions of France; whereas Cardinal Pamphili, who succeeded to the papal chair, under the title of Innocent X. was zealously devoted to the house of Austria. Under these circumstances, it appeared of considerable importance that Chigi should retain the office of mediator; for, though it might reasonably be supposed, that interest and ambition would tempt him to accommodate his politics to those of the Vatican; yet still it might be expected, that his natural feelings would render him less hostile to France, than any minister by whom he might be replaced. A change was therefore to be prevented at any rate; and, as the surest means of carrying this point, the French ambassador at Rome was instructed to assume a lofty tone, for the purpose of intimidating the new pope, who was given to understand, that should Chigi be recalled, his mediation would be immediately rejected. This menace was attended with the happiest results. Alarmed at the idea of being deprived of the glory to be acquired by restoring tranquillity to the Christian world, and of thus losing an opportunity of serving the Spaniards, Innocent consented to leave the negotiation in Chigi's hands, and con-

firmed the powers originally entrusted to him by Urban.\*

It would be trespassing too much upon the reader's patience, minutely to detail all the various subterfuges employed by the parties engaged in the treaty, to overreach their enemies, or their allies; for, in fact, France and Sweden were scarcely less jealous of each other's proceedings, than they were of Spain and Austria. This spirit was carried to such a ridiculous excess, that the ambassadors of those nations preferred meeting at a village, where no tolerable accommodations could be procured; because it was situated at an equal distance from Munster and Osnabruck, to enjoying comforts, purchased at the expense of pride, which considered it degrading for either party to proceed one step farther, than was prescribed by the rigid rules of etiquette.†

The invasion of Denmark produced considerable coldness between the two nations, which gradually augmented in every conference, till the French positively objected to make any additional payments so long as the Swedish troops continued in Holstein. This refusal, whether founded upon justice or not, might easily have led to an open breach, had not intelligence arrived, that Torstenson was pursuing the Austrians into Saxony. No pretext being now left for withholding the subsidies, the Swedes received the arrears, and harmony was in consequence re-established.‡

Many months were now spent in verifying the powers of the ambassadors, and in regulating the order for paying and receiving visits; for no object

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\* Bougeant, ii. 68.

† Ibid. 71.

‡ Ibid. 79.



was too trivial for discussion, which could afford the smallest plea for delay.

A congress is perhaps the spot where human vanity appears in the most ridiculous light. When united to beauty is as a strong palliation, and we feel rather disposed to pity than to condemn; but when grave statesmen contend about the form or position of a chair, or the modes of salutation, we can hardly repress a smile of contempt, to see talents so shamefully prostituted. The petty disputes and pretensions of the Italian states, during the Westphalian congress, afford a finer satire upon the vanity of man, than can be found in all the treatises, with which moralists and philosophers have inundated the world, since the days of Plato and Seneca.

The republic of Venice had long challenged and obtained the same distinctions accorded to royalty: but, though various precedents could be adduced to support this claim, the Dutch insisted upon being treated with equal respect; while Savoy, Genoa, Tuscany, and the whole tribe of electors, pretended to similar honours. Thus all gradations of rank were confounded; every power aspired to precedence; and it was regarded as humiliating for a state to remain in the station allotted to its ancestors.\*

The campaign of 1644 proved so inglorious to Austria, that she began at length to entertain a serious disposition to peace; but this change of policy was productive of little advantage, because fresh difficulties arose respecting the objects to be brought under discussion. Mazarin proposed that

the attention of the negociators should first be directed to Italy; from a just apprehension, that if the disputes in Germany should be previously terminated, France might be deserted by all her allies, who appeared totally indifferent to the destiny of a country, with which they had so little connexion. So far as France was concerned, the cardinal's project was desirable in every respect; but it was highly improbable, that either Holland or Sweden should agree to a proposal so inconsistent with their plans of aggrandisement; and of this D'Avaux was so sensible, upon his arrival at Munster, that he recommended to the minister to relinquish the idea, if he valued the good opinion of the Germans.

Notwithstanding every victory obtained by the Swedes lessened the arrogance of their enemies, it did little towards accelerating peace, because Mazarin was convinced, that a treaty, conducted under such auspices, must give a decisive preponderance to the protestant religion; a concession, for which he was by no means prepared. He was also apprehensive, that the Swedes, taking advantage of their success, might obtain so large an establishment in Germany, as would render them formidable to the rest of Europe: for though the two crowns perfectly agreed respecting the objects of the war, so far at least as it tended to the humiliation of Austria, they differed materially with regard to the means of accomplishing it. Oxenstiern contended, with reason, that the only effectual method of circumscribing her power within reasonable bounds, was to weaken the catholic party, which interest and bigotry must ever render subservient to her ambitious designs. The French, on the contrary, though secretly disposed to favour the orthodox

faith, did not venture to avow their prepossession, but contented themselves with observing, that, consistently with the dictates of rational policy, no distinctions of faith could be made. Anxious to obliterate every trace of sectarian hostility from a contest essentially religious; Mazarin pretended, that the dispute was entirely political, and that a balance of power, being once fairly established between the emperor and the other members of the Germanic confederacy, every cause of animosity would be removed; because it would be equally for the advantage of every sect to support the equilibrium. It was not as head of the papal party that Ferdinand was so formidable, but because he aimed at reducing the German people to the most abject submission; and, after overturning every vestige of a free constitution, to establish the most despotic authority on the tremendous basis of terror. Nothing, certainly, could be more fallacious than such arguments; but they suited the cardinal's purpose, and afforded a pretext for opposing the projects of Sweden, when not perfectly coinciding with his own.\*

Meanwhile he continued a clandestine correspondence with the Elector of Bavaria, in full conviction, that if he should succeed in detaching her from Austria, he might assume a tone of authority in his intercourse with Sweden, which would have gratified his vanity in the highest degree, but which prudence, at present, forbade him to employ. In the preceding chapters we have traced the progress of various negotiations, successively undertaken for that purpose, which eventually failed, because each

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\* Bougeant, ii. 221.

party was too well acquainted with the selfishness and duplicity of the other, to place the smallest confidence in protestations. These repeated miscarriages proving insufficient to cool the cardinal's ardour, he renewed the attack with renovated vigour the moment the congress assembled in Westphalia. But the caution of Maximilian had not abated with age, nor had his doubts been removed by a more intimate acquaintance with Mazarin. According to the common course of nature, it was impossible for the elector to live many years; but he had a numerous family to provide for, none of whom had arrived at that period of life when they could assert their own independance. Under these circumstances, he was apprehensive, in case of his death, that the emperor might take advantage of the minority of his son, to gain over the Bavarian army, and, with its assistance, monopolize all the influence and authority with the catholic league, which he had hitherto shared with Maximilian: for these reasons he was anxious to bring the negotiation to a speedy issue. But as he, at the same time, doubted his ability to retain all the spoils of the Palatine, he would have preferred a truce to a permanent treaty. It was not in the nature of Maximilian to feel either gratitude or affection—personal aggrandizement was the master-spring of all his actions. Whatever measures were most likely to enlarge his dominions, or to augment his authority, were those which he eagerly embraced. By these principles he was actuated in every situation; by them he had been impelled to adhere to the imperial throne, and by them he would have been equally induced to desert it, had it been consistent with his interest to humble Ferdinand. But the

splendour and stability of the house of Bavaria appeared inseparably connected with that of Austria: should the latter lose its ascendancy, it would be difficult for the former to preserve the electoral dignity, or even any part of the Palatinate. Even supposing him desirous to curtail the imperial authority, it was not by the agency of France, that he would have wished to accomplish it; because the latter appeared to his discerning eye no less an object of jealousy than the former.

Mazarin was too well acquainted with the influence of ambition, to misunderstand the motives of Maximilian. He, therefore, felt assured of carrying his point, if he could convince the elector, that an union with France presented more solid advantages than could be expected from an alliance with Austria. He accordingly solemnly promised to secure to him the electoral dignity, as well as the Upper Palatinate, provided he would support the pretensions of France at the congress. On the contrary, if he persisted in the chimerical plan of excluding all foreign powers from Germany, under the pretext of replacing the affairs of the empire upon their ancient foundation, he must prepare to relinquish his portion of the spoils: for, so long as he adhered to the Austrian interest, Mazarin threatened to assert the rights of the unfortunate Frederic, with all the strength of that powerful nation, whose councils he despotically directed. These arguments were perfectly intelligible to Maximilian, and equally in unison with his feelings. But he had hitherto flattered himself, that the proceedings of the Westphalian congress would have been circumscribed to the discussion of foreign affairs, and all questions regarding the internal policy of the em-

pire reserved for a national diet; in which he trusted, with the assistance of the imperial court, to overcome all opposition from the protestants. By his great anxiety to keep the discussions distinct, he had been induced vehemently to resist the claim of the princes and imperial cities, to send deputies to the congress, under the pretence, that this privilege belonged exclusively to the electoral college. But he no sooner perceived that his endeavours would prove ineffectual, and that by the accession of so powerful a party France would become irresistible, than he assumed a different tone, and implored the interposition of Cardinal Grimaldi, recently employed as papal legate at Paris, to deprecate the resentment of Mazarin, and after expressing his sincere desire for peace, to offer his assistance for the speedy removal of every obstacle.\*

This overture was so agreeable to Mazarin, that he resolved to confirm this favourable disposition by every possible encouragement. And he accordingly returned a decided negative to an application from the Palatine, for permission to serve in the French army; and soon after refused him the title of elector, notwithstanding his earnest solicitation: for that unfortunate prince no sooner beheld his dominions in the hands of a power professing to assert the independence of Germany, than he requested to be entrusted with the administration of justice, though he offered to exercise the functions, with which he might be invested, in the name and by the authority of Louis. Notwithstanding the difficulty of eluding so equitable a demand, without a flagrant violation of every principle, ostentatiously

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\* Bougeant, li. 228.

blazoned in repeated manifestoes, the cardinal attempted, with his accustomed duplicity, to evade it, upon the hacknied plea of inexpediency. Without daring to controvert the validity of the claim, he pretended a hasty decision would be repugnant to enlightened policy; and that it would be necessary first to consult the plenipotentiaries, because they were best able to judge of the impression likely to be produced upon the public mind, by predetermining a question so highly interesting to the civilized world. It may easily be inferred, that the answer of the ambassadors was conformable to the cardinal's wishes; recommending the government to wait with patience till the proper moment should arrive for executing the benevolent intentions of the king. They advised that justice should, in the interim, be administered in his majesty's name, by magistrates whom he should appoint.\*

Though it is highly probable that neither the minister of France, nor the sovereign of Bavaria, seriously expected to over-reach each other, they still kept up the farce of a negociation. That the business might be conducted with greater secrecy, the latter sent his own confessor to Paris; who, though educated in the school of St. Ignatius, if we may credit the testimony of well-informed persons, possessed the anti-jesuitical qualities of candour and honesty. But, however deserving he may have been of confidence, the object of his mission accorded so little with the projects of Mazarin, that he received positive injunctions to quit the capital, with an observation, that Munster, and not Paris, was the proper seat of negociation.†

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\* Bougeant, ii. 230.

† Ibid. 233.

We should utterly mistake the cardinal's character, were we to attribute his reluctance to enter into a secret treaty with Maximilian to any delicate feelings of honour. It was, on the contrary, inspired by the unconquerable timidity so deeply ingrafted in his nature; that, though surrounded by guards, and invested with absolute power, he never knew the bliss of security. Judging of Maximilian by the average standard of ministerial probity, he dared not confide in his promises; and therefore shuddered at a measure which might exasperate Sweden, and induce her to conclude a separate treaty. Neither had the negociation been conducted with sufficient secrecy to escape the imperial ministers, who, availing themselves of the opportunity, endeavoured to create a misunderstanding between the two crowns, by spreading a thousand malicious reports. Peace, they said, was actually upon the point of being concluded at Paris, without the intervention of Sweden, whose glory and interests were about to be sacrificed to the convenience of a faithless ally. Insinuations of this kind were calculated to augment the circumspection of Mazarin, who was too well acquainted with the proud feelings of Oxenstiern, to believe him capable of patient submission to an insult. He therefore thought it advisable to break off the negociation, rather than offend an ally, without whose co-operation all the blood and treasure, lavished with so much profusion, would have been ineffectually spent.\*

It was, probably, more from habitual prejudices than from political considerations, that the affairs of Italy presented themselves to the cardinal's ima-

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\* Bougeant, ii. 236.



gination with gigantic importance: but as pride prevented his acknowledging the real motive of his conduct, he affected to consult the opinion of his colleagues, though predetermined to follow his own. That it was highly impolitic to waste the resources of France in a country, where success could contribute so little to the attainment of peace, no impartial politician could deny; he therefore pretended, that were the attention of the Spaniards attracted to Lombardy, they would be impeded from assisting the emperor in Germany. This argument, though specious, was far from conclusive, because it applied to France in an almost equal degree. No permanent advantage was likely to accrue from an Italian campaign, though it occupied troops which might have been usefully employed on the Rhine, or Danube. In opposition to a statement so clear and decisive, it was argued, that from the relative difference in the situation of the two powers, a war in Italy must be attended with much greater inconvenience to Spain than to France; because the latter was able to pour her forces into Lombardy by various routes, while the Spanish troops were obliged to encounter all the dangers of a sea voyage, before they reached the place of their destination. The facility afforded to France, by her central position, for attacking the dominions of Philip, in opposite quarters, unquestionably compelled him to divide his force, and thus prevented him from making a powerful effort for the recovery of Flanders. So far, therefore, as it was applicable to Spain, the plan hitherto pursued had much to recommend it; and even, with regard to the Italian states, no valid objections could be started. Supposing Italy delivered from the dread of invasion,

mistaken zeal for religion might easily induce the majority of its governments to succour a monarch, who called himself the successor and representative of Augustus; while, on the contrary, their natural timidity would lead them to concentrate all the national strength for their domestic security, so long as they beheld their native plains exposed to hostile incursions. The only motive, therefore, to be alleged in favour of a truce, was the diminution of expense; but this was in fact more delusive than substantial, because that of the enemy was still greater. Besides, while contending to the south of the Alps, France was assisted by all the forces of Savoy; whereas in Flanders she must meet the efforts of Spain with her internal resources alone.\* Such appear to have been the argument in support of Mazarin's favourite system.

The warm attachment of the Swedes to the protestant worship was likely to have occasioned a serious misunderstanding between them and the French, when the moment arrived for communicating to each other their respective pretensions. Out of eighteen articles, contained in the Swedish *projet*, six related immediately to religion; and, in the preface, it was stated, that the emperor's intolerance had instigated Gustavus Adolphus to take up arms, in defence of the independance of Germany. Having established this as a motive for national hostility, they insisted that the free exercise of the Lutheran worship should be re-established in every country where it had existed at the beginning of the war; and that every member of the reformed church, who had been deprived of his property, or sent into

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\* Bougeant, ii. 239.

exile, should regain immediate possession of his estate. Though it would have been totally inconsistent with the professions of Sweden, to have neglected a subject of such infinite concern to the eternal welfare of man, their efforts were maliciously attributed by the French to mistaken enthusiasm; while the ardour, with which they themselves defended the ancient communion, was extolled as the highest effort of piety.

Servien, however, was too well acquainted with the weakness and obstinacy of theologians, to have recourse to polemical weapons, but confined his defence to political considerations, as more rational, conclusive, and satisfactory. The alliance with France, he said, was entirely founded upon worldly expedience; its object was to establish a just balance of power between the emperor and the other princes of Germany. These were tangible objects, might be easily ascertained, and tended to give both strength and popularity to the powers by whom they were asserted. But if they once suffered sectarian controversies to intervene, all Germany would be instantly in a flame, and the whole catholic body would immediately rally round the imperial throne; though many of them regarded the humiliation of Austria as essential to their own independence. It was extremely difficult for Salvius to contravert a doctrine which rested on such solid foundations; he therefore immediately admitted the principle, but denied its application to the question in debate. It was not for innovations, he said, that Sweden contended, but merely to place the rival religions upon a perfect equality, and to secure to the protestants the uninterrupted enjoyment of every privilege, to which they were entitled

by various treaties. For the attainment of this she had pledged her faith to those gallant allies, by whom she had been assisted during the arduous struggle, and whose friendship and good opinion she would endeavour to preserve, by a rigid adherence to her engagements.

The turn thus ingeniously given to the discussion considerably embarrassed the French ambassador, who found it difficult to follow the instructions of a bigoted queen, without risking an open rupture with Sweden. Such a misfortune was to be prevented at any rate, and he accordingly endeavoured to elude the demand, by solemnly promising to support the protestants in every claim, not decidedly hostile to the church of Rome.\* This engagement, though it served to silence the complaints of the Lutherans, was far from answering their expectations; because the spirit of controversy ran so high, that they could hardly prevail upon themselves to consider as friends, any who differed from them in religious opinions. Yet, notwithstanding every difficulty which he had to encounter, Servien at length prevailed upon Salvius to soften some of the most obnoxious demands, though the latter reserved to himself the right of bringing them forward, in their original form, when a more favourable opportunity should occur.†

That the suspicions of the protestants were not the result of ill-founded jealousy, may be collected from a confidential dispatch, addressed by D'Avaux to Brienne, in which he gives it as his opinion, that, even supposing it practicable, it would be totally in-

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\* Lettre des Plénipot. à M. de Briennes, 13<sup>re</sup> Mai, 1645.

† Bougeant, li. 254.

consistent with the real interests of France to appease the religious dissensions, by which Germany was distracted ; because, in the present agitated state of the public mind, the animosity which prevailed between the discordant sects might be easily kindled into a flame. These disputes, by paralyzing the natural resources of a country so renowned for military prowess, assured to France the possession of her conquests, and afforded her, at all times, a plausible pretext for interfering in the internal politics of the empire. So long as they prevailed, one of the contending parties must necessarily solicit her protection ; but the restoration of tranquillity would soon be followed by a confederacy to drive them out of Germany.

During the whole of this discussion, the behaviour of Servien was far more rational and unprejudiced than that of his colleague : the former examined the question with the enlightened eye of a statesman ; the latter viewed it through the clouded medium of prejudice, with all the misjudging zeal of a theologian. The former readily consented that the protestants should recover every privilege anciently enjoyed by them, while the latter regarded such a concession as injurious to the purity of the catholic worship, and tending directly to subvert it ; because the princes of the empire were legally entitled to compel their subjects to conform to the established religion, or to sell their property, and retire into some other state, where a different communion prevailed. Pretending that this law had been originally enacted for the protection of the orthodox faith, he strongly objected to its repeal. This, however, was too repugnant to justice to be admitted by the Swedes, who were thoroughly convinced, that the

members of the reformed church would never be secure from persecution, unless placed upon a perfect equality with the papists.\*

While the opinions of the allies so widely differed with regard to the objects to be obtained, it could hardly be expected that much progress should be made in the treaty. Yet, at a moment when the friends of humanity were almost reduced to despair, the political horizon suddenly brightened. The feast of Pentecost arrived, and Wolmar was piously occupied in his devotions before an altar, in the convent of the capuchins, when D'Avaux entered the church, and knelt on the opposite side. After the customary salutations, the Austrian ambassador unexpectedly remarked, that the sanctity of a day, so peculiarly devoted to the Spirit of peace, ought to inspire sentiments of universal benevolence. To this D'Avaux replied, "that God only could know how anxiously he desired to terminate a contest so destructive to the happiness of thousands;" adding, as a proof of his sincerity, "that before a week should expire, the French *projet* should be delivered to the mediators."—"That indeed is a most important point, and I trust will lead to the termination of hostilities," rejoined Wolmar, in a tone of humanity, which seemed to presage the happiest results.†

The promise of D'Avaux was shortly fulfilled. On the 11th of June the *projet* of the allies was given to Chigi; in which they demanded a general amnesty for all their adherents; farther required, that every thing should be replaced upon the footing, on which

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\* Bougeant, ii. 258.

† Meiern, acta pacis Westphal. ii. 79. Puffendorf, xvii. 58.

it existed in 1618, previously to the commencement of the troubles in Bohemia; that the ancient constitution should be re-established; its principles observed with scrupulous veneration, and that no member of the empire should be, in future, molested in the full enjoyment of his legitimate privileges. After having thus amply provided for the security of their friends, the two crowns deemed it expedient to attend to their private concerns, and they in consequence demanded an adequate indemnity for all the sacrifices to which they had been exposed. By the Swedes it was proposed, that all sources of contention, civil or religious, which might tend to interrupt the general harmony, should be clearly and satisfactorily explained; and the more effectually to provide against their recurrence, that all differences existing between the catholics and protestants, with respect to any article in the religious peace, or to the appropriation of ecclesiastical property, should be definitively settled by treaty; but in case any misunderstanding should arise at a future period, it should be amicably decided according to the strict principles of equity.\*

No sooner had the proposals of the allies been received by the papal ambassadors, than the people indulged in the most extravagant joy, as if the happy moment had actually arrived, when a period would be put to their sufferings. But the judgment of Oxenstiern was widely different: foreseeing the difficulty of reconciling such discordant interests, he sagaciously remarked, "That there were still many obstacles remaining, which could only be removed by the sword.†

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\* Puffendorf, v. 1—4.

† Bougeant, ii. 286.

The facility with which the Swedes had consented to alter some articles, which appeared objectionable to D'Avaux and Servien, might have served as a pledge of their honourable intentions; but instead of expressing their gratitude for this mark of condescension, the French ambassadors complained, that certain clauses had been unfairly introduced, from which inferences might be drawn, highly prejudicial to their religion. The Swedish plenipotentiaries, on the contrary, expressed much dissatisfaction at discovering that the French had deviated materially, in some important points, from the principles established between the two nations, as rules for their future proceedings. These disputes, however, were merely verbal; because both parties were too much impressed with the necessity of mutual forbearance, to allow them to assume a more formidable character.

The objections of the Austrians were not so easily removed, because they pretended that they had discovered, on the part of their adversaries, a settled determination to humble the imperial crown, and sap the foundations of the Germanic constitution, by subjecting it to foreign control. The privilege reserved by the allies of adding additional articles, as well as of altering those already proposed, occasioned much serious animadversion; because such a reservation precluded the possibility of adhering to the usual forms of negociation, and might open a door to the renewal of discussions, after every interest had been apparently reconciled. The vague manner in which the French had alluded to the unpopular subject of indemnities proved also a source of bitter complaint, as it particularly militated against the feelings of a people, who prided



themselves upon their integrity and candour. This silence upon so important a point was bitterly censured by Contarini, who remarked that, in her present triumphant career, France could have nothing to apprehend from sincerity; adding, that, in his opinion, there would be less danger of offending the Germans by an open avowal of her pretensions, however exorbitant, than by leaving them enveloped in doubt and obscurity.\*

Plain dealing, however, was much too repugnant to the character of Mazarin for this wholesome advice to be adopted. Indeed, so crooked was the turn of his mind as to render it highly probable, that whenever he contended for an object with intemperate ardour, it was not that which he really desired to obtain; but that the warmth he affected was merely theatrical, and assumed as a mask for his secret designs. In conformity to this principle, he objected to a truce, when proposed by the mediators, though he would have greatly preferred it to a permanent peace, for reasons already explained.

Such was the state of affairs, when the Duke of Longueville arrived at the seat of negotiation. His presence, however, instead of accelerating peace, produced a contrary effect, by giving rise to fresh disputes respecting the place he should occupy, and the distinctions he should receive, as a prince of the blood; and this ridiculous controversy proceeded so far, that, to prevent any serious consequences, he was prevailed upon by the mediators to relinquish the ceremony of a public entry into Munster.†

The victory obtained by the Duke of Enghien

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\* Bougeant, ii, 287.    † Puffendorf, xvii. 72.

at Nordlingen did little towards a general reconciliation, because, in proportion as it lessened the presumption of Ferdinand, it augmented the pride of the allies. In a conference at Osnabruck between the French and Swedish ambassadors,\* the latter urged the necessity of seizing the favourable opportunity for reducing the Austrian power within such moderate limits, that it might no longer be formidable to Europe. This they proposed to accomplish by rendering elective the throne of Bohemia; by restoring to the Palatine the dominions and dignity of which he had been unjustly deprived; and by placing every thing exactly upon the footing upon which it existed before the commencement of hostilities.† By the hereditary possession of the Bohemian sceptre, Austria, according to the most enlightened statesmen, had secured to herself the imperial crown, and had given a blow to the liberties of Germany, from which, if the present opportunity should be suffered to escape, they might never recover. All succeeding events, continued Oxenstiern triumphantly, have fully confirmed this prediction. The evil had progressively and rapidly increased, and the ambition of the house of Hapsburg had kept pace with the extent of her acquisitions. The undisputed possession of the throne of the Cæsars had been for a long period the main object to which she had aspired; but no sooner had she realized that presumptuous wish, than her power was exerted for the oppression of all who ventured to dispute her supremacy. The ruin of the Elector

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\* Lettre des Plenipot. a M. de Brienne, 30 Aout. 1645.

† Bougeant, ii. 369.

Palatine had inspired her with the hope of reducing all the members of the Germanic confederacy to the most degrading vassalage; and this project would have completely succeeded, had not a protector unexpectedly arisen in the person of Gustavus Adolphus. The re-establishment of the oppressed in the full enjoyment of their legitimate rights, was, he contended, the leading object of the alliance between France and Sweden. For this purpose they had fought; for this they had conquered; and they could not, without incurring eternal reproach, leave the pledge, which they had given, unredeemed.\*

Unable to controvert the truth of these assertions, Servien was obliged to admit them as conclusive; at the same time observing, that the plan of Oxenstiern, though a consummation devoutly to be wished, yet could hardly be regarded as attainable. If ever attainable, it must have been so at a moment when the imperial armies were annihilated; the resources of Austria so completely exhausted, that no means remained to replace them. But the greater part of the claims advanced by the Swedes were objects of jealousy to Mazariu, who would have beheld less reluctantly the triumph of Austria, than the permanent ascendancy given to the protestants by the measures proposed for their security.

During this controversy, the attention of the combatants was suddenly diverted into a different channel, by the answer of the imperial court. It was a work of considerable labour, and displayed much diplomatic address. Many points of import-

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\* Bougeant, ii. 370.

ance were artfully eluded, and others imperfectly discussed. Yet in spite of the warmest professions of philanthropy, and an affected tone of moderation, it was evident that Austria would prefer a continuance of hostilities, to a peace purchased by such sacrifices as in her present state of humiliation it would be difficult to avoid. And it was equally apparent, that the emperor was disposed to gratify the protestants by many concessions, rather than alienate any portion of his hereditary dominions, or even relinquish the abuses of power. Many baits were thrown out with ministerial dexterity to gain over the electoral college, and acquire popularity with the multitude; and, it must be confessed, that this object was in great measure attained. A strong impression was made upon the public mind by bold and unqualified assertions; and the compassion excited by the distressing picture of humbled ambition, was by many mistaken for patriotism.

This sudden revolution in the national feeling, while it mortified the pride of the allies, tended to elucidate a point of infinite moment with respect to the conduct they ought to pursue, by proving how averse the Germans were to all foreign interference, and how easily they might be rallied round the imperial throne, when its constitutional privileges were attacked.\* No people, according to the opinion of D'Avaux, were more jealous of their independence than the Germans; this enthusiasm for liberty made them desirous of confining the imperial prerogatives within legitimate bounds; but highly as they valued freedom, they were too prudent to purchase it by

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\* 1645. Woltmann, i. 119. Puffendorf, xvii. 85.

the dismemberment of the empire, and too proud to accept it as a present from foreigners.\*

Amidst interests so complicated, it was hardly possible for the most sanguine to entertain any rational expectation of an amicable issue, yet at the very instant, when the political horizon appeared entirely covered with clouds, it suddenly brightened, and presented itself to the world irradiated by visions of peace. Trautmansdorf was so remarkable for moderation and integrity, that his appearance at Munster was universally hailed as the harbinger of returning tranquillity. The talents and probity of that enlightened statesman had enabled him to acquire the esteem of his countrymen without losing the confidence of his sovereign. Descended from an ancient and illustrious family, he was educated in the principles of the reformers, which he abandoned for the more courtly tenets of Rome, when arrived at years of discretion. That his apostacy was the result of serious conviction, the whole tenor of his actions attests, though it is difficult to believe, that so comprehensive an intellect should have left the rational doctrines of the Lutheran church for the mysterious dogma of transubstantiation. Sincerity was the prominent feature in his character, and he appears to have held in the utmost contempt all the quirks and quibbles of diplomacy; for he aimed at convincing the understandings of his auditors by the clearness and solidity of his reasoning, instead of bewildering them by metaphysical theories, or blinding them by the effulgence of eloquence. To deep and extensive erudition, and a thorough acquaintance with the

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\* *Negotiations Secretes*, ii. 21.

German constitution, he added soundness of judgment, which enabled him to seize all the bearings of a subject with the greatest facility. Previous to his departure for Westphalia, he received his instructions from the emperor in person, with whom he was directed to communicate. During the reign of Rodolphus, who neglected an empire for the chimerical researches of Alchemy, as well as during that of his volatile and capricious successor,\* he had been employed in missions of the highest importance, which were invariably executed with so much intelligence, as to gain the approbation of two princes, totally dissimilar in their principles, their pursuits, and their attainments. But it was reserved for the penetration of Ferdinand II. to discover the extent of his capacity, and his aptitude for business of every description, in which he united quickness and precision to indefatigable industry and perseverance. The tempestuous times in which he lived afforded ample occasion for displaying his talents and virtues; and these became so conspicuous, that he enjoyed the confidence of his sovereign till the hour of his death, when he bequeathed him to his son as the most valuable legacy a dying father could bestow.† At the treaty of Prague, in 1635, the worth of his bequest was fully ascertained in the reconciliation of Saxony. The prudence with which Trautmansdorf conducted that intricate negociation, as well as the moderation which he displayed at Munster, exposed him to the imputation of indifference toward the papal religion, and even of secretly favouring the protestants. Yet the same elevation of mind which ren-

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\* Matthias.

† Woltmann, i. 129.

rendered him superior to the sectarian bitterness of bigotry, taught him to treat its malicious insinuations with equal contempt.

From the disinterested exertions of so consummate a statesman, the most beneficial consequences might be expected; particularly, as during his journey he publicly gave out that the object of his mission was to promote a fair and permanent reconciliation between the emperor and the states.\*

The superior attainments of this enlightened minister were concealed under a repulsive exterior; but, scarcely had he opened his lips, than the melodious tones of his voice bespoke universal attention, which gradually augmented in proportion as he displayed the depth and acuteness of his understanding. Too wise to attach unnecessary importance to the ridiculous forms of etiquette, and too prudent to shew how much he despised them, his moderation produced the happiest effects in allaying the animosities to which vanity had given birth, proving by the dignity and wisdom of his behaviour, that it is possible to preserve all the distinctions of rank without violating the precepts of reason.†

Convinced that Germany must continue a prey to the ambition and avarice of foreign powers, so long as she was convulsed by intestine dissensions,† Trautmansdorf laboured assiduously to efface every unfavourable impression which tended to inflame

\* Woltmann, i. 133.

† Ibid. 137.

‡ Enim vero isthac Germanici imperii moles, quæ in justî regni formam redacta, toti Europæ futura erit formidabilis, per intestinos morbos et convulsiones ita debilitatur, ut ægre sibi ipsi defendendæ sufficiat.

Monzambano de statu Imp. Germ. vii. 265.

the minds of the protestants, and thus destroy all their confidence in the promises of Ferdinand. Many difficulties, however, arose as he proceeded; because, though eager to escape from foreign control, they were unwilling to throw themselves upon the mercy of a prince, so blindly devoted to the Jesuits; but felt, on the contrary, that they had a far better chance of securing their independence, by remaining true to their engagements with France and Sweden. Persuaded, therefore, that this would prove a fruitless attempt, he resolved to have recourse to a different system, which promised to lead, if successful, to similar results, though by a totally opposite road. That the fidelity of the states was too firm to be shaken, experience had fully evinced; but still it might be possible to induce the Swedes to enter into a separate treaty, by offering them more advantageous conditions than they would be likely to attain by negotiating in concert with France. The demands of the former, however extravagant, appeared much less objectionable to Austria, because she naturally valued the hereditary province of Alsace beyond the Prussian duchy of Pomerania. Besides, she had greater danger to apprehend from the aggrandizement of France, than from any acquisitions which might be made by the heroes of Scandinavia on the shores of the Baltic. Another consideration, which operated powerfully in deciding the conduct of Trautmansdorf, was the attachment manifested by the greater part of the protestant states for those gallant defenders of the Lutheran faith; whereas, the professions of Mazarin were naturally suspected, because it was difficult to believe that a man, who persecuted the Calvinists at home, could wish to forward their preten-



sions abroad.\* For these reasons it appeared likely that a reconciliation between Sweden and Austria might lead to the pacification of Germany; but it could hardly be expected, that the example of France would serve as a precedent to the followers of either religion.†

Strongly impressed with this idea, Trautmansdorf hastened to Osnabruck, and explained his views to the Swedish ambassador with unaffected sincerity. The emperor, he said, did not consider the Swedes as he did the French, in the light of hereditary foes; because the wish of the latter was evidently to overturn the imperial throne, and strip him of his hereditary dominions. After every sacrifice which Sweden had made, he admitted, that she had a claim to some compensation; but he regarded the pretensions of the French with very different sentiments: he farther added, that the emperor would rather continue the contest for ever, than consent to the alienation of Brissac.‡ But that he had every disposition to satisfy the protestants, even at the expense of the catholic religion.§

The jealousy subsisting between Salvius and Oxenstiern, had rendered the latter less adverse to the pretensions of France, than he had hitherto appeared; because his colleague had manifested a strong disposition to favour the Spaniards. Though unquestionably the most powerful subject in Swe-

\* Plus se injuratis Suecia, quam millies jurantibus Gallis credere. Protoc. Woltmann, Feb. 1647.

† Woltmann, 140. Bougeant, ii. 424.

‡ Negotiations Secretes, ii. 242

§ Bougeant, ii. 445.

den, and universally revered for the splendour of his talents, as well as the importance of his services, the chancellor had in fact lost much of his influence since the accession of Christina; and he had in consequence to contend against a formidable faction, with which Salvius was closely connected. This party spirit was carried to such lengths, that the Swedish ambassadors seldom agreed when any question of moment occurred: hence, as Salvius seemed disposed to listen to the proposals of Trautmansdorf, his colleague grew every day more reserved in his behaviour, and at length determined to impart them to D'Avaux, accompanying the communication with the positive assurance, that no inducements should tempt him to deviate from the path which honour prescribed.

In spite of the apparent failure of his wishes, the Austrian plenipotentiary had effected a point of no little importance, by exciting the suspicions of the French negociators, who, notwithstanding the warm protestations of Oxenstiern, could hardly believe that Trautmansdorf would continue at Osnabruck, in case his offers had been finally rejected. It was not merely for the purpose of conciliating the Swedes that he prolonged his residence there; but he flattered himself, by soothing the prejudices, and indulging the hopes of the protestants, to dissipate their apprehensions, and appease their resentment. Before his arrival, the superiority of genius had been decisive on the side of the Swedes, as the pendency of Lamberg, and the bigotry of Crane, were ill qualified to contend against the learning and acuteness of their opponents. But as no evil could accrue from leaving the negotiation at Munster in the hands of the intelligent Wollmar, Trautmans-

dorf determined for the present to manage the discussions at Osnabruck in person.\*

Yet, in spite of the jealousies which continued to prevail between the two crowns, all attempts to create a rupture between them proved ineffectual. Nothing therefore remained, except to resume the original design of detaching the Germans from the interests of Sweden, by alarming their pride and their patriotism. The natural honesty of their national character led the Germans to credit the most improbable reports, when they proceeded from authorities which they were accustomed to respect, and were circulated with art and assiduity. To this principle the imperial ambassadors trusted for accomplishing their design: ingeniously availing themselves of the demand of the allies, they represented them as actuated solely by a sordid attachment to their own private advantage, while they ostentatiously professed the most disinterested zeal and generosity.

Arguments such as these could hardly fail of making a deep impression, particularly as many had vainly flattered themselves that the blood and treasure of Sweden had been lavished without the hope of any reward. Every passion that can agitate the human frame was instantly called into action: superstition trembled at the idea of secularizing property, which piety had consecrated to the service of God; avarice weighed all the sacrifices that she might be called upon to make, and termed this calculating parsimony, patriotism; pride, regarding indemnities as a tacit avowal of German inferiority,

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\* 1646. Woltmann, i. 146.

declaimed against them as highly degrading—while cowardice pretended that the possession of Pomerania, so far from contenting the ambition of Sweden, would stimulate her to insist upon additional sacrifices, by facilitating her schemes of aggrandizement.\* Is the moderation of France, they insultingly asked, so notorious, that no apprehensions ought to be entertained respecting her future behaviour? Is it seriously to be expected, that she will confine herself to the limits prescribed by the treaty, and rest satisfied with the acquisition of Alsace, when all Germany lies open to invasion? Influenced by these considerations, the princes of the empire were desirous of settling their domestic concerns, before the question of indemnities should be agitated; but the allies were too prudent to acquiesce in a proposal, which tended directly to frustrate their designs; since it could hardly be doubted, that they would be abandoned by the Germans, the moment the latter should have effected a reconciliation with Austria.

From various circumstances mentioned in the preceding pages, the reader must be aware of the importance which France justly attached to every acquisition in Flanders. By a convention concluded with the States General in 1635, the manner in which the conquest should be divided, when the Spaniards were driven out of the Netherlands, was definitively settled. To this plan, of which Richelieu was avowedly the author, Mazarin had steadily adhered; no impediments were sufficient to diminish his ardour, and in the warmth of pursuit he seems

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\* Woltmann, i. 159,

totally to have forgotten that such an accession of strength was calculated to alarm every European power, even supposing it possible to wrest them from the dominion of Philip, who would have exhausted all the blood and treasure of his empire, rather than submit to the loss of such valuable possessions.

The cardinal had hitherto overlooked the numerous obstacles that retarded his progress. Ten years had been consumed in a sanguinary struggle, and the opposition of Spain still continued so formidable, that he began to despair of accomplishing his purpose by the sword, and he accordingly resolved to change the mode of attack, and try the effects of negotiation. Though too proud to acknowledge the superiority of France in tactics, or courage, Philip might perhaps be tempted to accept Roussillon and Catalonia, in exchange for Franche Comté and the Netherlands.\*

The air of triumph that reigns throughout the memorial addressed by Mazarin to the French ambassadors at Munster, proves how highly he was delighted with his project.† After enumerating all the advantages likely to accrue to the present generation from the acquisition of Flanders, he gave unbounded scope to his fancy, anticipating the prosperity to which his adopted country might attain, from the wisdom and energy of his measures. An impenetrable barrier on the northern frontier would not only secure the kingdom against the dread of invasion, but would contribute to establish the authority of the crown on

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\* Bougeant, ii. 475. Basnage, *Annales des Provinces Unies*, 1446.

† *Mém. du Cardinal Mazarin*, 20 Janvier, 1646.

a more solid foundation than it had ever enjoyed ; because a factious nobility could no longer trust to external support, when every avenue was closed by an impregnable fortress. By extending the maritime dominion of France, the presumption of England would be restrained ; and the insolence of Holland confined within the limits of respect, perhaps reduced to submit to the dominion of a nation, whose greatness and glory were unbounded. These expectations, though in some degree just, were carried to a ridiculous length ; while Roussillon and Catalonia were subject to Louis, Spain would be constantly exposed to an attack. Those provinces besides were integral parts of the monarchy ; but the Low Countries, on the contrary, could be estimated only as colonies. Hence the possession of the latter must be always precarious, and depend upon the fortune of war ; a consideration which had tempted some of the ablest ministers, who ever presided over the destinies of Spain, to recommend the exchange that was now proposed, and to which the sovereigns of that country would have long ago acceded, had they not been impeded by the dread of popular clamour.

The main argument of Mazarin was founded upon the supposition, that Catalonia was lost irrecoverably, and that the destiny of Flanders depended entirely upon the moderation of France. Now nothing could be less consistent with the principles of the cabinet of Madrid, than to admit the correctness of this statement. Lerida, Tortona, and Tarragona still acknowledged the dominion of Philip ; and the revolution, which had severed the remainder of Catalonia from the parent state, was regarded by Castilian pride in the light of a passing storm, which must shortly subside. These objections ap-

peared so weighty to D'Avaux and Servien, that they exhorted the cardinal to adopt a different system; and by manifesting a firm determination to keep Catalonia, to render the Spaniards more eager than ever to regain it. But the vanity of Mazarin was deaf to every argument; and he determined to adhere to his original plan, in full persuasion that the Spaniards, when convinced that all resistance must prove ineffectual, might be induced to seek a palliative for national honour, in an union between the Infanta and Louis XIV. and surrender Flanders under the title of a marriage portion.\*

Following up this design with undiminished enthusiasm, he sent D'Estrades to the Hague, ostensibly for the purpose of arranging with the Prince of Orange a plan for the ensuing campaign, but in reality to sound that enlightened patriot, respecting the projected marriage with the Infanta. As an inducement to the prince to countenance a measure not likely to be popular in Holland, the ambassador was empowered to offer the cession of Antwerp, to be united to the hereditary possessions of the house of Nassau; an acquisition which, by putting into the hands of the prince the keys of the republic, would enable him to defy the ingratitude of the democratic faction, should the latter attempt, after the restoration of peace, to deprive him of the authority, to which he was entitled by the splendour and variety of his services.

Meanwhile Contarini was assailed by the prospect of the advantage which the Venetians might derive from the speedy termination of hostilities; because the armies, occupied at present in depopulating Ger-

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\* Bougeant, ii. 482.

many, might then be employed in driving the Turks out of Europe. Fresh assurances of support were given to the Catalonians, lest, terrified at the prospect of being abandoned to the resentment of an irritated tyrant, they should endeavour to avert the impending calamity by returning spontaneously to their duty. In a word, nothing was omitted by the cardinal, that could tend to conceal his real designs, or to answer those who were imprudent enough to confide in the promises of a man, who valued himself as much upon his talents to deceive, as Sully did upon his candour and integrity. On receiving an assurance that he had no opposition to apprehend from the Prince of Orange, he became almost frantic with joy, when his chimerical projects were suddenly disconcerted by an event, for which he was totally unprepared.

After ineffectually attempting to dissolve the alliance between France and Holland, by proposing to the latter the most favourable terms, provided they would abandon the coalition, the Spanish ministers endeavoured to alarm the jealousy of the republic, by an offer no less novel than singular. They promised through the mediators to leave the conditions of peace to the honour and justice of the Queen of France, with a positive engagement on the part of her brother, the King of Spain, to ratify the terms she might propose; in perfect confidence that she would act with the most rigid impartiality between her native and her adopted country.\* This offer at first appeared so inviting, that D'Avaux, in a letter to the cardinal, expressed his satisfaction in terms of unqualified exultation, strongly advising

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\* Boucancant, li. 488.



the queen to undertake the office of mediatrix, and to exercise it with as much regard to the interests of her son, as decency would allow.\* Mazarin, however, regarded the proposal in a different light; for being unable to account for this sudden transition from suspicion to confidence, he imputed it entirely to artifice, though he felt at a loss to discover the real motives of the stranger. Acting under these impressions, he exhorted the queen to decline the offer, upon the plea that, as mother to the reigning monarch, and governing the kingdom during his minority, her award could not be disinterested; but offering to submit the conditions of peace to the equity and discretion of her brother. It is highly probable, from the behaviour of the Spanish ministers, that Mazarin was right in conjecture, because they appeared as much discontented with the regent's refusal, as if some serious misfortune had occurred.

Enough has been said to elucidate the want of confidence that prevailed among the different members of the congress, and which appears to have augmented at every step progressively taken to remove it. In utter despair of being able to promote a general reconciliation, Trautmansdorf threatened to dissolve the assembly, and leave the questions in debate to the decision of arms. This measure, though warmly recommended by the court of Madrid, was too repugnant to the feelings of the German nation, for the emperor to have permitted its execution; as it might have led to a confederacy of all the states of the empire, for the

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\* Lettre du Cette. D'Avaux au Carle. Mazarin du 24 Fevrier, 1646.

purpose of compelling him to terminate a contest so ruinous to his country.\*

By the death of the Infant, which happened unexpectedly, his only sister became sole heiress to the extensive dominions of Spain. An event so important to the interests of Europe could not fail to occasion a considerable change in the political horizon, as well as in the views and language of the different negociators. The intimate connexion, subsisting between the two branches of the house of Austria, led Mazarin to imagine, that the immediate consequence of that melancholy event would be the union of the Infanta with the eldest son of the emperor; by which the ambitious designs of Charles V. would at length be realized, and a power erected sufficiently formidable to endanger the liberties of Europe. Such also appears to have been the general impression which it produced upon the minds of all, who were capable of estimating its probable consequences. But to Mazarin it presented itself under a more gloomy aspect, because it entirely destroyed every brilliant chimera in which his sanguine imagination had indulged. All hopes of obtaining the Netherlands by amicable agreement were completely annihilated; and, as it was probable that Austria would be equally interested in protecting a country, no less valuable for the fertility of its soil, than as the seat of a lucrative commerce, the difficulty of reducing it by force of arms augmented in a tenfold degree. On arms however he resolved to depend, provided he should be able to persuade the Dutch to persevere in the contest. But this was not likely to prove an easy

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\* Bougeant, ii. 555.

task. The object, for which those gallant opposers of Alva and Philip had so long and meritoriously struggled, appeared to be actually within their grasp ; and it could hardly be expected, that a nation so thoroughly acquainted with the principles of barter and exchange, should hazard realities for shadows. To obtain a legitimate rank among the nations of Europe, and to pursue without restraint their commercial speculations, was regarded by the rich inhabitants of the United Provinces, as far more desirable than the proudest wreaths which barren glory could confer. Besides, they were too deeply versed in the science of calculation not to see that more serious danger was to be apprehended from the aggrandisement of France, than from any accession of power which, in her humiliated state, it was likely for Austria to acquire ; for they regarded the report of the projected union between the latter and Spain, as a political fable, invented by Mazarin for the purpose of preventing them from concluding a separate treaty.

Hence the capture of Dunkerque was far from exciting any enthusiasm in Holland ; and hence the want of energy displayed by the Dutch, when called upon to co-operate with the Duke of Eng-hien, may be clearly and satisfactorily explained.

Anxious to convince, or corrupt the leading members of the government, Mazarin sent Servien a second time to the Hague, for the purpose of obtaining a suspension of all further proceedings with the Spanish court, till the French treaty should be equally advanced. In addition to this important concession, he was to endeavour by every means to extort a promise, that whenever the conditions of

peace should be agreed upon, they should be reciprocally guaranteed by both nations, in conformity to the treaty of 1635. The situation of affairs however was totally altered; the protection of France was no longer essential to the independence of Holland, and her influence of course had considerably abated.

Opinions, however, were greatly divided respecting the measures which ought to be embraced in the actual crisis of affairs. The partisans of France, a powerful body, though daily decreasing in numbers, insisted that the republic could never be secure, while Spain retained a single fortress in Flanders; and they in consequence recommended the strenuous prosecution of hostilities, in conjunction with France, till the whole of the Netherlands should be wrested from the dominion of Philip, and divided in conformity to the original compact. This plan was warmly supported by the young Prince of Orange, from interested motives, because it was highly improbable that he should be able to maintain his authority against the repeated attacks of the opposite faction, when the republic had no longer any danger to apprehend from foreign invasion. A second party, composed of what are usually denominated moderate men; that is to say, of persons whose weak understandings and timid minds are incapable of decision, professed themselves anxious to terminate a contest, which exhausted the strength of their country, but thought an honourable peace most likely to be obtained by treating in concert with France. But the far greater number inclined to accept the offers of Spain; if possible, without coming to a rupture with France; but at all events to take advantage of

the favourable disposition manifested by Philip for bringing the contest to an amicable termination. One of the strongest arguments adduced in defence of this opinion, was the danger to which the republic might be exposed, from allowing all the highest offices of the state to remain so long in the same family, because continued possession might confer a kind of hereditary claim to something like a perpetual dictatorship. Influenced by these considerations, the republican faction delayed the inauguration of the young Prince of Orange, for some time after the death of his father, in order to convince him, that the power with which he was invested did not descend to him as a right by regular descent, but was derived from the suffrage of his fellow-citizens. The losses sustained by the great mercantile houses from the continual depredations of the Spanish privateers, the immense expense of insurance, and the difficulty of raising the necessary supplies for continuing the war, were successively urged as additional motives for peace.\*

From the general feeling it was easy to foresee that the latter opinion would prevail; and, indeed, while Servien was exerting all the powers of eloquence for the purpose of convincing, or misleading the states, a provincial treaty was concluded at Munster in spite of the opposition of D'Avaux.† Servien, however, was fortunate enough, after experiencing a thousand difficulties, to prevail upon the government to renew the alliance with France, so far at least as it tended to secure both nations

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\* Bougeant, iii. 136.

† The definitive treaty was not signed till the month of January, 1648.

against any future aggression on the part of Spain. But its operations were subject to the condition, that perfect harmony should be established between the courts of Paris and Madrid, as well as to various other contingencies, by which the advantages expected by the former power were considerably restricted, and an opening left for the Dutch to elude the engagement, in case interest should tempt them to prevaricate.

After establishing an amicable correspondence with Holland, the Spanish ambassadors grew every day more indifferent respecting the issue of the negotiation with France. Mazarin, on the contrary, began seriously to repent his equivocating conduct, and would gladly have ensured the tranquil possession of the conquests in Flanders, by leaving the Spaniards in the uninterrupted enjoyment of those provinces, which still obeyed their authority. But finding the disposition of the enemy far less pacific than he expected, he resolved to hasten the treaty with Austria, that he might be able to direct all the resources of France against the sovereign of Mexico and Peru. The Spanish minister, though fully aware of his design, was by no means alarmed at the prospect, because he was convinced, that the benefits which his master might derive from restoring tranquillity to the empire, would outweigh its disadvantage. France would undoubtedly have more troops to employ in Italy and Flanders; but might not this augmentation of disposable force be balanced by the assistance which Spain would receive from the German catholics, whose zeal would induce them to support the orthodox faith, in defiance of every precaution? and, when the enemy should be reduced to his national resources, what more could

he expect than to preserve the conquests he had made? Hence nothing would be risked by continuing hostilities, though much eventual good might accrue.

If we attended solely to the representation of the French historians, we might be tempted to accuse both Sweden and Holland of want of generosity, if not of gratitude. But if we examine the conduct of both those nations with an unprejudiced eye, we shall form a very different estimate—though, in general, they certainly acted with a prudence and attention to their own particular interests. The haughty prelate, who governed in the name of Anne of Austria, would not have scrupled to sacrifice the happiness and independence of every nation in Christendom, except that which he insulted by his pride and ostentation, to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs. The lives and comforts of all foreign people appeared to him to be objects of little importance, compared with the acquisition of Dunkerque or Lerida. But, fortunately for the Dutch, the duplicity of his character was too notorious any longer to deceive. They well knew, that, in spite of his professions and promises, he would not delay the treaty a single day, provided his exorbitant demands were complied with.\*

Repeated disappointments had so totally obliterated every hope of peace, that the cessation of hostilities between Spain and Holland was hailed as the prelude to happier times. Hitherto the influence of the former had been successfully exerted for the purpose of prolonging the sufferings

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\* Woltmann, ii, 118.

of the Germans. Mazarin also had been equally active in his endeavours to prevent a reconciliation from taking place between Philip and the Dutch, upon principles equally disinterested; but, though the contest was reduced within narrower limits, the facilities to a treaty were not proportionably increased. The cardinal's vanity disdained to relinquish a foot of ground that was subject to the dominion of Louis; while the Spanish minister was equally disinclined to purchase peace at the expense of national honour. Anxious to employ the armies, which desolated the banks of the Rhine and the Danube, for the subjugation of Flanders, the cardinal suffered the treaty with Austria to proceed as fast as the necessary forms would allow, while his rival regarded his conduct with indifference, persuaded that, when both nations were left to their internal resources, the ascendancy of Spain would be confirmed.\*

All the reputation and talents of Trautmansdorf were required to prop the falling fortunes of Austria, and to contend against the duplicity of Mazarin, whose projects varied with every vicissitude of fortune. The insurrection at Naples excited the hope of being able to wrest that valuable country from the dominion of Philip; and, it is far from impossible, that this might have been accomplished, had not an unconquerable jealousy of all talents and virtues prevented his assisting the gallant Duke of Guise, till his fate was inevitably decided. Timidity and ambition were constantly at variance in the heart of the favourite of Anne of Austria. The latter incited him to per-

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\* Woltmann, ii. 130.



severe with renovated ardour till the enemy should be reduced to submission; but the former checked his activity, by pointing out the dangers which were likely to arise from perseverance. France was internally in a state of commotion. The parliaments disapproved the ministers' measures, and manifested a spirit sufficient to alarm a more resolute statesman. By obstinately refusing to sheath the sword when the contest might be terminated advantageously, his administration would be exposed to merited censure, and fresh pretexts afforded for peculiar clamour.\* This exposition may serve to place many of his actions in a more conspicuous light, and will, in some measure, account for the unmerited treatment which D'Avaux experienced, and to which the Duke of Longueville would, in all probability, have been equally exposed, had not Mazarin been restrained by the dread of encountering the formidable resentment of the house of Condè.

\* Servien, who concealed under the mask of austerity all the accomodating versatility of a courtier, submitted adroitly to partake with the cardinal all the odium excited by protracting hostilities, at a time when the nation universally believed that they might be terminated with glory and advantage; but his colleague disdained to conciliate the favour of an all powerful minister, by the sacrifice of popularity. In consequence of this disinterested conduct, D'Avaux was recalled at the moment when he was about to attain the reward of all his services, by signing a treaty, to the success of which he had so eminently contributed by his prudence,

sagacity, and indefatigable exertions. Neither was this disgrace (if that term can justly apply to the situation of a man, who falls a victim to ministerial intrigue) the consequence and punishment of error or treachery, but the triumph of jealousy and cabal.

After the arrival of the Duke of Longueville, Servien deemed it expedient to dissemble his animosity towards D'Avaux; and they accordingly met, and conversed with apparent cordiality, at least without ever disputing. But the unexpected failure of the former, in his endeavours to establish such an ascendancy in the councils of Holland, as might enable France to direct them in future, while his colleague acquired additional glory at Osnabruck, awakened his envy afresh, which was not a little embittered by the unqualified praises bestowed on D'Avaux by numerous partizans. Every encomium lavished upon his rival was regarded as a satire upon himself, and attributed to the malice of a secret cabal, which wished to deprive him of the distinctions he merited by long and laborious service. After his return to Munster all political concerns were neglected, or at least rendered subservient to resentment. Memorials were daily addressed to M. de Lionne, replete with invectives against D'Avaux, which, though totally unfounded, were welcomed and patronized by the partiality of the friend to whom they were sent, and by him repeated to Mazarin with such comments and explanations, as were best calculated to excite the indignation of the minister.

No specific charges were made, because they must infallibly have impaired the credit of their author. The method resorted to was more dex-

trous and destructive, requiring no positive proof, and resting on whispers and inuendoes. The character of Mazarin, it was pretended, had been treated by D'Avaux with little respect: his talents had been undervalued—his motives misrepresented. Suspicions, conjectures, anonymous rumours, the report of a stranger, the insinuations of a domestic, were successively brought into action. This was attacking the cardinal in his most vulnerable part. The plot was successful; D'Avaux was recalled, and forbidden to appear at court; and it is probable that he might have languished for years in exile, had not Mazarin, amid the turbulence of domestic dissension, required the support of his brother, the President de Mesmes; and, in order to insure it, D'Avaux was recalled, and placed at the head of the finances.\*

The duplicity of Mazarin had so completely disgusted the allies, that the influence of France decreased every day; and it was manifest to all Europe, that, if she wished to avoid the disgrace of being abandoned by every friend, she must hasten to terminate the contest. The moment was favourable for the attempt; the pride of Austria had received a fresh humiliation by the capture of Prague, and had neither general nor army to depend upon. In such a situation an obstinate perseverance on his part must unavoidably have conducted to ruin. Such was the counsel of prudence and Trautmansdorf; and, as the emperor was wise enough to listen to their advice, the wounds of humanity were healed.

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\* Bougeant, iii. 398.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

The conditions and consequences of the Peace.

THE articles of the peace were arranged in such a manner, that the conditions exclusively relating to France were confined to the treaty of Munster, and those which individually regarded Sweden, were inserted in that of Osnabruck; while those of equal importance to both were introduced without any distinction. The question most interesting to both nations was that of their respective indemnities. The pretensions of the Swedes were at first extremely exorbitant. They demanded the whole of Pomerania, together with several of the richest sees in Northern Germany, to be converted into secular principalities, and even extended their ambition to the possession of Silesia. The spoliation of the church, and the consequent detriment to the princes who still adhered to the ancient religion, was calculated to excite the most violent opposition on the part of the catholics, and it was supposed also, that the emperor would warmly object to the proposal. Contrary, however, to the expectation of his still numerous adherents, he preferred to satisfy the enemy at the expense of the church, rather than by dismembering the Austrian territory. So that when Sweden withdrew her claim to any part of his hereditary dominions, she obtained without difficulty the whole of Upper Pomerania, together

with several places of considerable importance in Lower Pomerania.\* In Mecklenburgh she acquired the city of Wismar, so valuable on account of its maritime situation. To these were added the rich sees of Bremen and Verdun, both secularized after their chapters and religious foundations had been abolished.† It was by no means the wish of the Swedish government that their territories should be separated from the empire; on the contrary, they preferred to hold them as fiefs; because, in that case, their sovereign would become a member of the Germanic confederacy, and enjoy a seat and vote in the diet.

The Elector of Brandenburg had an incontrovertible claim to the whole of Pomerania, as the legal representative of Bogislaus. It could not therefore be supposed that he would consent to relinquish that valuable duchy, without receiving an adequate compensation. Hence many difficulties occurred in settling the terms of the indemnities; but, after various negotiations, it was ultimately decided, that the bishoprics of Minden, Camin, and Halberstadt, should be given to Prussia; and that the see of Magdeburgh should also be ceded to her after the death of the actual possessor, Prince Augustus of Saxony, to whom it had been granted by an imperial rescript, with the title of administrator.

In return for the cession of Wismar, the Duke of

\* Stettin, Dam, Gartz, Golnau, and the Isle of Wollén.

† Putter's *Development of the Political Constitution of the German Empire*, a work of extraordinary erudition. I am unfortunately compelled to refer to an indifferent translation, because the long interruption of intercourse with the continent has prevented me from procuring the original. *ib.* 61.

Mecklenberg obtained Swerin and Ratzeburg, at the expense of the church; together with Mirow and Nemorow, two commanderies belonging to the order of St. John.\*

The princes of Brunswick being materially injured by the secularization of some of the Saxon bishoprics, of which they had obtained the reversion, it was settled that the valuable see of Osnabruck should be alternately occupied by a catholic prelate and a Hanoverian prince; and, in consequence of this arrangement, it is now actually held by the Duke of York.

Notwithstanding the Langrave of Hesse Cassel had no positive claim to any compensation, because he had contributed nothing to the satisfaction of the Swedes; yet, in consideration of the many and important services which William V. had rendered to the protestant cause, as well as of the fidelity with which his widow had adhered to his engagements, the rich Abbey of Hersfeld was annexed to the langraviate, as a signal mark of the gratitude of a nation, which recollected that the husband of Amelia Elizabeth was the first sovereign in Germany, who declared in favour of Gustavus Adolphus.†

The territory allotted to France was of the highest importance to her future security; and (which contributed greatly to enhance its value) was for the most part acquired by the spoliation of Austria. Notwithstanding the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, had been subject to the dominion of the Gallic monarchs for little less than a century,‡ they had never been officially ceded. The strong fortress of Pignerol was likewise annexed to

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\* Putler, ii. 65.

† Bougeant, ii. 326—355.

‡ Since the year 1552.

the crown of France; which, in order to secure a footing in Germany, obtained the privilege of garrisoning Philipsburg; but Louis's most important acquisition was Alsace, in return for which he engaged to pay three millions of livres to the Archduke Ferdinand Charles, to whom it had fallen as an appanage.\*

Next to that of providing for their own retribution, no consideration appeared more momentous to the allies, than to secure those, who had espoused their cause against the future resentment of Austria; lest, when no longer engaged in foreign warfare, she might seek a compensation for every sacrifice in the plunder and oppression of the protestants. It was in consequence proposed, that a general amnesty should be granted, and that all things should be replaced upon the ancient establishment, as they existed previously to the commencement of hostilities. No plan could have been more repugnant to the interests of Austria; because, by reverting to the year 1618, the Palatine would not only have been restored to the electoral dignity, but would have recovered his hereditary dominions. This period also affected many of the confiscated estates, which had been seized by the late emperor during the troubles in Bohemia, and distributed among his partisans and favourites. Foreseeing that such a claim might possibly be made, whenever a congress should assemble, Ferdinand III. promulgated a decree,† by which a pardon was granted, upon certain conditions, to all who returned to their allegiance; but this act of magnanimity, for such it was called in the courtly dialect

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\* Putter, ii. 67.

† At the diet held at Ratisbonne in 1641.

of flattery, was so limited in its operations, that it was merely an ostentation of mercy.\*

But as neither the pride, nor the avarice of the imperial faction, would consent to relinquish the confiscated property; and the allies insisted, with equal pertinacity, that no injury should accrue to their faithful adherents from their attachment to the protestant cause, a compromise was at length proposed and accepted; by which it was settled, that the Bohemian exiles should recover those estates, which had been taken from them after their junction with the enemies of Austria, but not those which had been previously forfeited.

The reinstatement of the Palatine formed a separate point of debate, and led to the most serious discussions. Both parties, however, having at length agreed to approximate by mutual concessions, an arrangement was entered into, by which the ancient electoral dignity remained with the house of Bavaria; but, by way of compensation to the descendants of the unfortunate Frederic, an eighth electorate was created, to continue till the extinction of the Wilhelmine branch, when the Palatine would recover his proper rank among the princes of the empire. The Upper Palatine, and the county of Cham, were also ceded to Bavaria.†

The same principle was applied to the minor states, though subject to some limitations. Most of the members of the confederacy recovered their property; but, in some particular cases, as in that which

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\* With respect to secular claims, it was restricted to the year 1630; but in ecclesiastical ones it was rather more liberal, and extended to 1627.

† Putter, ii. 70.



regarded the succession to the duchy of Juliers, the decision was left to the diet.

The main object, for which the war had been undertaken, having been to set bounds to the despotism of Austria, and to secure to the protestants the free exercise of their religion, as a right, and not as a favour, the attention of the negociators was particularly directed to the improvement of the Germanic constitution. But, as it might have shocked the prejudices of over delicate consciences, to have beheld the rigid enemy of heresy in France declare himself the champion of toleration in Germany, all questions regarding the protestant worship were debated at Osnabruck, and inserted only in the convention with Sweden, while those which related to political affairs, came equally under the cognizance of both nations, and were inserted in both treaties.

After fully confirming the convention of Passau,\* and the religious peace,† it was specifically declared,

\* The treaty of Passau was a convention between Maurice of Saxony and Charles V. by which the Landgrave of Hesse regained his liberty, and certain regulations were established for the protection of the protestants, to be in force till a diet should assemble.—Robertson's Charles V. iii. 260.

† The religious peace was concluded by Charles V. in a diet at Augsburg, in 1555, at the instigation, and with the assistance of his brother Ferdinand, who afterwards succeeded to the imperial throne. The following are its principal enactments: That all princes and cities, who have notified their adherence to the "Confession of Augsburg," should be allowed to exercise the rites which it sanctions, without the smallest molestation whatever; that the protestants on their side should give no interruption to those who still adhered to the ancient religion; that persuasion and argument should be the only means employed for the termination of any religious disputes; that the popish ecclesiastic should pretend to no jurisdiction in those states which had embraced the Confession of Augsburg; that the benefices seized before the treaty of Passau should remain with their present possessors; that the mode of worship to be practised in any particular state, should be regulated by the estab-

that the Calvinists, as well as the Lutherans, should enjoy the benefit resulting from that celebrated treaty. This decision was regarded as a memorable triumph over the disciples of St. Ignatius, who had flattered themselves, by the negligent manner in which many of the former articles were worded, that they had reserved at least one Christian sect for persecution. Every question which had occasioned, or was likely to excite, any serious dispute, between the followers of the Saxon theologian and those of the gloomy teacher of predestination, was provided for with laudable caution. Points, formerly settled by specific agreements, were left untouched, the provisions being only prospective; it was however enacted, that should any prince, in future, abandon the tenets of Luther for those of Calvin, or *vice versa*, he should not only be permitted to practise his religious duties with unshackled freedom, but to extend the same indulgence to every one who was inclined to follow the example of his sovereign. This permission, however, was in no degree to trench upon the freedom of his subjects, or to affect their religious opinions. Neither were any changes to be introduced in the established worship, in the application of the ecclesiastical revenues, or in the system of public education.\*

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lished authorities; but that those who refused to conform to the will of the sovereign, should have liberty to remove with their property; that if any ecclesiastic in future should abandon the papal communion, he should vacate the benefice which he held, and a successor should be appointed, as if the former incumbent had died.—Robertson's Charles V. iii. 332. Putter, i. 467.

\* In conformity to this principle, the House of Brandenburg, which had embraced the Calvinistic faith in 1613, when it got possession of Magdeburg, had a right to found one Calvinist church for its private

• The differences subsisting between the partizans of Rome and the friends of the Reformation demanded a different treatment; because the line of separation between both communions was marked too distinctly, and their mutual antipathies were too deeply rooted, to admit of the smallest approximation. Unabating hatred toward each other formed an essential attribute of the rival religions; and the papists would as soon have abolished their pageantries, and the disciples of Calvin adopted them, as condescended to yield in the most indifferent article to the prejudices or opinions of their opponents. While equally slaves to pride and obstinacy, it was fortunate for both that any expedient could be devised for terminating hostilities between them, without attempting to decide how far the doctrines of either church were conformable to those of the gospel. After various discussions, all tending to envenom the bitterness of zeal, an idea happily occurred, that all disputes might be settled by determining the question according to the existing state of ecclesiastical property at a given period. By this chronological reference both clerical pride and popular prejudice were spared the humiliation of bowing to the acknowledged superiority of a rival, in points relating either to legal distinctions, or ecclesiastical dogmas. The propriety of establishing some such general principle having been readily admitted by all parties, the only question that remained for ulterior discussion regarded the selection of the time. This,

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convenience, which was done at Hallé, but in all other places of public worship, the Lutheran rites were preserved; and, when an university was subsequently endowed, all the professors were necessarily Lutherans.

however, was a point of too much importance to be easily settled; but, by the mediation of Trautmannsdorf, it was finally determined, that the year 1624 should be adopted as the definitive epoch; all reckonings to be taken from the first of January, whenever such a proceeding should be practicable.\*

By this happy invention, the future appropriation of all ecclesiastical benefices was permanently and pacifically settled. Of course those religious establishments, respecting which any previous arrangements had been made with Sweden, or any of her allies, were not included in the number; but all other foundations were to remain exactly in the situation, with regard to religion, in which they stood on the 1st of January, 1624, whether they were at that time subject to a catholic or a protestant sovereign.

Thus the long pending contest concerning ecclesiastical reservation, the source of such bitter animosity, was laid at rest; and, it was farther enacted, that in case the possessor of a benefice should change his religion, the benefice should be vacated, and a successor appointed, professing the tenets which he had abandoned.

The spiritual jurisdiction of protestant bishops over catholic subjects, as well as that of catholics over protestants, was regulated according to the same general rule; but, it was at the same time agreed, that nothing should be exacted, by either party, repugnant to the "Confession of Augsburg." The rights of Diocesans were prudently confined to their respective territories a point of the highest

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\* Putter, ii. 76.

importance; because it was by no means unusual for the Romish prelates to assert a spiritual authority in protestant countries, which had formerly made part of their see, to the unspeakable annoyance of the inhabitants.

It was difficult to provide any adequate security, by which the unmolested enjoyment of their religious worship could be ensured to the protestant subjects of catholic states; because, though it might be easy to protect them against open persecution, it was almost impossible to find an effectual remedy against those lesser evils, which the pious ingenuity of a bigot might inflict. It was, therefore, resolved, that the free exercise of their religion should be granted to all, who enjoyed it at the period alluded to; and, that those who were not actually in possession of that right, should be permitted to remove with all their property without the smallest molestation. The sovereign also might order them to quit his dominions, but was obliged to allow them sufficient time to dispose of their estates, and was forbidden to impose any exorbitant duties, or to refuse them the necessary testimonials. But, as few men were sufficiently addicted to superstition, or so blind to the dictates of interest, as to deprive themselves of the talents of industrious mechanics, because they differed from them upon speculative questions of theology, it was agreed that the members of both churches should be left at liberty to practice their domestic devotions, even when they had no chronological claim to toleration; that they should have full permission to educate their children according to the principles they professed, and, that they should freely participate in all the benefits of civilized society, so

long as they continued to shew a becoming respect for the established worship of the country they inhabited.

The superstition of Ferdinand was alarmed at the idea of unrestricted toleration; and it was therefore requisite to modify the latter article, so far as it concerned his hereditary dominions. To a few of the principal nobility the free exercise of their religion was conceded; and permission was even granted to the inhabitants of certain towns in Silesia to erect Lutheran churches; but, with these limited exceptions, the wretched people were left at the mercy of a prince, whose opinions, in all ecclesiastical matters, were influenced by the sanguinary spirit of the Jesuits.

By these salutary provisions, the relative situation of the rival religions was materially altered. The papists no longer enjoyed any political superiority. In the different circles they alternately prevailed, but Germany ceased to be a Roman catholic state, as well as Switzerland, though a majority of the cantons were catholic.

It is true that the emperor still adhered to the papal communion, but catholicism was no longer a necessary qualification for holding the imperial sceptre. This question, indeed, had been never debated; but, as the protestants were excluded by no positive law, the point was still undecided, and remained open for future discussion, whenever the case should occur. Neither was it by the religious opinions of the sovereign that those of the nation were regulated: but it was not only in the equality of civil rights that the two religions were placed upon a footing; the numbers of their disciples were more nearly balanced than the pride of Rome was

disposed to admit; and, should the political consequence of the different states, with respect to revenue, population, or military strength, be assumed as a standard, it might have been difficult to determine on which side the scale would incline. Even in the different colleges no decisive superiority existed. In the assembly of the electors the secular votes were equal; but, in that of the cities the strength of the protestants prevailed; while, in the college of princes they were inferior to their opponents. Nothing, therefore, could be more conformable to the dictates of reason, than that no civil distinctions should be suffered to exist between the followers of Luther and those of the Roman pontiff. This accordingly became a leading principle in arranging the articles of the treaty; and, it was in consequence enacted, that all Germans, without the smallest regard to their religious opinions, were entitled to the enjoyment of similar privileges, and were subject to the jurisdiction of the same tribunals. As the surest method of preventing the infringement of a stipulation so essential to national tranquillity, it was established as a rule in the different courts of judicature, that the judges should be chosen in equal numbers from the members of both communions: but, when it was impossible to preserve a numerical uniformity, as in a diet, where attendance was optional, all differences respecting ecclesiastical affairs were to be determined by an amicable compromise. The ancient mode of imposing contributions upon the different states having frequently occasioned serious disputes, it was proposed, that in future, all questions of finance should be regulated upon a similar principle.

The reader must have observed, that at the West-

phalian congress only two religions were mentioned, because the Lutherans and Calvinists were both comprehended under the general denomination of "adherents to the confession of Augsburg." These, indeed, were the only sects possessing a legal claim to toleration, and the only ones which could pretend to the enjoyment of civil communities. This exception, however, by no means infers, that persons of any other persuasion were prohibited from settling in Germany, or that they were deprived, by unjust and tyrannical laws, of the fruits of industrious enterprise; on the contrary, there is hardly a country in Europe inhabited by such numbers of Jews. In Francfort particular streets are allotted for their residence, where they carry on an extensive and lucrative commerce; for, though not legally entitled to the privileges enjoyed by Christian traders, they are not only protected against every injury, but are indulged in the public exercise of the Mosaic rites, and frequent their synagogues, in open day, without being insulted by the populace, or fined by the magistrates.

Under a constitution so complicated as that of the German empire, where the authority exercised by the different states, in their respective domains, had never been clearly defined, disputes must have frequently arisen respecting the jurisdiction of the local tribunals, and the right of appeal from their sentences; for notwithstanding precedents were drawn from the remotest times, to shew that every sovereign possessed the highest attributes of justice, yet this prerogative had been contested by the emperors, as well as by the turbulence of the people. The former contended, that they could claim only such particular rights as had been an-



ciently conferred by investiture, but that these, unless unequivocally specified in the grant, did not convey all the prerogatives of sovereignty: the latter, of course, disputed those claims which curtailed their privileges, or interfered with their comforts. To provide against an evil, which gradually augmented during a period of general anarchy, an article was introduced into the treaty, by which it was expressly enacted, "That all the members of the Germanic confederacy should be protected in the legal exercise of their territorial rights, without being subject to the control of any superior power." These prerogatives, however, which were universally acknowledged to belong to the imperial crown, were not affected by this declaration, but were preserved inviolate under the title of "reserved rights." These, however, were confined within a narrow compass, and were rather the characteristics of feudal pre-eminence than the attributes of superior power.\* All the higher prerogatives belonging to sovereignty were expressly secured to the princes of Germany by the peace of Westphalia. From that time they enjoyed an uncontested right to contract alliances with each other for their mutual convenience, and even to enter into engagements with foreign powers, provided these engagements were not subversive of the public tranquillity, nor inconsistent with the duties which they owed to the empire and its legitimate chief. Thus they obtained the right of making peace and war, though restricted

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\* Viz. the right of conferring titles and academical honours, together with certain other prerogatives, such as that of granting permission to establish tolls, and even to coin money, which, though universally exercised by all the German princes, was supposed to have been originally derived from an imperial grant.—Putter, ii. 91.

from invading each other's dominions; which they were bound to respect, as constituting a part of the same political confederacy.

The convocation of diets had hitherto been regarded as a branch of the imperial prerogative, and they, in consequence, had never been summoned, except when it suited the convenience of Austria; neither had the privileges of the members been so clearly defined, as to prevent the emperors, wherever they found themselves strong enough to urge the unpopular claim, from pretending, that, notwithstanding they graciously condescended to consult their co-estates, they were not obliged to follow their advice. But the present opportunity appeared much too favourable for curtailing the imperial prerogatives, for the allies to suffer it to escape; and they, in consequence, insisted that the states should in future enjoy unlimited freedom of debate, particularly in all questions which regarded the enactment of laws; a declaration of war, the erection of fortifications, the formation of alliances, or the imposition of taxes: these were regarded as objects of such national importance, as to require the maturest deliberation. The Austrian ambassadors attempted to qualify this proposal, by introducing a clause, which stipulated for the reservation of every right belonging to the imperial crown; but when called upon to specify the privileges to which they alluded, they declined entering into particulars, thinking it more prudent to abandon an unfounded claim, than to bring the prerogatives of the emperor under discussion; for they were fully aware, that nothing is so dangerous to royal authority, as to become the subject of popular debate.

After clearly ascertaining the exact portion of power which belonged to the different members of the diet, it was essential to determine of whom it should be composed. The imperial cities, though always permitted to send their representatives, had been allowed only a deliberative voice; a grievance of which they had long complained. This restriction, when submitted to serious examination, appeared too ridiculous to be maintained, and it was in consequence determined, that they should henceforth be included under the general denomination of "states of the empire," and enjoy the privilege of voting accordingly.

In conformity to long established custom, the electoral college deliberated apart from that of the princes; and in case they agreed, the resolution was submitted to the consideration of the states; and, if sanctioned by them, it formed what was termed in forensic language "an opinion of the empire." But if the three colleges happened to disagree, the question was dropped, because a majority was insufficient.\*

The tribunals of justice were in future to be constituted, according to the established principle of religious equality; in order that no partiality might be shewn by the judges to their own theological tenets. For this purpose, it was enacted, that the imperial chamber should be composed of an equal number of persons of both persuasions; but, when the new assessors were appointed, a device was employed to destroy the happy effects of such an institution. Out of fifty judges, the number appointed by the treaty, twenty-four only were allowed

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\* Putter, ii. 97.

to be protestants; twenty-four also were allotted to the catholic states; but, as the remaining two were placed at the emperor's disposal, they were chosen from the ancient communion, and thus, contrary to the intention of the framers of the treaty, as well as to the principles upon which they acted, the papists obtained a majority.

The nomination of president of the imperial chamber was also left to the emperor, without any religious restrictions. But as many questions, respecting the formation of the inferior tribunals, were referred to the consideration of a diet, they were never satisfactorily explained; because the influence of the imperial court was always sufficient to prevent a decision, though unable to dictate the proceedings.

To regulate the functions of the aulic council,\* was a work of far greater difficulty; every attempt for that purpose being vigorously resisted by the Austrian ministers, who publicly declared, that no alteration could be effected in the constitution and privileges of that august tribunal, without annihilating the prerogatives of the imperial crown. And their opposition was so artfully conducted, that the congress actually separated without deciding whether the authority of the aulic council, or that of the imperial chamber, was superior. It has often been objected against this celebrated tribunal, that it had no regular mode of transacting business, but that its decrees were the result of private opinion, and consequently irregular and arbitrary. It is however generally admitted, that during the reigns of Ferdinand I. Matthias, and Rodolph II. certain

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\* See Appendix A.

instructions were drawn up by the express order of those emperors, to regulate the conduct of the aulic council ; but, it is contended, on the other hand, that these were not so much rules for the direction of judicial proceedings, as general hints to facilitate the transaction of business, by explaining the nature of the causes to which the attention of the judges should be particularly directed, and the forms to which they should adhere.

The force of this remark did not escape the sagacity of Trautmannsdorf, who endeavoured to obviate it by a positive assurance, that in future the aulic council should be guided by principles adopted by the imperial chamber, and conform to all its judicial regulations. This offer, though plausible, was unquestionably liable to many objections ; because, though the emperor might be desirous of establishing a perfect uniformity in the practice of both these courts, the thing was perfectly unattainable, those tribunals being radically different in their constitution, and designed for different purposes. This difficulty, however, was in some degree removed, by holding forth the prospect of an immediate reform, accompanied by a promise, that when the intended changes should be effected, they should be submitted to the consideration of a diet. To elude an immediate decision was the main object for which the Austrian ministers contended, well knowing that reforms, when delayed, are seldom carried into execution.

That the aulic council consisted entirely of catholics afforded another cause of complaint ; but this objection was in some measure removed by the conciliating policy of Trautmannsdorf, who consented to admit the regulation respecting religion, which

had been adopted by the imperial chamber. But this provision was rendered abortive by an imperial edict, limiting the number of the judges to eighteen, of whom only one third were to be protestants. This disproportion, however, progressively increased as the judges augmented, who, in the reign of Leopold, amounted to thirty-nine, all the additional members being catholic.\*

In spite of the acuteness of the ablest civilians, various clauses in the Westphalian peace were liable to different interpretations. The animosity subsisting between the rival religions made it probable that disputes would frequently arise, upon which the opinions of the judges might differ. Under such circumstances the cause was to be referred to a diet; but the article was worded with so much negligence, that many persons believed that it was the intention of the congress to revive an ancient statute, directing that in all cases, in which the sentiments of the assessors were equally divided, the casting vote should remain with the president. At the first establishment of the imperial chamber, a period when the darkness of the middle ages was hardly dispelled, this practice might have had its advantages; because few cases could occur of a nature too subtle to be decided by sense and experience, though unskilled in the nice distinctions of law, and unacquainted with the edicts of Justinian.

But when lawsuits began to be conducted in writing, and custom prevailed over reason, forensic discussions assumed a more laborious and intricate

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\* Putter, ii. 107.

character; and the advocate who could waste the largest portion of time in quotations and precedents, and could cite the pandects and institutes with the most pedantic facility, was universally admired as a prodigy of wisdom, and placed at the head of his profession. Thus law became a complex and separate study, depending no less upon a retentive memory than upon a quick and comprehensive understanding; and, like its twin sisters, theology and medicine, endeavouring to conceal the deficiencies of genius under the scholastic display of erudition. Men, who had nothing to assist them except sense and experience, were no match for these erudite practitioners, who were able, with the assistance of a little logic, to confound every distinction between right and wrong, till their opponents were silenced, if not convinced.

It, therefore, became necessary, to place at the head of every tribunal, a person thoroughly acquainted with all the quirks and quibbles of law; and to the hands of such a president it would have been highly dangerous to have confided the important privilege of deciding a cause, when the opinions of the assessors were divided. It may, therefore, fairly be presumed, that this was not the intention of the Westphalian congress, which, upon every occasion, manifested a strong inclination to circumscribe the authority of the emperor, though the inaccuracy of those, by whom the article was drawn up, left room for a different construction.\*

Since that time, however, many instances might be adduced of causes referred to the cognizance

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\* Putter, ii, 116.

of the diet by the imperial chamber; but, this has never been the case with the aulic council, though it is difficult to believe, that no difference of opinion should have ever prevailed; or, that all the protestant counsellors should not once have disagreed with their catholic colleagues, which alone was sufficient cause for an appeal.

While this question was agitating, it was strenuously contended by the Swedish plenipotentiaries; that previously to the despotic reign of Charles V. whenever a suit of importance, not immediately cognizable by the imperial chamber, was brought before the emperor, it had been customary for him to summon a certain number of princes to assist him with their advice and experience. The example of Maximilian I. was produced as an instance, who held such a court when the Landshut succession was contested by the house of Bavaria.\* Neither had Rodolph II. decided the dispute between the archbishop and citizens of Treves, without consulting the electors.†

This fact might have been established by such a variety of precedents, that it would have been fruitless for the Austrians to have disputed it. They, therefore, contented themselves with declaring, that the example of his predecessors would ever guide the conduct of Ferdinand; who would be always disposed to consult the princes of both religions, on all questions which regarded the internal tranquillity of the empire, or tended to promote its prosperity. This explanation appearing satisfactory, no positive obligation was imposed, and of

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\* Putter, ii. 118.

† Ibid.



course the emperor was left at perfect liberty to follow his own inclination. But as sovereigns are seldom disposed to abandon power which they are able to retain, the princes were never consulted; on the contrary, those acts, which had been formerly transacted by their advice, were left entirely to the aulic council.\*

This tribunal, in its infancy, proceeded with greater circumspection. Whenever cases relating to imperial grants, or to the investiture of fiefs, were brought under discussion, it modestly declined to pass a definitive sentence; but, after procuring all the information that could possibly be obtained, referred it to the decision of the emperor. Indeed, during the triumph of feudal ignorance, it had been customary for the sovereign to preside in person, in the different tribunals, when any intricate question was agitated; but, no instance occurs of his having ever attended the aulic council; on the contrary, he contented himself with examining the written documents, when officially transmitted for his inspection.

So long as this court continued a "college of state," and refrained from the exercise of all legal jurisdiction, this system was liable to very few inconveniencies; but, when it attempted to administer justice, a thousand objections might be started to it. All legal questions ought, then, to have been decided by competent judges, according to established forms of law; for how could it be supposed, that the head of the empire should be sufficiently versed in the intricacies of Roman jurispru-

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\* Putter, ii. 119.

dence, to determine according to the opinions of the accomplished Tribonian, and his nine learned associates. Perhaps it would be difficult to discover any method better calculated to evade an impartial decision, than that of submitting nice points of law to the judgment of a man, accustomed to untie the Gordian knot with a sword. By a reference to the emperor, a wide field was opened for the insinuations of faction, the activity of intrigue, and the violence of sectarian prejudice. This is said actually to have happened during the reign of Ferdinand, when every cause was submitted to the examination of a Jesuit, before a definitive sentence was pronounced; so that the lives and property of German people depended upon an order, which would have regarded no decision as repugnant to equity, which tended to strengthen the pillars of the church, or to augment the authority of its pontiff. By judges, not more enlightened than a prince, or a confessor, what incalculable mistakes must have been committed; even supposing them free, a difficult hypothesis, from the influence of party or superstition; but when the two latter contributed to bias their judgment, it was natural to expect, that reason and justice would be sacrificed to the bitterness of zeal, and to the extension of the royal prerogative.\*

Independently of the power exercised by the emperor, as head of the two supreme tribunals, according to the practice of the middle ages, his authority extended over the mediate members of the Germanic confederacy, in concurrence with that of

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\* In 1580—Putter ii. 125.

their ordinary government; so that any person was at liberty to appeal to the imperial courts, established in different provinces, if he preferred them to those of his legitimate sovereign. But the far greater part of those provincial tribunals have long fallen into disrepute; because, according to the present constitution, every state possesses an exclusive jurisdiction within its own domain, and acknowledges no superior power.

It was unhappily the fate of many important questions to be referred to a diet, instead of being definitively settled at the congress. One of these related to a subject of no less moment than the capitulation of the emperors at the time of their election. This had been always drawn up by the electoral college, and submitted to the inspection of the other states, by whom it was sanctioned as a matter of course, so long as the electors were supposed to have had no object in view, except the general welfare of the empire. But in the capitulation presented to the Emperor Matthias, certain clauses were inserted, tending to increase their own consequence and authority, at the expense of the other members of the confederacy. This naturally excited universal discontent; and, in consequence of a remonstrance presented to the congress, a permanent capitulation was framed, intended to serve as a precedent for the latest posterity, and to form a kind of constitutional law. This, however, like all the proceedings of the Germanic states, when acting as a corporate body, was exposed to so many unnecessary delays, that no definitive arrangement took place till 1711, when, by an amicable compromise, the privilege of capitulating remained with the electors; but under the express condition, that no

alterations should be inserted in the instrument, unless with the knowledge and approbation of the other chambers.\*

An attempt was likewise made to prevent the imperial dignity from becoming hereditary in the Austrian family; for notwithstanding the German throne was universally admitted to be elective, yet at the time of the Westphalian congress, it had been filled, during the space of two hundred years, by the descendants of Rodolph of Hapsburg. This uninterrupted succession arose almost entirely from the venality of the electors, induced by the prospect of personal advantage, to consent to the election of a king of the Romans, during the life of the reigning monarch. No provision could be found in the "Golden Bull," by which this practice was authorized; because that celebrated production of pedantry and pride, provided only for the appointment of an emperor, leaving the choice entirely to the electors. It became, therefore, a question of intricate solution, not only whether this right legally extended to the choice of a successor, before the throne was actually vacant, but whether such a measure was consistent with the principles of the Germanic constitution, and conducive to the prosperity of the empire. Now, as it was a much easier task to purchase the support of seven individuals, than to conciliate a nation convulsed by religious and political dissensions, it was proposed to extend the elective franchise to the other states; and, as this project tended to diminish the influence of Austria, it was warmly supported by France and Sweden. No

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\* Puffer, ii. 127.

specific remedy, however, being applied, the question was left to a diet, which did not assemble till after Ferdinand III. had accomplished the election of his son. This abuse, for in fact it must be considered as such, continued till 1711, when the two superior colleges agreed in a resolution, "not to proceed hastily to the election of a king of the Romans, unless some extraordinary occurrence should require it—such as the emperor being obliged to absent himself from Germany for a considerable period, or becoming incapacitated from performing the functions of government, either by the pressure of age, or mental derangement. Under such circumstances, it might be essential to the tranquillity of Germany, that a king of the Romans should be chosen." Notwithstanding the meaning of this resolution was far from equivocal, it has given rise to much serious discussion, whether in any cases, except those specifically mentioned, it was lawful to proceed to an election? and to whom the decision of this point belonged? There is, however, in great political questions, a more powerful agent than reason. Force was clearly on the side of the electors, when acting in concert with Austria; and, we accordingly find, that in 1764, the necessity of appointing a successor to the imperial throne during the life of the emperor, was decided by the electoral college alone, without consulting the other states.\*

It would be trespassing gratuitously upon the patience of an English reader, circumstantially to enumerate the various objects of political reform,

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\* Putter, ii. 129.

successively submitted to the congress, and which, for reasons which it is now unnecessary to explain, were, the most part, referred to a diet: although such as affected the principles of the Germanic constitutions have again acquired a permanent interest, since Europe has burst the disgraceful shackles, by which she was held in thralldom, whilst those which relate to local immunities have only a local importance.

Enough has been said to convey an adequate notion of the extensive operation of the Westphalian peace with regard to the internal situation of Germany. At the very moment, however, when every obstacle was apparently removed, and nothing remained except to give a legal form to the proceedings, two fresh questions arose of such infinite moment, that the utmost moderation and temper were required to prevent every thing from being thrown into confusion. All the points in contest, between the states and the emperor, had been brought to a happy conclusion. The only one liable to the smallest dispute regarded the manner in which the various provisions, contained in the treaty, should be carried into execution. These regarded the acts of restitution, which affected almost every member of the confederacy, and tended particularly to diminish the strength and resources of the catholic powers. It was also a matter of general concern, by what means the existing grievances should be removed without the possibility of recurrence; and, within what period the provinces in the occupation of the enemy should be evacuated.\*

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\* Putter, ii. 150.

While these questions were in agitation, a deputy arrived from the Swedish camp, commissioned to demand twenty millions of dollars as an indemnity for the sufferings of the army. By virtue of the authority, with which he was invested, Ersken required security for the payment of this exorbitant sum, and promised in return that the fortresses should be evacuated the moment his request was complied with. A claim so unexpected occasioned universal consternation, because it was openly countenanced by the Swedish ambassadors, who declared their concurrence in the justice of the demand, and their firm resolution to support it. Nothing, therefore, remained, except to endeavour by every means to mitigate the avidity of the troops; and, a negociation being undertaken for that purpose, the army was at length prevailed upon to accept five millions of dollars. Though all the circles might reasonably have been called upon to contribute their share towards the payment, the whole burthen fell upon seven: Burgundy was exempted, because the King of Spain, to whom it at that time belonged, refused to become a party in the general peace; and neither Austria nor Bavaria were included in the obligation, upon the plea, that they were already sufficiently aggrieved in providing funds for the remuneration of their own armies.

The success of the Swedes induced the langravine of Hesse Cassel to insist also upon receiving some indemnity; and, though no claim ever rested upon a less solid foundation, it was at length admitted, in consequence of the efficacious support of France and her protestant allies.

The Westphalian peace professing to give a more liberal constitution to Germany, it was resolved

that all the changes which it introduced, should become fundamental laws of the empire, and that no attention should be paid to any protests, or remonstrances, which might hereafter be made against its enactments. A clause was in consequence inserted in the next recess, declaring every person, who should oppose their execution, guilty of a breach of the public peace, and requiring all constituted authorities to unite in exacting the most ample satisfaction.\* As guarantees to the treaty, the crown of France and Sweden obtained a permanent influence in the empire. That right, however, was not exclusively vested in them, but belonged equally to all the belligerents, though the superior resources of the two former rendered them in fact the guardians of the independence of Germany, and the assertors of its religious immunities. The calamities, however, to which Europe had been exposed, proved most powerful incentives to peace; for it was impossible to look back to the destruction of Magdeburg, and the desolation of the Palatinate, without trembling at the prospect of similar horrors, and preferring to submit to many inconveniencies rather than seek a remedy with the sword.

Scarcely, however, had the treaty been signed, than it was easy to foresee, from the delays which arose with respect to its ratification,† that many of the articles would never be executed, while it was possible for chicanery to elude them. From the Alps to the Baltic Germany resounded with mur-

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\* Putter, ii. 154.

† Three months were suffered to elapse without a single step being taken for that purpose, notwithstanding only eight weeks had been allowed for its final completion. Ibid. 158.



murs and complaints; the armies refused to disband, and the expense of maintaining them excited universal dissatisfaction. Under such circumstances it would have been highly inexpedient for the congresses to separate; because the intellect, which accomplished the stupendous work, was alone capable of giving effect to its labours.

At length, however, the ratifications being exchanged, an energetic rescript was issued by the emperor, enjoining instant compliance with the provisions of the treaty, and ordering the restitutions to be made without the smallest delay. This, indeed, was a most necessary precaution; for scarcely had the negociators quitted Osnabruck, when an attempt was made by some of their colleagues at Munster, to introduce a clause into the original treaty, which would have annulled several of its most salutary enactments. The object in view was to postpone the restitutions till the fortresses were evacuated, and the armies disbanded; and, when there were no longer any troops to enforce its execution, a thousand expedients might have been devised to evade it. But a vigorous remonstrance on the part of the Swedes disconcerted the project altogether.

History would be at best a barren study, were it confined entirely to the recital of facts. It is not the plunder of a town, or the passage of a river, which are interesting in the eyes of posterity, but the consequence produced by such events, with respect to the general balance of power. Neither do the ceremonials, observed by the different ambassadors, nor the violence with which they are sometimes asserted, constitute the essential parts of a treaty; but, the alteration which takes place in the

situation of the belligerents, either by the acquisition of territorial strength, or the increase of commercial prosperity. The peace of Westphalia attracts curiosity, not only because it put an end to those insolent pretensions, which had continually destroyed the tranquillity of Europe, since the pride and presumption of Charles V. aspired to give to the imperial crown a paramount authority over all the powers of Europe, but because it secured the enjoyment of civil freedom and religious toleration to the numerous sects which inhabited Germany. It may not, therefore, be inconsistent with our original plan, briefly to enumerate the changes produced in the constitution of the empire, which then assumed a permanent form, and acquired its proper strength and consistency.

Great political revolutions scarcely ever take place, without being previously prepared by a corresponding change in the habits and opinions of men. They do not resemble earthquakes and volcanoes, which swallow up cities by a sudden explosion, but act with progressive effect, like the silent stream, which gradually undermines the lofty bank, till its ruin is entirely completed. Since the fortunate period when Luther instructed his countrymen to examine those doctrines which they were commanded to receive as the tests of salvation, a spirit of inquiry had universally spread among all ranks and descriptions of persons; and practical abuses, as well as speculative theories, were become objects of general investigation. Little sagacity was requisite to foretel, that amidst the concussions of hostile sects, and the virulence of party, Germany, instead of remaining an undivided em-

pire, subject to the authority of a single chief, would recover its independence, in spite of the efforts of Austria to reduce it to a state of degrading servitude.

According to the principles established by the house of Hapsburg, the German princes were vassals of the imperial crown, holding their dominions in virtue of grants, either expressed or implied, emanating from their feudal lord, the legitimate head of the empire. It was farther pretended, that the uninterrupted possession of two hundred years had given the Austrian family a kind of prescriptive right to the throne of the Cæsars, and pointed them out as the only proper successors to Augustus, Constantine, and Justinian.

The power of the emperor was, however, so much circumscribed by that of the great feudal nobility, that it would be entertaining a very erroneous idea of the Germanic constitution, to consider it as placing unlimited authority in the hands of its political head. Every spiritual and temporal sovereign was in fact independent in his own dominions. The imperial cities formed so many distinct republics, and were governed by laws and local customs. Even the immediate nobility possessed many of the attributes of sovereign power within the limits of their private estates. Germany ought, therefore, to be considered as a great political confederacy, consisting of as many members as it had electorates, principalities, prelacies, imperial cities, and immediate nobility. These separate states were united together by a general league; connexion being perpetual, and consequently indissoluble, all were subject to the same fundamental

laws, and acknowledged the authority of one legitimate chief.\*

Traces of a similar constitution might be found in France before the duchies of Brittany and Burgundy were annexed to the crown. The most striking difference which existed, previously to the French revolution, in the government of the two countries, consisted chiefly in the following circumstances. First, the descendants of Pepin had preserved their own private domains, while the emperors, on the contrary, had lost them; and, secondly, all the great fiefs had been progressively united to the crown of France, while in Germany, even the hope of redeeming those territories, which from temporary distress had been alienated by mortgage, was abandoned for ever.

The general current of public opinion had been for a long time unfavourable to any augmentation of power on the part of the emperor. Yet, after the victories of Prague and Nordlingen, the ambition of Ferdinand aspired to realize the mighty projects of Charles V. by rendering the empire hereditary in the house of Austria. Against this daring attempt "the thirty years war" proved a successful struggle; and the peace of Westphalia put the question to rest, by establishing the independence of every member included in the Germanic confederacy. All doubts, which had previously existed, respecting the prerogatives of the imperial throne, and the rights of the different German potentates, were then for the first time satisfactorily explained, and the constitution established upon a

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\* Putter, ii. 166.

basis too solid for despotism to shake, or casuistry to undermine.\*

Germany from that time became, in fact, what it had ever been in theory, a compound body, consisting of various religions and states, connected together by reciprocal ties, the result of political expediency. Though every sovereign enjoyed, within his own dominions, an independent authority, he was still subject to the control of general laws, which could not be transgressed with impunity. When we consider the German constitution in this point of view, all uncertainty with regard to its fundamental principles, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical, will be instantly removed; because such mistakes have arisen from the wish of reducing every species of government to one of the abovementioned forms; though Holland and Switzerland afford ample proofs, that several states may unite in a political confederacy, without relinquishing their claims to independence.

In its quality, as a compound political body, Germany consisted of as many different parts, as it contained republics, or principalities. Considered as an empire, it possessed all the attributes of imperial sway; but the authority of its chief was limited by constitutional laws, so that he could take no step of importance without the concurrence of a general diet. But in another point of view, it bore some analogy to the Helvetic confederacy, though with this essential difference, that the various members were not merely connected by a congress of the states, but united under the government of

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\* Putter, ii. 168.

one supreme magistrate, endowed with monarchical, though not with absolute, authority.\*

Every principality, belonging to the Germanic confederacy, had its own peculiar system of laws and customs, and possessed every essential of independent sovereignty, as the administration of justice, the right of coining money, and of imposing taxes. It had besides its own military establishment, which might be augmented, or diminished, at pleasure; it could enter into alliances with foreign powers, and even make war against its constitutional chief, without incurring the ban of the empire.†

No jurisdiction could be exercised over the immediate nobility, except in the name of the emperor, though it had been frequently an object of serious dispute, whether this constituted a part of the imperial prerogative, or wanted the concurrence of the diet. This question, though agitated at the Westphalian congress, was never decided with sufficient accuracy to preclude all farther discussion; because the emperor pretended that no cases, except such as were specifically mentioned, came under the cognizance of the diet, while the latter endeavoured to extend its authority by the rules of analogy and implication. Though all measures were determined in that august assembly by the majority of suffrages, it differed materially in one respect, both from the parliament of Great Britain and the diets of Sweden and Poland. The latter consisted of private individuals, elected to represent the community, or possessing a vote by hereditary right; but in Ger-

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\* Putter, ii. 170.

† A right the King of Prussia has frequently exercised.

many the members were the actual sovereigns of the countries from which they derived their seats.\*

The emperor's consent was in general requisite to give validity to a decree of the diet; but this was not an invariable rule, because precedents might be produced to shew, that the joint resolution of all the states, or even that of a considerable majority, has acquired legal efficacy, even though the sanction of the emperor was refused.†

According to the Germanic constitution, as finally settled by the peace of Westphalia, every member of the confederacy was firmly protected against the tyranny of the emperor. Adequate provisions were likewise made to secure the welfare and tranquillity of each particular state, by the enactment of wise and salutary laws. Every member was authorized to introduce any regulations within his own domain, which neither clashed with the general interests of the empire, nor prejudiced the rights of any particular member. But in case any injury should arise, the person aggrieved might appeal to any of the higher tribunals, or refer his suit to a general diet; and these courts were always open to every complainant without the smallest distinction of persons.‡

Till the reign of Henry IV. the imperial crown had usually descended from father to son; but amid the dreadful dissensions with which Germany was convulsed at that disastrous period, every vestige of hereditary right disappeared.

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\* Putter, ii. 174.

† This has repeatedly happened with respect to the standard of money. Ibid. 175.

‡ Ibid. 177.

A considerable change, however, may be remarked at the election of Frederic I. who was chosen only by six, according to some historians, and according to others by eight, princes; all of whom were invested with those pompous offices, which were in the sequel attached to the electorates. At Frederic's coronation, the King of Bohemia officiated as cup-bearer; the Palatine as high steward; the Duke of Saxony as grand marshal; and the Marquis of Brandenburg as high chamberlain; which dignities, with the prerogative annexed to them, remained in those families so long as the German constitution existed.

The word *elector* is expressly mentioned in a grant from Frederic to the house of Austria, enabling the princes of that illustrious family to take place immediately after the electors. The city of Francfort was fixed upon as the place of election, and Aix la Chapelle appointed for the coronation. After that august ceremony was performed with the usual formalities, it was customary for the new sovereigns to proceed directly to Italy, that he might receive the crown of Lombardy at Milan, and the imperial diadem, from the hands of the pope, in the ancient capital of the Cæsars.\* This letter was regarded as a point of such infinite importance, that till the successors of St. Peter had given the sanction of the church, the German monarch was styled only "King of the Romans," in the presumptuous language of the Vatican.

Such, indeed, was the arrogance of those haughty priests, that they affected to regard the imperial

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\* Putter, i. 201.



crown in the light of a papal fief; and the coronation was in consequence called an investiture, an oath being administered to the emperor elect, upon the occasion, not very dissimilar from that which was taken by vassals, as a mark of allegiance. Such was the doctrine propagated by the partizans of Roman supremacy: that held by the Germans differed materially in every respect. According to the opinion of the latter, a paramount authority over the whole Christian world was annexed to the imperial dignity. They farther pretended, that the code of Justinian was obligatory upon every people who acknowledged the divinity of the Messiah. A monk, named Gratian, made a new collection of Roman laws, which, till the destruction of the papal government, formed the only jurisprudence of the Vatican. From the period of their publication, the canon and civil laws of the popes and the emperors; or, in other words, the spiritual and secular codes, mutually assisted each other; or rather were so blended and interwoven, that it was almost impossible to understand the latter, without a competent knowledge of the former. But, whenever any contradiction was discovered between them, ecclesiastical authority prevailed.\*

An intimate acquaintance with those celebrated codes required greater application, and a more accurate knowledge of the Latin tongue, as well as higher abilities, and more extensive information, than was necessary to practise in the German courts, where it had been formerly usual to decide according to provincial customs, enlightened by the prin-

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\* Putter, i. 203.

ciples of natural equity. Upon this account, the universities of France, England, and Italy, which daily increased in reputation and learning, made the study of jurisprudence a primary object of education. From these seminaries of wisdom or pedantry the Roman code was gradually diffused over the rest of Europe, till, in process of time, it began to be considered as the only rational system for the distribution of justice, and the protection of property.\*

The celebrity, which attended the university of Bologna, attracted crowds of students from the semi-barbarous nations of Northern Europe; who, when they recrossed the Alps, introduced to the knowledge of their less enlightened countrymen those civil codes, which they themselves had been taught to admire as the most perfect productions of human genius. Without this previous information, the celerity with which the pandects and institutes supplanted the local customs of Germany must appear altogether incredible. Among other innovations, the right of primogeniture, so precious in the estimation of feudal pride, was in danger of being totally abolished; because, in conformity to the principles of the Roman code, every proprietor was allowed the free disposal of his estates, and the invidious distinction between males and females was prescribed. This sudden alteration in the nature of feudal tenures threatened to subvert the fundamental principles of the Teutonic constitution, which depended entirely upon a rigid adherence to the rights of primogeniture. To obviate this diffi-

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\* Puffter, i. 204.

culty, recourse was had to the cruel expedient, of compelling daughters to renounce their claim to the patrimonial estate, or forcing them to retire into a cloister; thus preventing, by a violation of every parental duty, the operations of Roman jurisprudence.\*

Before the peace of Westphalia, it was no uncommon thing for the territorial lords to consider the country, over which they presided, as their private property, which they might dispose of, or manage as best suited their convenience, or caprice, and to look upon their subjects in the light of slaves created to administer to their pleasures. But by many of the provisions of that celebrated monument of genius and perseverance, they were instructed that princes, no less than peasants, had their respective duties to perform, and that they were placed by Providence in eminent stations, and endowed with riches and power, not to waste their lives in sensual indulgence, or the ostentatious display of magnificence, but to animate the efforts of industry by proper rewards, to encourage morality by virtuous examples, and to promote the welfare and prosperity of mankind.

It has been frequently said by the partisans of economy, that the thirty years proved no less injurious to Germany, by introducing a taste of foreign manners, than by the devastation and slaughter which attended it. Though we readily admit that a striking alteration took place, not only in the habits of domestic life, but in the morals and opinions of the people, we must consider the change

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\* Putter, i. 205.

as beneficial. Refinement and luxury succeeded to noisy mirth and convivial excess. A taste for literature and the fine arts was gradually diffused among the higher circles; pictures were collected, statues bought, and the unrivalled productions of Greece and Rome adorned the banks of the Rhine and the Danube.

## APPENDIX.

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(A.)

**T**HE aulic council is supposed by some historians to have been modelled after a court established, or revived, by Frederic II. at a diet held at Mentz in 1235; but this opinion appears erroneous, because that institution bore a greater analogy to the imperial chamber. It is far more probable, that the forms and proceedings of the latter inspired Maximilian with the ideas of establishing at his court a similar tribunal, for the determination of all causes, which came under his immediate cognizance. With this view he erected at Vienna, in 1581, a college of regency, an exchequer, and aulic council. The jurisdiction of the latter was of course as comprehensive as legal cunning, stimulated by the desire of gain, could make it; and it seems to have been the intention of the court-civilians to have extended their authority over all parts of the empire, as well as of the Austrian domains. This court originally consisted of eighteen members; five of whom were to be chosen from the different circles, the remainder to be composed of Austrian subjects. In the sequel, however, the pressure of business made it necessary to separate the affairs of the empire from those of the hereditary

states ; to the former of which the attention of the council was afterwards confined.\*

The members at first were regarded only in the light of counsellors, intended to assist the emperor with their advice in weighty and intricate business ; but it soon appeared that this was a mere political illusion, and that the object of Maximilian was of a nature which he dared not openly avow ; it being his intention to subject all the members of the Germanic confederacy to the paramount authority of this new tribunal. The first attempt which excited the attention of the public, was a summons issued by the members of the aulic council, commanding the Elector of Cologne to appear before them, to answer in person to the accusations preferred against him by some of his subjects. This bold endeavour to enlarge the imperial jurisdiction so far beyond its constitutional limit, led people to inquire, by which of his prerogatives the emperor was entitled to submit questions of law to his own private tribunal, when the imperial chamber had been established on purpose to decide them, and had been always regarded as the only competent court. The necessity of obeying the injunction was next debated. At the instigation of the elector, all the princes of the empire requested Maximilian to abolish a court erected without the sanction of a diet ; and which, if suffered to exist, must unavoidably interfere with the proceedings of the imperial chamber. This remonstrance, however, was attended with no permanent benefit ; because parties who ought to have pleaded before the latter, preferred the rival tribunal, either

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\* Putter, i. 368.

from the hope of obtaining an earlier hearing, or from the prospect of some other advantage.\*

Still, however, according to the established forms of the empire, a legal process could be carried on nowhere except in the imperial chamber; a tribunal universally regarded as superior to all others: many advantages accrued from the latter. Every individual was sure of obtaining an impartial trial; and, if injured, of meeting with redress. Add to this, it afforded to every state the means of placing the administration of justice upon an equal and permanent footing, thus abolishing the custom of waging private war, which had been carried to such an horrible extent as to render nugatory all judicial institutions, however excellent in their kind. This state of confusion could hardly fail to inspire a general wish for the erection of a supreme court of judicature, armed with power sufficient to restrain the lawless spirit which led to private hostilities; and to which it might no longer be regarded as derogatory from the privileges of illustrious birth to appeal.

The energetic conduct of the imperial chamber, and the happy results which attended it, occasioned the establishment of tribunals upon similar principles in the different provinces of the empire. The many advantages resulting from this institution contributed to reconcile the public to the aulic council, when it was found to act upon similar principles. The former consisted of a judge and several assessors, and so did the latter. In both the president was chosen from among the nobility; a curious institution in a country, where talents and virtues are not exclusively the attendants upon rank.

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\* Pütter, i. 360.

Most of the statutes enacted for the regulation of the aulic council were copied from those of the imperial chamber; while many of the improvements introduced to perfect the former, were subsequently adopted by the latter. Indeed, so general was the estimation in which both were held, that the German sovereigns thought themselves fortunate to procure, as judges, or assessors for their legal courts, persons who had acted as advocates in those eminent tribunals; hoping with their assistance to be able to establish a more perfect system for the administration of justice.

A striking chance was thus introduced in the constitution and proceedings of the different tribunals. The provincial courts were no longer restricted to the examination of private suits, but decided in cases of the highest importance. Formerly the petty quarrels of peasants and mechanics were referred to the decision of unlettered men, who judged according to the dictates of common sense, or the rude precedents of their barbarous predecessors. But, princes now thought it essential to their own reputation, as well as to the comfort and happiness of their subjects, to employ none in the character of bailiffs, or stewards, who had not studied the law as a profession. How far this was likely to conduce to the object in view, must be left to the decision of those who are best acquainted with the principles of petty practitioners.

By one of the statutes of the imperial chamber, it was enacted that, in future, every subject should be placed under the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals; for till that time he had been at liberty to appeal to the imperial courts. This was justly regarded as an important triumph, because it was followed



by the acquisition of various other privileges, all obtained at the expense of the emperor's authority.\*

From the first institution of the imperial chamber, the Justinian code was universally adopted by all the tribunals of Germany: but as Teutonic pride revolted at the idea of any innovation, the civilians insisted that Germany formed an integral part of the Roman empire, and that Maximilian and his predecessors from the earliest times were the legitimate representatives of the Cæsars, and of course were bound to conform to the code compiled by Tribonian and his learned associates. This change, however, did not entirely exclude the municipal law; for, in spite of the veneration universally entertained for the pandects and digests, the minds of the vulgar would have been shocked by the total dereliction of many local customs which time and habit had endeared, and which could not therefore be abolished with safety. These, however, were regarded, not as contradictions, but exceptions; not as alterations introduced by superior intelligence, but as sacrifices made to ignorance and prejudice.†

### (B.)

THE titles of counts and dukes, which were originally attached to certain governments conferred by the emperor, and not only absolutely dependant upon his caprice, but transferable with the office from one person to another, began to be considered in the reign of Henry V. as hereditary in the family by

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\* Putter, i. 372.

† Ibid. 374.

which they were then enjoyed. With respect to the different counties, which anciently belonged to the Duchy of Lorraine, such as Holland, Flanders, Namur, Hainault, and Friesland, they had been regarded as hereditary at a still earlier period, and conferred titles on their actual possessors. But in the extensive country which stretches from the Elbe to the Rhine, the word *grafshaft*, or county, was not used in the same sense in which it is now employed. Instead of serving as the geographical designation of a certain portion of land, according to its modern acceptation, it was merely an official title, and conveyed the idea of an extensive, but limited command. All counties were originally divided into cantons; and estates were described by the name of the canton in which they were situated; that of the count alone being mentioned, to whom the command of the district was entrusted. That dignity, however, was not hereditary; neither was it customary for the son to be appointed to the vacant office, though it occasionally happened. The nomination depended solely upon the pleasure of the sovereign, and might be transferred to another family.

About the beginning of the twelfth century hereditary claims, which till that time had been confined almost exclusively to Lorraine, began to be partially admitted in Germany. They did not, indeed, extend to the succession of entire cantons; but every count resided in a fortified castle, the domains of which consisted of family estates, which it would have been no less difficult than unjust to take from the heir. It is also probable, that when the command of a canton had been conferred two or three times, in a regular line from father to son, it might have been dangerous to have given it to another fa-

mily. Hence it gradually became customary to continue to the son, the government which his father had enjoyed, till after a few generations it was claimed as a right, and could not be safely disputed.—Putter, i. 186.

In consequence of this important change, the cantons no longer retained their original names; nor were their governors, as formerly, designated by the appellation of Henry, Louis, or Conrad, but were called after the castles in which they resided; and from those receptacles of plunder, and vulgar hilarity, the adjacent territory was denominated.

The word *gau*, or *canton*, seems to have been seldom employed after the year 1100, except to distinguish particular districts, as Rheingau, Argau, &c.; but it would be difficult to find a single county at present that terminates in *gau*. It was no unusual thing for families to change their names when they caused a new castle to be erected, as was the case with the house of Wittelsback, one of the oldest and most illustrious in Germany. The same thing also happened when two brothers divided the patrimonial estate, without perceiving any common appellation to shew that they sprung from the same stock. According to the ancient mode of succession, sons were invariably preferred to daughters; and when a baron, or count, left several sons, they inherited from each other, so long as they possessed the patrimony in common; but in the event of a complete separation of interests, the collateral branches had no claim to the succession; the estates being transmitted in the female line, whenever the male branch was extinct. About this period armorial bearings began first to be regarded with jealousy; because they were looked upon as proofs of the same descent, and of course

indicated the right of inheritance: for whenever the chiefs of a house ceased to hold their estate in common, and the right of mutual succession was abrogated, they ceased to bear the same arms. The duchies, and other secular principalities, were not so easily rendered hereditary, as the counties had been; but even that was accomplished during the struggles between the popes and the emperors. The same families who possessed them during the tempestuous reign of Henry IV. and his two immediate successors, have continued to enjoy them ever since, except such as have been deprived of their dominions by the chances of war, or a rigorous sentence of proscription. The Duchy of Lorraine, for instance, remained in the family of Duke Gesard, who lived in the time of Henry III. till Francis, the husband of Maria Theresa, exchanged it for Tuscany, by the peace of Vienna.—Putter, i. 192.

(C.)

THE distinction existing between the *mediate* and *immediate* nobility, is, I believe, peculiar to Germany; and, therefore, requires some farther illustration. Two objects are immediately related to each other, when nothing intervenes; but otherwise their connexion is only mediate. Thus a grandfather is mediately related to his grandchildren, while the relation subsisting between parents and children is immediate; and in one or other of these situations all the members of the empire were placed with respect to their chief. If a nobleman's estate was situated in a German principality, he was subject to the jurisdiction of its sovereign, and consequently

was connected with the empire so far only as his property formed a part of the principality to which it belonged. With respect to the empire, therefore, he was only a mediate member; but, in case of his possessing an independent county, or barony, he became an immediate one. Hence the Germanic confederacy might be divided into two bodies; the one mediate, the other immediate. Every immediate noble was virtually as much a member of the empire as the King of Prussia, or the Elector of Bavaria. But the mediate nobility, not being independent, did not enjoy a seat in the diet.—Putter, ii. 172.

(D.)

THE circumstances of the times were peculiarly favourable to such an innovation; for, by the death of Henry V. the reigning family became extinct, and of course an election was unavoidable. The choice of the electors, however, did not fall upon the issue of the female line, though Frederic of Swabia, and Conrad of Franconia, were both descended from sisters of the deceased emperor, and both flattered themselves with obtaining the diadem. Lotharius of Saxony proved the successful candidate; but, as he also died without male issue, and left only a daughter, her husband, who united the ducal crowns of Saxony and Bavaria, in vain solicited the honour of succeeding him. Conrad III. was chosen; and, after his death, his cousin Frederic I. and not his son, was raised to the throne by the unbiassed suffrage of all the electors. These three elections, which were perfectly free, and followed each other without interruption, so fully es-

tablished the right of chusing a sovereign, that it has never since been contested, even by the warmest admirers of hereditary monarchy.

The right of chusing a chief was exclusively vested in a small number of princes almost as soon as the throne became elective. But the case of Lotharius forms a kind of exception, as all the ecclesiastical and secular princes assembled with such numerous and splendid retinues, as to give the meeting more the appearance of a military encampment, than that of a civil convention. From so large a body unanimity of sentiment could hardly be expected; the business, however, was finally settled by a compromise between the most powerful members; those of an inferior order being obliged to rest satisfied with the empty compliment of being invited to give their concurrence.

THE END.

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